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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the nature of the thirteenth-century constitution by 
focusing on the minority of Henry III. It is argued that Henry’s succession to the 
throne was a demonstration of the complicated interaction between hereditary 
right, designation, and election. It is argued that the distribution of power within 
the government was, for the most part, ill-defined and varied throughout the 
minority’s course. It is also argued that there was a fundamental uncertainty 
about when the minority would end and what role Henry himself would play 
during the minority. Taken together, it is argued, these demonstrate that Henry’s 
minority was more of a political settlement than a constitutional settlement. This 
does not mean that England had no constitution during the thirteenth century 
but merely that it was more sensitive to the political dynamics of the time than 
perhaps modern constitutions are and that, compared to modern constitutions, it 
was much less well defined and lacking a clear unified philosophy.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Henry III’s minority, which lasted for over a decade, is constitutionally 
significant. It placed immense strains on the thirteenth-century political system, 
which somehow needed to balance legitimate with effective government. 
Henry’s accession may have guaranteed the former to some extent, but as he 
could not control the government, at least initially, it is difficult to see how he 
could have legitimized all of its operations. Furthermore, there was little that 
Henry could have done personally to ensure effective government either by 
managing the members of his government or through his own actions. His 
accession might have created a degree of stability in the long-term but, in the 
short-term, it threatened to paralyse the government and undermine the 
centralised English state.  
The strains induced by Henry’s minority were compounded by the lack of clear 
guiding constitutional principles and the fact that he inherited the throne when 
the country was in the throes of civil war. Therefore, not only was there the 
problem about how to structure the government, but there was also not much 
time to think about it. Moreover, the government was in dire financial straits and 
the institutions of central government were crumbling away; by the end of the 
war, only the chancery remained functional.1 One wonders whether this was the 
time for constitutional niceties. Considering the situation, Hillen and Wiswall 
said that Henry’s minority was a “crisis management response, rather than the 
articulation of any long-term constitutional principles”.2  
This thesis will argue that Hillen and Wiswall were correct in this respect: King 
John’s untimely death did result in a crisis in government and that it is difficult to 
reconcile the solutions to the crisis with all that had gone before. Whilst the 
institutions such as the exchequer and the general eyre were reinstated,3 other 
strange features appeared, such as an immensely powerful papal legate and 
the office of rector given to William Marshal. Furthermore, the structure of 
                                            
1
 David A Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III (University of California Press, 1990), 1–2, 52. 
2
 Christian Hillen and Frank Wiswall, “The Minority of Henry III in the Context of Europe,” in The 
Royal Minorities of Medieval and Early Modern England, ed. Charles Beem (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 17. 
3
 For the reinstatement of the general eyre, see: Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 96–103. 
7 
 
government was constantly reinvented without any real process; it always 
remained somewhat vague and reliant on the political tenability of its officers, 
which is best illustrated by Peter des Roches and Hubert de Burgh. This was 
not unique to Henry’s minority as all of the English minorities after Henry also 
saw ‘ad hoc innovations’.4 
Before proceeding, it is important to consider whether it is sensible to look at the 
thirteenth century through the lens of constitutional history, which has fallen out 
of favour with many medieval historians.5 This is because of the field’s 
association with the ‘Whig’ historians, such as Stubbs and Macaulay,6 who, in 
their writings, largely failed “to meet the past on its own terms and value it for its 
own sake.”7 For some historians, ascribing a constitution to the medieval period 
is a case in point: medieval England had no constitution and, therefore, any 
investigation into the constitutional history of the period is meaningless.8 This 
view, however, conflates ‘constitution’ with ‘modern constitution’, which is the 
same mistake made by the Whig historians. The difference is that whereas the 
Whig historians found a constitution and believed it was the modern one, those 
who rejected constitutional history could not see a constitution in the modern 
sense and concluded that there was no constitution at all. Every functioning 
political community has a constitution of some description,9 although the extent 
to which this is regarded as fundamental and supreme varies across time and 
place. Fully-fledged constitutionalism in the strong legalistic sense of a 
sophisticated notion of the rule of law was certainly not prevalent in medieval 
England. However, there was clearly a weak form of constitutionalism, which is 
                                            
4
 Charles Beem, “Woe to Thee, O Land? The Introduction,” in The Royal Minorities of Medieval 
and Early Modern England, ed. Charles Beem (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3. 
5
 For a discussion of the place of constitutional history in late medieval historiography, see: 
Christine Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” in The 
McFarlane Legacy: Studies in Late Medieval Politics and Society, ed. RH Britnell and AJ Pollard 
(Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1995), 175–206. See also: Christine Carpenter, Locality and Polity: 
A Study of Warwickshire Landed Society 1401-99 (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–10; 
John Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship (Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 1–
2. 
6
 For discussions of Whig history, see Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History 
(WW Norton and Company, 1965); JW Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the 
English Past (Cambridge University Press, 1981); Melinda Zook, “Early Whig Ideology, Ancient 
Constitutionalism, and the Reverend Samuel Johnson,” Journal of British Studies 32, no. 2 
(April 1993): 139–165. See also 5.1 in this thesis. 
7
 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 178. 
8
 See, for example, JC Holt’s claim that England had no constitution in the twelfth century: JC 
Holt, Magna Carta, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 23. 
9
 Carpenter, Locality and Polity: A Study of Warwickshire Landed Society 1401-99, 5; Watts, 
Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, 4. 
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demonstrated – amongst other things – by the veneration of the ‘laws of St 
Edward’, the use of the coronation charters (not least by King John’s 
adversaries10), and the place that Magna Carta quickly assumed in English 
politics. This weak constitutionalism was more akin to political rather than legal 
constitutionalism, meaning that it was enforced through political rather than 
legal discourse and, naturally, left many uncertainties.11 Thus, whilst an 
overarching conceptual framework was absent and whilst contemporaries’ 
beliefs did not amount to a coherent, consistent, complete, and commonly 
understood set of rules that were independent of practical considerations, the 
commitment to preserving roughly a certain order and structure is tantamount to 
a kind of constitutionalism; meaning an adherence to certain principles of 
governmental organisation and operation. Even though they lacked the 
vocabulary to explicitly do so, by holding certain actions appropriate (such as 
claims to the throne, see Chapter 1), they were tacitly holding them 
constitutional; meaning concordant with the implicit principles of governmental 
organisation and operation. 
Consequently, whilst Henry’s minority is probably better understood as a 
political rather than constitutional settlement, it nevertheless took place in a 
constitutional theatre where semi-permanent customs mixed with politics. The 
medieval English constitution, therefore, was constantly adapting and changing, 
and, in this respect, it is not incomparable to today’s changing constitution.12   
1.2 Historical Background and Outline 
1.2.1 First Barons’ War 
Henry was the eldest son of King John, who spent his final year or so 
attempting to quell rebellion at home. A number of John’s barons had come out 
– for various reasons13 – in open rebellion in early 1215 and by the summer had 
                                            
10
 Janelle Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution: St Edward’s “Laws” in Early 
Modern Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 65. 
11
 For discussions on political constitutionalism, see: JAG Griffith, “The Political Constitution,” 
The Modern Law Review 42, no. 1 (January 1979): 1–21; Graham Gee and Grégoire CN 
Webber, “What Is a Political Constitution?,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30, no. 2 (April 14, 
2010): 273–299, doi:10.1093/ojls/gqq013. 
12
 See, for example, the works of Anthony King and Vernon Bogdanor, who argue that the 
‘constitution is changing as we speak: Anthony King, The British Constitution (Oxford University 
Press, 2007); Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2009). 
13
 See: Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 6. 
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attained a position of sufficient strength to force John to the negotiating table. 
Out of these negotiations came the short-lived first issue of Magna Carta. 
Following its failure, the rebels invited the heir-apparent of France, Prince Louis, 
to claim the English throne. In May 1216, Louis landed unopposed at Thanet.14 
For a short while, Louis was successful but then struggled to gain ground. His 
problems were compounded by his fruitless siege of Dover, rising tensions 
between the English and French components of his forces, the deaths of 
leading rebels such as Eustace de Vesci and Geoffrey de Mandeville, and the 
return of the earls of Salisbury and York, as well as the earl of Pembroke’s son, 
to John’s cause.15 Furthermore, whilst Louis had superior numbers, John’s 
adherents were weightier “in power, influence, and sagacity”.16 Nevertheless, it 
was undoubtedly true that Louis had a strong foothold and substantial native 
support. 
Henry was only nine years old when, in October 1216, John unexpectedly and 
prematurely succumbed to a short, painful illness. Although Henry was clearly 
incapable of leading the country’s administration or military, he was vested with 
the crown. In Carpenter’s opinion, “[n]o king of England came to the throne in a 
more desperate situation than Henry III”.17 
1.2.2 Minority Government 
The fact that a child acceded to the throne of a medieval kingdom would not 
surprise anyone today. Indeed, European history is brimming with examples of 
minor kings, such as the Holy Roman Emperor Otto III, Baldwin III of Jerusalem, 
Henry II of Sicily, Henry I of Castile, Richard II of England, Alexander III of 
Scotland, and, moving into the early modern period, Louis XIV of France. The 
idea that it was natural for a prince to succeed his father has no doubt been 
compounded by romanticised, politicised, and partisan versions of the past in 
both historical and fictional writing.  
                                            
14
 Holt, Magna Carta, chap. 6–7, 10. 
15
 Wilfred Lewis Warren, King John (Peregrine Books, 1966), 274; For more on the decline of 
Louis’ support in England, see: Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 27–29. 
16
 Warren, King John, 250. 
17
 David A Carpenter, The Struggle for Mastery – The Penguin History of Britain 1066 – 1271 
(Penguin, 2004), 300. 
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However, in the context of thirteenth-century England, it was an incredibly 
radical move. In the first place, there had not been a child king in England for 
over two centuries, during which time much had changed: England had been 
conquered by the Danes and briefly formed part of a Scandinavian empire; 
then, after a short restoration of the West Saxon dynasty, England fell to the 
Normans and thus became part of a cross-Channel realm, which was to 
develop into the ‘Angevin Empire’ on the accession of Henry II in 1154. Even if 
the loyal magnates in 1216 were aware of the Anglo-Saxon precedents, which 
is doubtful, so much had altered in the intervening period that it is unlikely that 
they would have felt compelled to follow any such precedent.18 This will be 
discussed further in the first chapter, which relates to the law of succession. 
There was also the small matter of who would run the country before Henry 
would be able to – not to mention bring the civil war to a successful conclusion 
and restore peace.19 If the magnates had been aware of the Anglo-Saxon 
precedents, there certainly would not have been detailed blueprints from the 
time regarding how the government was to be constructed; there was a lack of 
clear guiding constitutional principles.20 In the event, they chose to create a 
position in the government, seemingly from nothing, for William Marshal, which 
disappeared on his death in 1219 with Henry still not of age. From the point of 
the Marshal’s death, the government, by degrees, appears to have become 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of one man: Hubert de Burgh. The fact 
that this situation developed ‘by degrees’ is important, because it indicates that 
the government of the kingdom was constructed in response to political, rather 
than constitutional, dictates. The government during the period shall be 
discussed in the second chapter.  
Henry’s minority not only affected how the government of the kingdom was 
seen but also how the monarch was seen within that system. It could have been 
                                            
18
 Kate Norgate, The Minority of Henry the Third (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1912), 61; Hillen and 
Wiswall, “The Minority of Henry III in the Context of Europe,” 17. 
19
 The maintenance of peace, along with the protection of the church, the preservation of good 
laws, and “equitable administration to all men”, would almost certainly have been part of Henry’s 
coronation oath, see: HG Richardson, “The English Coronation Oath,” Speculum 24, no. 1 
(January 1949): 44–45; Percy Ernst Schramm, A History of the English Coronation (Clarendon 
Press, 1937), 196. 
20
 The young Anglo-Saxon kings of England are all mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 
but there is little clarity as to their exact ages or to the impact of their youth on the workings of 
government: JA Giles, ed., The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 2nd ed. (G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1914), 
78 (Eadwig), 78–84 (Eadgar), 84–85 (Edward the Martyr), 85ff (Æthelred II). 
11 
 
arguable before Henry ascended the throne that, because of the centrality of 
the monarch to the running of the kingdom, no child could be king. Henry’s own 
minority, however, laid down a firm precedent for the later minorities, the last of 
which was Edward VI in the mid-sixteenth century. The impact of the minority 
on conceptions of the monarchy will be discussed in the final chapter. 
There are three thematic chapters, each of which is an answer to a central 
question: the first chapter, on succession, asks ‘how does a boy become king?’; 
the second chapter, on government and governance, asks ‘how was the 
kingdom actually run?’; and the third chapter, focusing on Henry himself, asks 
‘what role did Henry play in all of this?’. Each chapter is arranged in a 
chronological fashion and, by structuring it in this way, it is possible to get an 
appreciation of what ideas were important at what times, and how those ideas 
changed as time passed. 
There are two overarching questions that reach across this thesis as a whole:  
1. How can we characterise governance during the period of Henry III’s 
minority?; and 
2. To what extent do these arrangements indicate the existence of a 
constitutional framework? 
The first is a largely empirical question, which will be tackled through analysis of 
the primary and secondary sources relating to the period. The second question 
is analytical and shall be tackled with the aid of modern scholarship. The 
literature that I will use will be described in greater detail in the literature review 
below. 
1.3 Literature Review 
Despite having received reasonable attention from ‘general’ historians, Henry 
III’s minority has received only very sparse and cursory attention from 
legal/constitutional historians. Most of the work on Henry III’s minority has 
aimed to discover the facts of the period, rather than to undertake constitutional 
analysis and interpretation thereof. That is the gap that this thesis intends to 
address. 
1.3.1 Modern Historical Writers on Henry III’s Minority 
12 
 
The first significant works investigating Henry III’s minority in its own right were 
GJ Turner’s two papers entitled The Minority of Henry III, presented to the 
Royal Historical Society in 1904 and 1907 respectively.21 Turner was editor of a 
number of volumes for the Selden Society and had a legal background, being a 
barrister of Lincoln’s Inn. In his first paper, he did include a section entitled “The 
Constitution and the Minority”.22 However, it is a little under sixteen pages long 
(in which adequate treatment certainly cannot be achieved), focuses mainly on 
the early minority, and gets caught up in the particulars rather than considering 
the wider ramifications. 
The most extensive historical attention given to Henry III’s minority is to be 
found in the work of Kate Norgate (The Minority of Henry the Third, 1912) and 
David Carpenter (The Minority of Henry III, 1990), the latter of whom is the 
principal modern authority on the period. Farmer, in his review of Carpenter’s 
book, said that it was, “[e]ssentially … a chronological narrative confined to 
political and fiscal matters” and this equally applies to Norgate’s book.23 Being 
political narratives, both books inevitably consider constitutional questions. 
Norgate, for example, begins her second chapter with a discussion of the 
creation of William Marshal’s position in the government, but like Turner before 
her does not go on to discuss how that affects our interpretations of the 
constitution.24   
Norgate wrote extensively on the period and her works include England under 
the Angevin Kings (1887), John Lackland (1902), and Richard the Lionheart 
(1924). Despite the fact that her works have largely been superseded by more 
modern scholarship (e.g. Powicke, Warren, and Carpenter), she remains an 
important authority.25 It is perhaps interesting to note, however, a little about 
where she was coming from when she was writing her works. This can be 
gleaned from the fact that she had edited, along with his late wife, John Richard 
                                            
21
 GJ Turner, “The Minority of Henry III. Part I,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 18 
(1904): 245–295; GJ Turner, “The Minority of Henry III. Part II,” Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society 1 (1907): 205–262. 
22
 Turner, “The Minority of Henry III. Part I,” 268–284. 
23
 DL Farmer, “The Minority of Henry III (Review),” Biography 15, no. 4 (1992): 414–416. 
24
 Norgate, The Minority of Henry the Third, 61–63. 
25
 See: Warren, King John; FM Powicke, King Henry III and the Lord Edward: The Community of 
the Realm in the Thirteenth Century (Oxford University Press, 1966); Carpenter, The Minority of 
Henry III. 
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Green’s A Short History of the English People;26 Green was considered by JW 
Burrow to be “another obvious ‘successor’ to Macaulay’s work, in its readability, 
its immense popularity, and in the way it made basic Whig notions vivid and 
appealing for a wide audience.”27 Norgate was part of a tail-end to nineteenth-
century historical thought. 
Sir Maurice Powicke’s work should be mentioned at this point, as coming in 
between the work of Norgate and Carpenter; in particular, his King Henry III and 
the Lord Edward first published in 1947. This book covers the entirety of Henry 
III’s reign and about one-tenth focuses on the period of the minority.28 Powicke’s 
reviewer, CR Cheney, directly compared the book to Stubb’s chapters on Henry 
III and Edward I in his Constitutional History, but added that: 
the comparison is unsatisfactory, for it takes no account of the last seventy years’ 
work in medieval studies, which Sir Maurice has thoroughly absorbed, or of the 
author’s entirely original, personal approach to his subject.
29
 
However, like his predecessors, Powicke did not go out on a limb to make an 
assessment of the impacts of the minority as a whole on the constitution. The 
closest he came, in truth, was a footnote on page forty-two, which referred to 
some pages of Pollock and Maitland’s History of English Law published some 
sixty-seven years earlier – before, in fact, even Turner turned his hand to the 
matter. These pages form part of their discussion on “The King and the Crown” 
in the thirteenth century. It is as assiduously and carefully written as we would 
expect from Pollock and Maitland, but lacks the insight of modern scholarship 
and it achieves little more than saying that Henry became king because he was 
his father’s son and that, because he was too young to rule, somebody else had 
to do so.30 In fact, neither of these conclusions is quite correct, as there were 
other factors involved in the succession (see chapter 1) and it makes the 
assumption that there would be a regent and a council without considering the 
relationship, if any, between them. 
                                            
26
 John Richard Green, A Short History of the English People, vols. 1-4 (eds. JR Green and K 
Norgate, Macmillan & Co., 1892-4) 
27
 Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past, 287. 
28
 Powicke, King Henry III and the Lord Edward, 1–83. 
29
 CR Cheney, “King Henry III and the Lord Edward: The Community of the Realm in the 
Thirteenth Century by FM Powicke (Review),” The English Historical Review 63, no. 246 
(January 1948): 110. 
30
 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law: Before the Time 
of Edward I, vol. I, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1899), 522. 
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Both Norgate and Powicke relied “almost exclusively on printed materials”.31 
Carpenter, on the other hand, made extensive use of unprinted materials – 
particularly financial information. He went much further than previous accounts 
of the impact of Henry’s minority on the constitution, although the constitutional 
analysis largely remained incidental to the historical narrative. For Carpenter, 
the period “planted the Charters [i.e. Magna Carta and the Charter of the 
Forest] into English political life and it also engendered the belief that great 
councils, or as they were soon to be called, parliaments, should have a large 
say in deciding the personnel and policies of the king’s government”.32 Indeed, 
he saw the Paper Constitution 1244, the measures of 1258, and the Ordinances 
of 1311, or, as he called collectively called them, the “high watermark of 
medieval constitutional reform”, as being firmly rooted in the minority.33 Thus, on 
the one hand, the minority saw the start of constitutional monarchy and, on the 
other, the conciliar and consensus-based nature of the minority government led, 
in stages, to parliamentary democracy. The implicit assumptions that the 
constitution changed and that it changed in response to political events are, in 
my view, correct; however, Carpenter idealizes the minority government 
somewhat, particularly in his belief that there was a general consensus that 
there ought to be a general consensus and that that consensus had special 
constitutional implications over and above the weightings of political power.  
There have been a number of biographies written on influential persons in the 
minority period: William Marshal,34 Peter des Roches,35 Ranulf of Chester,36 the 
late King John,37 Savaric de Mauléon38; including foreign influencers, such as 
Philip Augustus,39 Blanche of Castile,40 and Frederick II41. A significant absence 
is that of any extended scholarly work on the life of Hubert de Burgh who was 
                                            
31
 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 4–5. 
32
 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 402. 
33
 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 412. 
34
 Sidney Painter, William Marshal: Knight-Errant, Baron, and Regent of England (John Hopkins 
Press, 1966); David Crouch, William Marshal: Knighthood, War and Chivalry, 2nd ed. (Pearson 
Education Ltd., 2002). 
35
 Nicholas Vincent, Peter Des Roches: An Alien in English Politics (Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
36
 James W Alexander, Ranulf of Chester: A Relic of Conquest (The University of Georgia 
Press, 1983). 
37
 Kate Norgate, John Lackland (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1902); Warren, King John. 
38
 HJ Chaytor, Savaric de Mauléon, Baron and Troubadour (Cambridge University Press, 1939). 
39
 Jim Bradbury, Philip Augustus King of France 1180-1223 (Longman, 1998). 
40
 Régine Pernoud, Blanche of Castile, trans. Henry Noel (Collins, 1975). 
41
 David Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (The Penguin Press, 1988). 
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Justiciar from 1215 to 1232 and, arguably, de facto (if not de jure) regent from 
1221 to 1227. He does receive some attention in Powicke’s work, and SHF 
Johnston and Carpenter have both written short essays on him, but he has not 
received attention on anything like the scale that des Roches received from 
Vincent.42 All of these works are important in their own right (although some 
have been eclipsed by more recent works, such as Painter’s by Crouch’s and 
Norgate’s by Warren’s) but they are all biographies, not constitutional 
dissertations. 
By and large, Henry’s minority has been a passing interest and the same is true 
of the royal minorities as a whole. There has only been one work published that 
takes the six royal minorities as its focus, which is a collection of essays in The 
Royal Minorities of Medieval and Early Modern England, edited by Charles 
Beem and published in 2008.43 The first point to note is that each of the essays 
is essentially self-contained and thus cross-comparison between the minorities 
is minimal. The most comparative chapter is, in fact, the one on Henry III, which 
incorporates a discussion on the minorities of Louis IX (France), Henry VII 
(Germany), Ladislas III (Hungary), and James I (Aragon). Once again, however, 
the constitutional narrative is incidental to the historical narrative, which is not 
too surprising seeing that both authors, Christian Hillen and Frank Wiswall, are 
historians by training, not lawyers. Indeed, it appears that the only person with a 
legal background to have turned their attention specifically (as opposed to being 
part of a grander narrative, such as Pollock and Maitland’s) to the minority of 
Henry III was Turner a century ago. 
1.3.2 Thirteenth-Century Sources 
It should be first noted that the best overview of the early thirteenth-century 
textual sources is to be found in Antonia Gransden’s Historical Writing in 
England.44  
                                            
42
 Powicke, King Henry III and the Lord Edward, 42–83; SHF Johnston, “The Lands of Hubert 
de Burgh,” The English Historical Review 50, no. 199 (1935): 418–432; David A Carpenter, “The 
Fall of Hubert de Burgh,” Journal of British Studies 19, no. 2 (1980): 1–17. 
43
 Charles Beem, ed., The Royal Minorities of Medieval and Early Modern England (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). 
44
 Antonia Gransden, Historical Writing in England, C. 550 to C. 1307 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd., 1974), chap. 15–18. 
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Perhaps the most interesting source is the Anglo-Norman ‘romance history’ in 
the chivalric vein charting the life of William Marshal until his death in 1219. 
L’Histoire de Guillaume le Marechal or The History of William Marshal (hereafter 
simply the ‘History’) was translated into English and released in two volumes 
(plus an introductory volume) in the mid-2000s by the Anglo-Norman Text 
Society, but it is only the latter half of the second volume that is of interest to 
us.45 The historical value of the History has been assessed by David Crouch in 
his biography of William Marshal and in the historical introduction to the 
History.46 The History was designed to entertain and to commemorate the 
idealized memory of the Marshal; being written in the mid-1220s, it is an 
invaluable source but not wholly trustworthy, is protagonist-centric, and only 
covers the first two years or so of the minority.  
The principal textual source for the minority of Henry III is to be found in the 
monastic chronicle, Flores Historiarum, attributed to Roger of Wendover, a 
monk at St Albans.47 The chronicle was commenced sometime between 1204 
and 1231, making it difficult to know just how current the information was when 
he was writing it, but his account of the period from 1202 until the end of the 
chronicle in 1234 appears original.48 Throughout the work, there is a marked 
hostility “to king and pope”, which was developed further by Wendover’s 
ideological successor at St Albans, Matthew Paris.49 Nevertheless, the St 
Albans chroniclers are well-informed, which was no doubt partially due to its 
excellent connections: Henry III stayed at St Albans at least nine times before 
1259 and many other men, including Hubert de Burgh, Richard of Cornwall, and 
Peter des Roches, all had connections with St Albans.50  
There are a number of other monastic chronicles that are informative about this 
period: the ‘Barnwell’ chronicle (to 1225), the chronicle attributed to Ralph of 
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Coggeshall (to 1223), the Waverley chronicle (to 1291), and the Dunstable 
annals (to 1297). The author and the writing location of the Barnwell chronicle 
are unclear, but it appears to have been the work of an individual and is original 
between 1202 and its cessation in 1225.51 Ralph of Coggeshall’s chronicle is 
probably original from 1187 to 1224 and is, during that period, the work of a 
single author.52 Unlike the Barnwell and Coggeshall chronicles, the Waverley 
chronicle had a number of different authors, who compiled annals more or less 
contemporaneously with events from 1219 to 1266.53 The Waverley chronicle 
takes a distinctly anti-royalist view, although Gransden has questioned whether 
this was really a principled view or rather whether it was based on the lack of 
favour shown to the Cistercians by the crown, particularly under John.54 Finally, 
the Dunstable annals, which were compiled by the prior until 1241, also provide 
a near-contemporary account of events.  
Norgate identified a number of discrepancies and confused passages in the 
chronicles,55 but did not make full use of the archival sources, such as the 
memoranda, pipe, and receipt rolls or private correspondence.56 Extensive use 
of these, however, has been made by modern scholars such as Carpenter and 
Vincent and this thesis must be indebted to their work and critical knowledge of 
these sources. This additional evidence has not only extended our knowledge 
of the period but has also helped to establish a near-definitive chronology 
against which the chronicles can be tested. In broad terms, they pass this test 
but the details must always be treated cautiously. In the case of the History, this 
is because the information was second- or third-hand and the writer would have 
used creative licence to give the work dramatic effect; in the case of Wendover 
and his successor, Paris, they seemed to have had accounts relayed to them by 
the important political players, but it is doubtful that their testimonies would have 
been entirely accurate or objective. Thus, whilst we must approach their 
interpretations of events carefully, they remain important and valuable sources 
and, as far as the historical details go, along with the archival sources they are 
the best we have. 
                                            
51
 Gransden, Historical Writing in England, 339ff. 
52
 Gransden, Historical Writing in England, 323–324. 
53
 Gransden, Historical Writing in England, 412. 
54
 Gransden, Historical Writing in England, 414–416. 
55
 See, for example, Norgate’s criticism of Wendover's coverage of the events at the start of 
1227: Norgate, The Minority of Henry the Third, 266. 
56
 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 5–6. 
18 
 
1.3.3 Central Medieval Legal Treatises 
Two sources should be mentioned in this context, which are the treatises 
attributed to Ranulf de Glanvill and Henry de Bracton.  
1.3.3.1 Glanvill 
Ranulf de Glanvill’s Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom of 
England (Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie, commonly 
called the Tractatus of Glanvill or simply Glanvill) was the first work of its kind in 
England and is commonly attributed to the latter part of Henry II’s reign. It was 
translated into English by John Beames in 1812 and, more recently, by GDG 
Hall in 1965.57 Glanvill’s focus was on private law with a little criminal law mixed 
in.58 As there is little pertaining to public law in Glanvill, for the most part it is not 
of direct relevance to this thesis. However, it does become of interest if we were 
to agree with Pollock and Maitland’s thesis that the king differed from his 
subjects not by virtue of holding different kinds of rights but, rather, different 
degrees of the same rights.59 Such a comparison is considered in the chapter 
on minority. 
1.3.3.2 Bracton 
On the Laws and Customs of England (De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae) 
was written sometime in the early-to-mid-thirteenth century. It is attributed to 
Henry de Bracton (hence why the work is often referred to as simply ‘Bracton’), 
but many believe that Bracton was not the original compiler; for example, Paul 
Brand has argued that the original compiler was, in fact, William Raleigh.60 In 
any case, it was most certainly compiled by, or under the guidance of, at least 
one senior lawyer sometime in the first half of the thirteenth century. 
At the start of the 2000s the Latin text from George Woodbine’s edition and the 
authoritative translation by Samuel E Thorne into English were published online 
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by the Harvard Law School Library.61 Bracton is an invaluable source for 
medieval law and, from time to time, on more esoteric questions such as the 
nature of kingship.62 It does not, however, give any consideration to Henry III’s 
minority in and of itself. However, this is not surprising as Bracton’s focus, like 
Glanvill’s, is private and criminal law and even his discussions on the nature of 
kingship are within the context of Bracton trying to understand how the king fits 
into the private law system.   
The extent to which Glanvill and Bracton accurately reflect the thirteenth-
century English legal system is debateable. Maitland noted Bracton’s familiarity 
with Italian jurisprudence, especially Azo of Bologna. Indeed, he “borrowed 
maxims and some concrete rules” so that he could “fill up the gaps in our 
English system”.63 Furthermore, the English legal system was still in the 
process of being unified and made uniform. Thus, it is important to recognise 
that their works were informed opinions on the English legal system of the time, 
not definitive expressions of it.  
1.3.4 Political Writers of the Period or Lack Thereof 
There are no surviving contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous political 
tracts from Henry’s minority. It is a shame that important writers who 
experienced the period, such as Robert Grosseteste (who was probably in his 
late thirties or early forties at the time) or Roger Bacon (who grew up in the 
minority), tended to focus on matters of theology and natural science. However, 
lack of political discourses is characteristic of the period up to the sixteenth 
century. In the words of Goldsworthy, until then there was “a lack of both clear 
theoretical thinking about constitutional fundamentals, and written records of 
what thinking there was.”64 It is true that there were some writers, such as Sir 
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John Fortescue who wrote towards the end of the fifteenth century, but there 
were not many. 
This makes the task of understanding the thirteenth-century constitution 
immeasurably harder for it is truly only through the eyes of the contemporaries 
that we can understand the constitutional arrangements of the time. Instead, we 
have to rely largely on inference and conjecture based on the actions of the 
contemporaries and the passing comments of the chroniclers. It is an 
unfortunate fact that thoughts and beliefs are lost much easier than fragments 
of pottery. But we must aspire to understand the world as they did if we are to 
understand the institutions that they created and sustained.  
1.3.5 Political and Constitutional Historians of the Period 
It has already been said that, whilst some historians have turned their attention 
to the period of Henry III’s minority, it is a path much less well trodden by 
political and constitutional historians. For example, the late Sir James Holt’s 
work abuts the minority but rarely talks of it and WL Warren in his book The 
Governance of Norman and Angevin England deals with Henry’s minority in a 
little over two paragraphs. 65 
John Maddicott’s book, The Origins of the English Parliament, 924-1327 
published in 2010, does give some treatment of the minority and, like 
Carpenter, is keen to stress the conciliar nature of the government.66 However, 
it is limited to tracing the development of Parliament, rather than considering the 
wider constitutional implications of royal minorities.  
The most recent, all-encompassing works taking a critical look at the (UK)67 
constitution focus only on the events of the last half century. In particular, there 
are the works of Anthony King and Vernon Bogdanor, which give no 
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consideration at all to the thirteenth century – let alone the minority of Henry 
III.68 I do not believe that by studying the thirteenth-century constitution we can 
learn anything about the content of the modern constitution because it has 
changed so drastically over the course of the centuries. However, I do believe 
that it can tell us a lot about the nature of constitutions and especially about how 
they change – contrary to the belief of many who stand in long-cast shadows of 
the Whig historians. 
                                            
68
 King, The British Constitution; Bogdanor, The New British Constitution. 
22 
 
2 Succession 
2.1 Introduction 
Superficially, Henry III’s accession is in line with our expectations of a medieval 
succession: the eldest son (Henry) succeeded his late father (King John). However, 
this simplicity is illusory and although the crown passed as if by primogeniture, it will 
be argued, there were other factors at work.   
We have evidence of minor kings in England as far back as eighth-century 
Northumbria, although, admittedly, the Northumbrian example (Osred I) is the only 
pre-unification example of which we know.69 Post-unification Anglo-Saxon England 
saw a string of young kings (it is perhaps too strong to call them ‘minor’ kings), 
culminating with Æthelred II’s accession in 978. England then underwent 
momentous changes: it was first conquered by the Danes in 1013 and 1016, 
becoming part of a Scandinavian empire and then by the Normans in 1066, 
becoming part of a cross-Channel empire that reached its greatest extent under 
Henry’s grandfather, Henry II. Then, when England had not had a minor king for 238 
years, Henry III was crowned in 1216. Considering how much time had passed and 
how much had changed, it seems doubtful that contemporaries would have known 
of, or paid any attention to the Anglo-Saxon examples. As Norgate said: 
[T]hese cases were all too remote to furnish precedents for the guidance of the 
statesmen into whose hands the task of carrying on the government was thrown by the 
death of John.
70
 
2.1.1 Basing a Claim 
There are a number of ways that a person can claim to be rightful monarch, which 
can be broadly separated into four categories: (1) entitlement, (2) appointment, (3) 
transfer, and (4) capture. These shall be briefly outlined. 
2.1.1.1 Entitlement 
Entitlement means that a person has fulfilled any sufficient criterion for a successful 
claim. Two kinds may be roughly distinguished: (a) intrinsic entitlement, which a 
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person has by virtue of being themselves and includes things such as hereditary 
right; and (b) acquired entitlement, which a person has gained through being 
positioned in certain circumstances and includes, for example, hereditary right jure 
uxoris, i.e. a man might claim land in his wife’s name. To give an example of the 
latter case, Prince Louis – who fought King John – claimed England, in part, through 
the fact that his wife was a granddaughter of Henry II. 
2.1.1.2 Appointment 
Appointment implies a unilateral choice stemming from a discretion held by a person 
or group. There are many forms of appointment, such as: (a) designation, which has 
overtones of arbitrariness; (b) election, which implies some sort of democratic 
process; and (c) divine appointment, which has a mystical character and would be 
deduced from supposed divine intervention, e.g. omens or miracles.  
2.1.1.3 Transfer 
Transfer implies in a very strong way that the thing in question has been given (not 
necessarily willingly) and encompasses things such as purchase and cession. The 
most famous examples of transfer are probably the Louisiana Purchase (1803) and 
the Alaska Purchase (1867).71 
Transfer and appointment differ in that, in the former, the transferor is in possession 
of the thing in question whereas, in the latter, the appointer merely has some control 
over its destiny. 
2.1.1.4 Capture 
Capture does not imply that something has been given (as by appointment or 
transfer) but that it has been (often forcibly) taken. Under capture we find concepts 
such as conquest/annexation, adverse position, and occupation of terra nullius. 
2.1.1.5 The Claims and the Minority 
When discussing the succession to the throne, there is – in most cases – a classic 
trinity of hereditary right, designation, and election – and these are the claims that 
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will be discussed in this thesis. In the context of this thesis, transfer and capture 
have little relevance. 
It should be noted that these bases are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For 
instance, nineteenth-century constitutional commentators often explained Anglo-
Saxon kingship as ‘elective kingship limited by a hereditary principle’ through which 
“the king was chosen by the state assembly, but the choice was limited to those who 
possessed the indispensable prerequisite of noble blood”. 72 Whether or not this was 
true of the early thirteenth century will be discussed in due course.   
In this chapter, the legitimacy of Henry’s claim will be discussed with reference to 
these principles. It will be considered whether or not there could be said to be rules, 
which were identifiably ‘constitutional’ and determined the succession. It will also be 
considered whether or not Henry, as a minor, was barred from taking office.  
2.2 The Road to Newark, October 1216 
In October 1216, John was moving rapidly through northern East Anglia. He arrived 
at King’s Lynn on 9 October and moved to Wisbech on 11 October. The following 
day he moved again and, in an unfortunate turn of events, lost “all his carts, 
waggons, and baggage horses, together with his money, costly vessels, and 
everything which he had a particular regard for…” in the Wash.73 That night, he 
arrived at Swineshead Abbey where, according to Wendover, John’s mind was so 
troubled by the loss that he “was seized by a violent fever and became ill”. His fever 
was then exacerbated by “his pernicious gluttony” – too many peaches and too much 
new cider.74 According to some accounts, John had already fallen ill at Lynn, which 
Norgate described as “a violent attack of dysentery”, owing to his gourmandising.75 A 
later tradition developed (seized upon by protestant Tudor playwright, John Bale76) 
that John had been poisoned by the monks at Swineshead, because he had taken a 
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fancy for a prioress and ordered that she be brought to him.77 Whatever the case, he 
was struggling when he left Swineshead on 14 October to make his way to Sleaford. 
It was at this time that he wrote a letter to the pope asking him to protect England 
and its young princes, seemingly already concerned that he might die.78 John was to 
make one final journey, although he had to be carried part of the way, and by 16 
October he was at Newark Castle.79 There his condition worsened and on the night 
of 18 October, he died. 
2.2.1 John’s Testament 
John’s testament mentions that, at the time of writing, he was “hindered by great 
infirmity”, which seems to indicate that it was made in his last few days; although, as 
there is no place-date clause, we cannot know this with certainty.80  
2.2.1.1 Persona of the Testament 
John’s testament was mostly written in the first person singular, as opposed to the 
first person plural (the ‘royal ‘we’’), which “had been the standard diplomatic form 
since 1189 giving verbal expression to the developing concept that the king was 
acting for the collective community of the realm”.81 Does this mean that John’s 
testament was in the persona of John’s body natural, i.e. a personal, not state 
document? Of the five testaments that still exist prior to John’s, four of them employ 
the singular, indicating that this was the preferred form, although it largely depended 
“on the inclination of the clerk”.82 Certainly, the opening words “I, John” (ego 
Johannes) have more impact in the first person – particularly when he goes on to 
provide for salvation of his soul (pro salute anime mee). It may also have to do with 
the haste in which the document was drawn up, for the scribe does slip into the 
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plural at one point: “…and in making reward to those who have served us 
faithfully…” (in remuneratione facienda illis qui fideliter nobis seruierunt).  
Judging by the contents of the testament and the fact that the opening words ‘I, 
John’ are immediately followed with John’s titles (“king of England, lord of Ireland, 
duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, count of Anjou”), it would seem that John was 
speaking in the dual persona as both John, the man, and John, the king-lord-duke-
count. Therefore, John’s testament cannot be regarded as a purely personal 
document pertaining only to John’s personal possessions and affairs as separate 
from the Crown. 
2.2.1.2 John’s Testament 
In view of his illness, John only dictated a brief testament and largely left matters to 
the discretion of the familiares listed in the document. They were to do as they saw 
fit in distributing his goods, making his peace with the church, sending aid to the Holy 
Land, rewarding his loyal followers, giving to the poor and religious houses, and, 
most importantly, “providing support to my sons towards obtaining and defending 
their inheritance”.83 What John had in mind by this latter phrase is clear, if the 
contemporary accounts are to be believed. 
According to Wendover, after confessing to the abbot of Croxton at Newark, John 
“appointed his eldest son Henry his heir, and made his kingdom swear allegiance to 
him; he also sent letters under his own seal to all the sheriffs and castellans of the 
kingdom, ordering them one and all to obey his said son”.84 In the original Latin, 
Wendover used the verb constituere, which Giles (above) translated as ‘appointed’.85 
The verb may be translated in a number of ways, but Giles’ translation captures the 
gist of the passage.86 This is reinforced by the account found in the History, which 
describes John’s plea to those at his deathbed that Henry be placed in William 
Marshal’s care: 
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“…for my son will never govern these lands of mine with 
the help of anyone but the Marshal.”
87
 
It seems clear that, using the scheme set out in 2.1.1, John was designating Henry 
as his heir. It should be noted that this was not the conclusion that Turner drew, who 
thought that John’s testament was “only concerned with the King’s property” and his 
executors were “given no special authority to govern the realm or take charge of his 
children”.88 However, the weight of the circumstantial evidence would seem to be 
against him.  
Was John’s designation the operating factor in Henry’s succession or was it 
unnecessary because Henry would succeed under hereditary right as the eldest 
son? It should be noted that, either way, the succession would be deemed to have 
been settled before John’s death, whether it was decided after his death shall be 
discussed in 2.3. 
2.2.2 Designation and the Royal Prerogative 
It is almost impossible to discuss English constitutional history without discussing the 
royal prerogative. In this case, was it John’s prerogative to designate his heir? John 
himself, arguably, ascended the throne through the prerogative exercised by Richard 
I on his deathbed. Roger of Hoveden described the scene: 
When the king was now in despair of surviving, he devised to his brother John the 
kingdom of England and all his other territories, and ordered fealty to be done to the 
aforesaid John by those who were present, and commanded that his castles be delivered 
to him, and three-fourths of his treasure.
89
 
Looking to later history, it was arguably Elizabeth I’s refusal to exercise her 
prerogative and designate her heir that caused the nobles of the day so much 
anguish and, “[i]n the end, an incoherent sign made after she was incapable of 
speech was interpreted as consent, and the last barrier to James [I]’s succession 
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was removed.”90 However, to understand designation and the prerogative more fully, 
it is worth looking at the examples prior to Henry’s accession. 
2.2.3 A Survey of Designation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries 
Following the death of Cnut (king of England, Denmark, and Norway) in 1035, it was 
widely considered that his successor would be Harthacnut. Harthacnut was not 
Cnut’s eldest son but, crucially, his eldest son from his most recent marriage. 
However, Harthacnut was in Denmark seeing to its defence against Magnus 
Olafsson of Norway and, after a time, his older half-brother, Harald Harefoot, 
became king in England. In 1036, a peace was agreed between Harthacnut and 
Magnus: each was to be the other’s heir should he die without issue. In effect, they 
designated one another. An interesting part of this agreement was the infusion with 
heredity, as the agreement made each to the other the “rightful heir as if he were his 
brother born.”91 Unlike King Stephen’s and Henry FitzEmpress’ later agreement, this 
seems to only have been metaphorical. 
When Harefoot died in 1040, Harthacnut became king of England as well as of 
Denmark. On Harthacnut’s accession, Emma of Normandy (his mother) 
commissioned the Econmium Emmae. In many ways, this was a work of propaganda 
to reinforce hers and her son’s positions, and one claim made in it was that 
Harthacnut was rightful heir because Cnut had designated him.92  
When Harthacnut died childless in 1042, Magnus of Norway claimed both Denmark 
and England in pursuit of the 1036 agreement. Magnus captured Denmark and 
threatened to invade England – where Edward the Confessor had been crowned – 
but decided against it. If Harthacnut’s and Magnus’ agreement included only 
Denmark/Norway, then the agreement seems to have been effective. If the 
agreement also included England – as Magnus seemed to think that it did – then 
Harthacnut failed to designate Magnus as his heir. Harald Hardrada, Magnus’ uncle 
and successor believed that England had been included in the 1036 agreement and 
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invaded in September 1066. His death at the battle of Stamford Bridge all but ended 
the Scandinavian claim.  
Edward the Confessor’s attempts to designate his successor are perhaps the most 
famous. It is said that in 1051 he promised the throne to his first-cousin-once-
removed, William of Normandy, and that in 1064 his brother-in-law, the Anglo-Dane93 
Harold Godwinson, Earl of Wessex, promised to uphold William’s claim.94 Then, on 
his deathbed in January 1066, Edward ‘commended’ the kingdom to Harold for 
‘safeguard’.95 This vague statement can be interpreted as either designating Harold 
as his heir or making Harold regent whilst William was fetched from Normandy. If it 
was the former, then it was initially successful as Harold became king; if the latter, 
then it was eventually successful as William defeated Harold at Hastings later that 
year.  
Whether Edward was at liberty to change his mind is another question to be asked of 
this supposed royal prerogative. Beckerman has argued that in English testamentary 
custom, the verba novissima (‘newest words’) were deemed to “supersede previous 
donations of the same property.”96 In Normandy, on the other hand, “such a promise 
… was binding and could not later be revoked legally.”97 There are doubts as to the 
truth of this98 and, indeed, William does not seem to have denied that it was 
revocable – by Edward at least. The English magnates, on the other hand, who had 
promised to support William’s claim were not at liberty to change their minds – least 
of all Harold Godwinson.99 To believe that a king’s promises are revocable but that 
his subjects’ promises are irrevocable would certainly have suited William well. 
It is worth noting that in Merovingian France, some childless kings had adopted their 
successors to invoke primogenital succession: Guntram adopted his nephew when 
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his natural children died and Sigebert III adopted the son of ‘his Grimoald mayor’ as 
his successor.100 However, this idea never gained traction in England and it does not 
appear that the Confessor considered adopting anybody. 
William I also attempted to designate his heir. There is evidence that William had 
originally planned to disinherit his eldest son, the rebellious Robert Curthose, even 
though he had previously designated him as early as 1063.101 In 1087, Robert was 
included in the succession, but he gained only the patrimony of Normandy and the 
acquisition of Maine; England went to the second son, William Rufus. Beckerman 
saw this as recognition of the inviolability of the earlier promise under Norman 
testamentary custom, whereas Patourel saw it as more of a compromise made 
under pressure from his deathbed attendees.102 Patourel’s seems the more likely 
explanation as it squares better with the political reality. 
After a brief war, Rufus and Curthose came to an agreement not dissimilar to that of 
1036. This agreement definitely failed: Curthose was on crusade when Rufus died 
suddenly in a hunting ‘accident’ in 1100 and their younger brother, Henry Beauclerc, 
seized the throne. Henry I eventually captured Curthose at Tinchebrai and 
imprisoned him for the rest of his long life – during which time Henry controlled all of 
his father’s lands. Whatever William I had originally envisaged, it is unlikely that it 
was this – although, younger brothers usurping their older brothers was not unheard 
of, as in the case of Alphonso VI, which occurred when Henry I was four years old.103 
Henry I’s son, William Adelin, died tragically in 1120. When it seemed unlikely that 
Henry would have another son, he twice had his barons swear oaths of fealty to his 
daughter, Empress Matilda: at the Christmas court of 1126 and at the Council of 
London in 1128.104 When he died in 1135, however, Henry was at war with Matilda. 
We are told that on his deathbed he had released his barons from their oaths and, 
according to John of Salisbury, had designated his nephew, Stephen of Blois, as his 
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heir.105 The truth of this is, in many ways, less important than the fact that it was 
used to bolster Stephen’s claim. 
Stephen spent the vast majority of his reign defending his crown. In 1152, he 
attempted to have his eldest son, Eustace, crowned as junior king but the 
ecclesiastical polity refused him.106 Crowning one’s heir during one’s lifetime – or 
‘anticipatory association’ – was often an effective way of ensuring one’s successor. It 
was common in early Capetian France, although not so in England.107 It was in the 
same year that Matilda’s son, Henry FitzEmpress, married Eleanor of Aquitaine, 
vastly increasing his power on the Continent and reinforcing his control over 
Normandy. Consequently, many of the English barons reevaluated their allegiance to 
the House of Blois.108 When Henry landed in England in 1153 – and Eustace having 
already died – Stephen came to terms with the twenty-year-old Henry in the Treaty 
of Winchester (1153). Accordingly, when Stephen died in 1154, Henry II ascended 
the throne not only as the grandson of Henry I, but also as the adopted son and heir 
designate of Stephen – even though Stephen did have another surviving son, 
William, who was a similar age to Henry. 
Henry II’s relations with his sons were complicated. The eldest, Henry the Young 
King, had been crowned as junior king in 1170 (the feat that Stephen had failed to 
achieve). The young Henry, however, predeceased his father and, when the elder 
Henry died in 1189, he refused to name Richard, his third son (the second to reach 
adulthood), as his heir on his deathbed. Indeed, there were rumours that he had 
considered making his youngest son, John Lackland, his heir.109 In spite of this, it 
was Richard who was crowned.  
When Richard embarked on his crusade in 1190, he refused to designate either 
John or his nephew, Arthur of Brittany. In his treaty with Tancred of Sicily, however, 
he named Arthur as his heir and appears to have notified England of this around 
Christmas.110 In spite of the earlier inclination toward Arthur, however, Richard 
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named John his heir, as we have seen, on his deathbed in 1199. Interestingly, 
according to Carpenter: 
John proclaimed in 1199 that he had succeeded by hereditary right, ‘divine mercy’, and 
‘the unanimous assent and favour of clergy and people,’ thus precisely stressing the 
elective element later used against him.
111
 
The notable exception here is Richard’s designation of him as his heir, which might 
indicate that – in John’s view – he was the rightful heir of Richard, regardless of who 
Richard pretended to designate.  
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, designation was often attempted (or refused), 
though not always successfully. As a claim, therefore, it appears to have been 
tenable but not decisive. 
2.2.4 John’s Designation of Henry 
Between Henry’s birth in October 1207 and the onset of John’s sickness in October 
1216, John does not seem to have attempted to associate Henry with the throne in 
the way that Henry I, Stephen, and Henry II had attempted to do. He did not make a 
testament when he embarked to reclaim the lost continental possessions in 1214, as 
Philip Augustus of France had done in 1190 (even providing for a minority 
government)112 or, indeed, as Henry III did in 1253 when he departed for 
Gascony113. Later practice had it that the heir apparent would be the Prince of 
Wales, but Wales was not made into a principality until the completion of its 
conquest by Edward I in 1283.114 
One could see John as reckless for not acting sooner. Indeed, as Evans pointed out, 
John was twenty years his wife’s senior and therefore “there was always a chance 
that John would not have an adult heir by the time he died”.115 However, John may 
have learned from the examples of his father and Edward the Confessor: appointing 
one’s heirs too early and creating expectations could cause trouble. Furthermore, 
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whilst in some places co-rulers had been named very young,116 the English 
examples up to John’s time show associations only being made later: Henry I’s, 
Stephen’s, and Henry II’s offspring were all at least in their mid-teens when attempts 
were made, but Henry had only just turned nine. Finally, it seems that it was 
common in the twelfth century – and thus likely in the beginning part of the thirteenth 
century also – “for testaments to be made in extremis”, i.e. at the bitter end.117 
It is interesting that John felt any need to designate Henry, which perhaps indicates 
the weakness of hereditary right or that it at least required reinforcement. Could his 
designation guarantee Henry the throne? From the above discussion, the answer 
would appear to be ‘probably not’, although it could create and strengthen his claim. 
As Warren said, designation was “influential but not decisive”.118 Perhaps the most 
poignant example of a failed designation comes from 1553 when Edward VI failed to 
designate his cousin, the Lady Jane Grey, who was imprisoned by Mary Tudor and 
subsequently executed.  
Although it may not have been decisive, John’s designation recognised the 
fundamentally political nature of the succession and he knew that his son stood a 
greater chance if he made sure that his supporters became Henry’s supporters.  
2.2.5 Hereditary Right 
The succession may have been preordained simply by the fact that Henry was 
John’s eldest legitimate surviving son. In many ways, this is the most tempting 
explanation and would confirm most people’s assumptions about medieval 
succession and feudal patriarchy. 
This opinion is certainly reinforced by the successive father-to-eldest-son 
successions from John/Henry III in 1216 to Edward III/Richard II in 1377.119 Indeed, 
primogeniture appears to have been so strong towards the end of the fourteenth 
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century that Richard II succeeded in precisely the circumstances that Arthur of 
Brittany had lost out to John. The strength of hereditary right was also demonstrated 
in the accession of Edward I, Henry III’s son. Edward had taken the cross in June 
1268 and sailed to the Holy Land in August 1270, accompanied by his younger 
brother, Edmund. Edmund, arguably Edward’s greatest rival, had already returned to 
England when Henry died in November 1272.120 In the past, absence from the 
kingdom on the death of the monarch had often been fatal for a claim: Harthacnut 
lost out to Harefoot; Curthose to Henry I; and Empress Matilda, William Count of 
Sully, and Theobald II Count of Champagne all lost out to Stephen of Blois (William 
and Theobald were Stephen’s older brothers). Edward’s throne remained safe, 
however, until his return in August 1273. For Hannis Taylor, this demonstrated “how 
the ancient doctrine of elective kingship was fast giving way to the new feudal notion 
of hereditary right”.121  
The events after Richard II are worth mentioning briefly in this context. Richard was 
childless when he was deposed in 1399 by his cousin, Henry Bolingbroke. Under 
strict primogeniture, Bolingbroke – who was descended from a younger cadet, John 
of Gaunt – would not have been next in line for the throne. Rather, it would have 
been Richard and Bolingbroke’s first-cousin-once-removed, Edmund Mortimer, 5th 
Earl of March. Edmund, like father and grandmother during their lifetimes had been 
the heir presumptive of Richard, although he was only six when Richard was 
deposed. Interestingly, Bolingbroke apparently did try to argue his claim on an 
hereditary basis by pointing to the story that Edward I had been the younger brother 
of Edmund ‘Crouchback’, whose hereditary right had been set aside in view of his 
physical deformity. The story is almost certainly apocryphal,122 but Bolingbroke’s use 
of it as a demonstration that cadet lines can take precedence shows that hereditary 
right was not as straightforward as many today assume. In fact, if Bolingbroke had 
wanted a better example, he should have turned to Æthelstan’s accession in the 
920s. As it was, Richard II’s deposition and the accession of the younger cadet line 
under Henry IV – the House of Lancaster – was to have far-reaching consequences 
in English history, resulting in the War of the Roses. 
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When one looks at the period before Henry III’s accession, rather than after it, the 
picture is dramatically different. When Richard I succeeded Henry II in 1189, the 
crown had not passed directly from father to eldest son for 172 years when Edmund 
II had succeeded Æthelred II in 1016. Accepting patrilineal primogeniture, John 
would not have been Richard I’s rightful heir, just as Sweyn Forkbeard, Cnut, Harold 
Harefoot, Harthacnut, Edward the Confessor, Harold II, William I, William II, Henry I, 
Stephen, Henry II would not have been their immediate predecessors’ rightful heirs. 
Hereditary right is starting to look weaker, but it was weaker still. 
2.2.6 Avoided Minorities 
Edmund Mortimer was ignored in 1399, though arguably he had the greater 
hereditary right (see above). Edmund is one of many minors who have been passed 
over in the succession. Looking at the early kings of England, we find Edmund I’s 
two young sons losing out to their uncle, Eadred, in 946, although both eventually 
became king.123 After the young Æthelred II came to the throne in 978, there were at 
least four occasions that a minor claimant was passed over before Henry III’s 
accession, which will be discussed below.  
2.2.6.1 Edmund Ætheling and Edward the Exile (1016) 
Following Cnut’s late father’s successful conquest of England in 1013 and its 
subsequent return to the allegiance of Æthelred II, Cnut invaded England in 1016. 
Shortly after, Æthelred died and his son, Edmund II, was crowned. After a few 
months of fighting, Edmund II and Cnut came to an agreement whereby they would 
be ‘brothers by adoption’ and share power in the kingdom: Edmund would have 
Wessex and Cnut would have Mercia.124 
When Edmund died soon after the agreement, Cnut became king of all England, 
even though Edmund had left two sons: Edmund Ætheling, who was about a year 
old, and Edward the Exile, who was younger still. Hoveden said that Edmund had 
intended Cnut to be their “guardian and protector, until they should be of fit age to 
reign”.125 This was very optimistic and, as it happened, the young princes were 
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rushed out of the kingdom, lucky to escape alive. However, theirs was the stronger 
claim as their dynasty – the House of Wessex – had ruled England since its 
inception, but there was neither the political will nor the strength to overthrow Cnut. 
Their uncle, Eadwig Ætheling – the last of Æthelred’s sons by his first marriage – 
was exiled in 1017 but returned shortly after only to be executed by Cnut. Their half-
uncle, on the other hand, Edward (later ‘the Confessor’), had a very different life 
ahead of him. 
2.2.6.2 Edgar the Ætheling (1066) 
Edward the Exile and Edmund Ætheling had arguably still been more entitled to the 
throne than the Confessor in 1042 (they were all sons of Æthelred II but from two 
different marriages). However, they were far away in Hungary at the time. Around 
1059, when it began to look as though the Confessor would not produce heirs, 
Edward the Exile was invited back to England. Although he died shortly after arriving, 
he was survived by his young son, Edgar the Ætheling.  
Edgar was the half-grand-nephew of the Confessor, grandson of Edmund II, and 
great-grandson of Æthelred II. However, despite the fact that Eadwig, Edgar the 
Peaceful, and Edward the Martyr had all been crowned around a similar age, Edgar 
was passed over in January 1066 for Harold Godwinson. Edgar lacked close and 
powerful relatives (which all previous young kings had had) and, in any case, few 
were in a position to rival Harold Godwinson; he was not only the most powerful earl 
in the kingdom but he also was of full age and experienced – a man much more able 
to run the kingdom and repel the imminent invasions. Harold’s hereditary claims 
were much more tenuous, being only the brother-in-law of the Confessor and the 
nephew of Cnut’s sister, Estrith, but they appear to have been sufficient to place him 
close enough to the throne. 
Edgar’s chance almost came when Harold II was defeated by William of Normandy 
at the Battle of Hastings on 14 October 1066. Beem drew a comparison between 
Edgar and Henry III: 
37 
 
when all the other adult male challengers to William … were in their graves, young Edgar 
presented the only possible dynastic alternative to William, a scenario remarkably similar 
to that of 1216, when nine-year-old Henry III was hastily crowned John’s successor.
126
 
Edgar was hastily proclaimed king by the surviving Anglo-Saxon nobles, but support 
for him dwindled as William worked his way towards London. The writer of the Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle (D) said, with a hint of sadness, that William’s victory was ‘God’s 
punishment [on the English] for their sins’127 and that it was ‘a great piece of folly that 
they had not [submitted] sooner, since God would not make things better, because of 
our sins’.128 Thus, the chronicler had infused divine appointment with right of 
conquest (i.e. a form of capture, 2.1.1.4) to nullify Edgar’s claims. 
Edgar went into exile in 1068, but continued to play a role in English affairs (for 
instance, he was with Robert Curthose at Tinchebrai). His niece, Matilda of Scotland, 
married Henry I, reintroducing the Wessex line to the English throne.  
2.2.6.3 Henry FitzEmpress (1135) 
As will be remembered from the discussion on designation, there was no love lost 
between Henry I and his eldest daughter, Matilda, when he died, even though Henry 
had initially intended that she become England’s first regnant queen. If it was the 
case that the English constitution did not allow for a regnant queen, then Henry’s 
closest male heir was Matilda’s son, Henry FitzEmpress who could have been 
crowned instead of his mother. However, Henry FitzEmpress was only two years old 
when his grandfather died and both his parents unpopular amongst the Anglo-
Norman baronage.129 Instead, it was Stephen of Blois, whose promptness and 
initiative triumphed. It is worth noting that Stephen was Henry I’s nephew, although 
he did have older brothers: William, County of Sully and Theobald II, Count of 
Champagne. Henry FitzEmpress did eventually become king, however, succeeding 
Stephen as Henry II. 
2.2.6.4 Arthur of Brittany (1199) 
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Henry II had four sons who survived to adulthood. The eldest, Henry the Younger, 
predeceased him. The second eldest, Richard, became king in 1189. By the time of 
Richard’s death in 1199, the third eldest, Geoffrey, had also died, although he had 
left a son: Arthur of Brittany. Henry II’s youngest son was John. The question was: 
when Richard died, did the son and brother of a king (John) have a greater right than 
the child (Arthur) of an older sibling who was never king (Geoffrey)? In Norman and 
perhaps Germanic custom, John had the greater right, although Glanvill and Bracton 
appear to favour the nibling.130  
Constance of Brittany, Arthur’s mother, moved to have Arthur proclaimed as 
Richard’s heir and succeeded in Anjou, Maine, and Touraine.131 However, the 
English magnates (notably William Marshal132) favoured John. After a tactical 
campaign and some political manoeuvring, in May 1200 John’s position was so 
strong that Philip Augustus (as overlord of the Plantagenet continental dominions) 
accepted him as heir to Richard’s continental lands.133 A few years later, Arthur’s 
claim was revived when, in July 1202, Philip put him forward as the lord of the 
Plantagenet continental lands (except Normandy), claiming that John had forfeited 
his right in the Lusignan affair. In less than a month, however, John had captured 
Arthur and his sister whilst they were besieging Eleanor of Aquitaine at Mirebeau.134 
Arthur disappeared sometime in 1203 and there are many theories about his fate.135 
2.2.7 Indeterminacy at John’s Death 
At the time of Henry’s accession, hereditary right alone was insufficient to secure the 
throne. This is demonstrated by both the lack of any apparent hereditary rule 
regulating the succession and the fact that minor claimants had, on a number of 
occasions, been overlooked. Hereditary claims also had a tendency to become 
complicated, particularly when premature death, childlessness (or too many 
children), remarriage, and intra-family rivalry were involved; often, the debate was 
                                            
130
 Glanvill, Tractatus, 1965, 78; Bracton, De Legibus, 2:189–90; See also: Painter, William Marshal, 
120. Cf. Richard II’s accession in 1377. ‘Nibling’ is a recent neologism, which means the child of one’s 
sibling (i.e. one’s niece or nephew). 
131
 Warren, King John, 65; Painter, William Marshal, 121. 
132
 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, vol. 2, l. 11835–11908. 
133
 Painter, William Marshal, 121; Warren, King John, 70. 
134
 For the History’s account of Arthur's capture, see: Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William 
Marshal, 2004, vol. 2, l. 12059–12164. 
135
 See: Warren, King John, 99. 
39 
 
not about who had the right, but the greater right, which was demonstrated by the 
accession of Henry’s father, John. Thus, in spite of Æthelred II’s precedent – if they 
had been aware of it – Henry’s accession could not have been secure on hereditary 
grounds alone.  
John was right, therefore, to designate Henry and to use what influence he had. 
However, John could not rule from beyond the grave and all he could have done 
when he closed his eyes for the last time was hope. Though his cause may have 
seemed hopeless, Henry was in a better position than many of the minor claimants 
who had been passed over: Louis’ power in the kingdom was not as extensive as 
Cnut’s had been when Edmund II died; Henry was in the kingdom, unlike either 
Henry FitzEmpress or Arthur of Brittany; Henry did lack a powerful mother – such as 
Ælfthryth, mother to Æthelred II, or Blanche of Castile, mother to Louis IX of France 
– but having a powerful mother could also be a setback, as shown in the case of 
Empress Matilda and Henry FitzEmpress. Most importantly, and quite unlike Edgar 
the Ætheling, Henry’s father was established in the kingdom and had had a long time 
to build up personal ties of loyalty with the powerful magnates.  
Patourel and Abulafia, talking of the Norman and Germanic succession respectively, 
recognised that the strength of a hereditary claim was contingent upon the influence 
of the departing monarch.136 Whether they had done enough, however, was 
something that could only be assessed after they had departed the throne. Henry 
had a good claim, and John had done his best to strengthen it, but, as the survey of 
the centuries leading up to the thirteenth has demonstrated, it was far from 
unchallengeable. Even if Henry could show that he did have the greatest right, he 
would still need to translate that into a reality, which, given the civil war and his 
youth, was in the balance. 
2.3 Interregnum, 19–28 October 1216 
It shall now be considered how the succession was decided after John’s death and 
why it was Henry, and no other, who became king.  
2.3.1 Need for Urgency 
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England had been a papal fief since 1213 and Pope Innocent III had firmly taken 
John’s side in the struggle. Innocent had forbidden Louis’ invasion and consequently 
excommunicated him. The English Church supported John and, even though Louis 
held London, he did not have anybody who could crown him.  
Nevertheless, it was important that if an alternative to Louis was to be crowned, they 
needed to be crowned quickly for two reasons: (a) the singularity of the royal office 
and (b) the difficulty of ‘unkinging’ a monarch for, as Shakespeare’s Richard II put it  
Not all the water in the rough rude sea, 
Can wash the balm off from an anointed king.”
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The importance of ‘winning the race’ to be crowned had been demonstrated by 
Henry I, who left his brother’s corpse lying in the New Forest to secure the treasury 
at Winchester before going on to London to be crowned by the nearest available 
bishop. It had also been demonstrated by Stephen, who likewise secured the 
treasury and went to London. It was perhaps Lady Jane Grey’s failure to have 
herself crowned in 1553 that meant her cousin, Mary Tudor, could so easily unseat 
her. 
There would always be the possibility that Louis would get himself crowned 
regardless and become an ‘anti-king’. Such a situation had happened not long 
before in Germany with Otto of Brunswick and Philip of Swabia, crowned in July and 
September 1198 respectively. Indeed, twice in English history there had been two 
consecrated kings: (1) Henry II and Henry the Young King (who was only a junior 
king) in the twelfth century and (2) Henry VI and Edward IV in the fifteenth century. 
Empress Matilda came close to being crowned during Stephen’s reign in the mid-
twelfth century, but did not manage it. In all cases, the result was tension and they 
were by all accounts exceptional. For the most part, it appears to have been 
accepted that a challenger to the throne would have to unseat the incumbent before 
assuming the office themselves. After all, even challengers had an interest in 
preserving the integrity and potency of the monarch’s office as, if they triumphed, 
they would want to exclude all others. 
2.3.2 Events of the Interregnum 
                                            
137
 William Shakespeare, Richard II, ed. Anthony B Dawson and Paul Yachnin (Oxford World’s 
Classics, 2011), l. 3.2.54–55 (p. 208). 
41 
 
According to Wendover, John had requested burial at Worcester, although the 
Barnwell Chronicler said that he was buried in Worcester “not because he had 
chosen burial there, but because the place seemed safer at the time”.138 The papal 
legate, Guala, and William Marshal both met the funeral train en route and attended 
the funeral.139 Those present then went to Gloucester and summoned the other 
loyalist barons to them. 
The appeal met with a quick response; a council was held, and all present unanimously 
agreed that they should send for little Henry.
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Henry was then conveyed to Gloucester where the barons were “anxious that the 
coronation should take place without delay”.141 According to the History, an unknown 
speaker said “The sooner the better, / for upon my faith, there is no question, / of 
waiting; if we waited too long, / we might end up with nothing”; after all, as the author 
of the History said, “nobody knows what is round the corner”.142 As seen above 
(2.3.1), their concerns were legitimate. The absence of Ranulf, earl of Chester, 
however, caused some anxiety, as he was regarded as one of the most powerful 
loyalists. The unknown speaker in the History went on: Ranulf would be “pleased to 
see that it is already done, / for he knows that the need is pressing”.143  
The account in the History says that Ranulf did not arrive in time for the ceremony, 
although Alexander believed that he may well have made it.144 In any case, the 
coronation took place on 28 October 1216. 
2.3.3 Elective Kingship 
A King of the English had never possessed a constitutional right to bequeath his kingdom 
like a private estate. The right of electing a king resided in the Witan alone, acting on 
behalf of the whole nation.
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For a long time, the orthodox opinion was as above: heredity or designation (or 
perhaps rather ‘nomination’) entitled a person to candidature for the throne but, 
because kingship was essentially elective, the ultimate decision lay with the leading 
assembly of the kingdom. Certainly, the fact that a group of the leading magnates 
gathered at Gloucester and then discussed whether or not to bring Henry to them 
appears very much like they were deciding whether or not to elect Henry. 
There are many problems with the concept of elective kingship, which shall be now 
discussed. 
2.3.4 Form 
The idea of elective kingship relies principally on interpretations of the Anglo-Saxon 
Witan, which is often said to have had the power to elect and depose kings.146 There 
is some evidence to support this case. When Swein Forkbeard invaded in 1013, the 
‘Witan’ set aside Æthelred II, but, when Swein died the following year, the ‘Witan’ 
invited Æthelred back from exile, even though Swein’s army had chosen his son, 
Cnut. Take also Edward the Confessor’s letter to Magnus of Norway following 
Harthacnut’s death, which might be obliquely referring to the Witan when he says: “it 
was decided by all the leaders in England that I be given the title of king”.147 
At its core, the Witan appears to have been an assembly of sorts. However, it is an 
elusive body that was constantly changing. The nature and development of the 
Anglo-Saxon assembly has been recently discussed by Roach (whose dedicated 
treatment of the Anglo-Saxon assembly is the first for over half a century) and 
Maddicott, both of whom were careful to place it in its proper context.148 In particular, 
Maddicott was careful to distinguish the Anglo-Saxon institution from Parliament and, 
in the words of his reviewer, to emphasise “the place of contingency and 
happenstance” in the latter’s creation.149 Consequently, I shall therefore limit myself 
to two comments. First, the size and composition of the assembly varied, and there 
is no mention of quorum.150  Second, the assembly is often thought as representing 
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the ‘English people’, but there is little evidence that it was in any way democratic. 
Instead, it was almost certainly aristocratic and its membership was determined by 
wealth and influence.151   
Was the meeting at Gloucester an election? If the answer is ‘yes’, then it was a sham 
election. The attendees were not a representative group; only those barons known to 
be “on the King’s side” and who “were not deterred from [attending] by the war” were 
invited.152 In many ways, this is equivalent to gerrymandering or electoral rigging. We 
do not know whether a vote was taken, but if there was it is doubtful that it was 
specified beforehand what proportion of the vote would be required to succeed or 
that it was done by secret ballot. Peer pressure almost certainly played a role. It 
does not seem that the votes were equal, as the concern over Ranulf of Chester’s 
absence implies that he might have been able to exercise a veto. Perhaps one could 
say that there was restricted suffrage and a poor turnout, but the more one looks at 
it, the less legitimacy it appears to convey.  
In fact, according to Carpenter, the loyalists could have held “an assembly at 
Northampton ‘to elect’ Henry king but since Louis also claimed to have been elected, 
this would merely place Henry on a par with his rival”. Therefore, they decide to 
“plunge ahead” with the coronation.153 It is better, therefore, to see the events at 
Gloucester as not being an election per se, which implies a guaranteed course of 
action following the announcement of the result, but, rather, a collection of 
declarations of support. It was a political settlement; one might go so far as to call it a 
gamble made in the vein of game theory. It did not make Henry an ‘elected king’, 
although the effect was similar; in the end, it appears to have been a triumph for 
strong-armed hereditary right (i.e. a hereditary claim forcibly enforced). 
2.3.5 Scope of Choice 
Even if we admit that there was some constitutional form, there were many 
occasions when any such ‘election’ seems to have been reduced to a rubber stamp 
– a confirmation, acknowledgement, or even submission. For example, as William of 
Normandy pressed towards London, the initial election of Edgar Ætheling was set 
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aside in favour of William. For Liebermann, as the time passed “the election sank 
into ceremonial form”, becoming secondary to other factors; being required to decide 
in contentious cases but otherwise not having a say.154 If required to decide, there 
was always the question as to how much choice they had: could they choose their 
favourite, or did they have to decide between claims much as a court of law would? 
In either case, decisions almost certainly would have taken into account ‘policy 
reasons’. Indeed, there is evidence that the support of the magnates could be 
purchased – if not with money then with promises, e.g. the Coronation Charter of 
Henry I. 
In truth, Henry was the only plausible candidate and this would be a good 
opportunity to demonstrate it by looking at the other ‘candidates’. 
2.3.6 Louis 
William Marshal and Peter des Roches had been sent by John to argue before Philip 
Augustus that the conflict was an internal affair and to ask him to prevent his son 
from becoming involved. Philip did not listen. On 25 April 1216, Guala, the papal 
legate, halted at Philip’s court en route from Rome to England, to command him to 
control his son.155 Guala was met with a theatrical performance whereby one of 
Louis’ knights explained the basis of Louis’ claim: John had forfeited his kingship 
through his tyranny and had been “deposed by the barons of England”, leaving the 
throne vacant; the barons elected to fill this vacancy with Louis, who was chosen “by 
reason of his wife, whose mother, namely, the queen of Castile, was the only 
survivor of all the brothers and sisters of the said king of England”.156 Thus, Louis 
claimed not only to be elected, but to be a rightful heir by (acquired) hereditary right. 
Guala remained unconvinced and sailed for England. Philip, meanwhile, sent envoys 
to Innocent III arguing his son’s case and, in May, Louis himself sailed to England.157  
Louis’ claims are tenuous and Holt went so far as to dismiss them as ‘concocted’.158 
He seems to set himself up as a candidate by being related to the House of 
Plantagenet through his wife, Blanche of Castile. Blanche was a granddaughter of 
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Henry II through her mother, Eleanor of Castile. However, Eleanor had older sisters, 
who also had children and, furthermore, Blanche was not even the eldest daughter 
of Eleanor. There were a number of people with a much stronger claim than 
Blanche. The real reason for choosing Louis appears to have been strategic. 
According to Wendover, the rebels had chosen Louis because John was surrounded 
by people with continental lands, which were under the control of the French crown. 
The rebels hoped that John’s attendees would choose their lands over their support 
of John and, thus, he would be “left destitute both at home and abroad”.159 
Louis was certainly invited by the rebels, but whether they could validly elect Louis is 
as dubious as an election of Henry at Gloucester.  
2.3.7 Other Possible Claimants 
2.3.7.1 Geoffrey of Brittany’s Children 
First, there were the children of John’s older brother, Geoffrey. Had Geoffrey’s son, 
Arthur of Brittany, lived, he would have been the most obvious rival to Henry. 
However, his disappearance in 1203 ruled him out. He was survived by his sister, 
Eleanor, who had also been captured by John. Eleanor became, according to 
Carpenter, the “focus of flitting conspiracy and ambiguous intrigue” and five years 
later her gaoler, Peter de Maulay, was accused of plotting with Peter des Roches to 
carry her to the king of France.160 Indeed, she still featured “towards the end of the 
century in romantic stories as ‘the true heir to England’ to whom, indeed, according 
to one tale, a conscience-stricken King Henry had briefly resigned his crown.”161 
However, she was never a serious candidate: she had been imprisoned for half her 
life, had little to call her own, and little support. Moreover, England had not had a 
regnant queen and, if she got married, then that might also cause difficulties. There 
may have also been questions about her ability to produce an heir, being in her 
thirties.162 Eleanor died, still imprisoned, in 1241. 
2.3.7.2 John’s Sisters’ Children 
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Then there were Henry’s aunts, John’s three sisters: Matilda, Duchess of Saxony; 
Eleanor, Queen of Castile; and Joan, Queen of Sicily. All three predeceased John 
and it is feasible that their children’s claims could have been stronger had they lived. 
Their offspring shall be quickly noted. 
Matilda’s children included Henry V, Count Palatine of the Rhein and Otto IV, Holy 
Roman Emperor. If John had failed to have children, Henry V would have been heir-
apparent. However, in 1216 he was around forty-three and his only son, Henry VI 
(who had been raised in John’s court), had died in 1214, leaving the future of his 
dynasty insecure. Otto IV had been John’s ally and was around forty-one at the time; 
he had no children and, following his defeat at Bouvines in 1214 (effectively sealing 
the fate of the Angevin continental territories), he was not a tenable choice. In any 
case, the time it would take to send for either of them, negotiate terms, and await 
their arrival with sufficient force would take too long.  
Eleanor’s eldest surviving son, Henry I of Castile, was only twelve at the time. It is 
interesting to note that when he died in June 1217, the crown of Castile passed to 
his eldest sister, Berengaria who, in turn, passed it to her son, Ferdinand III. 
Ferdinand was five years his cousin’s senior, being seventeen in 1216. Being 
descended from the eldest daughter of Eleanor, Ferdinand was arguably much more 
entitled than his aunt, Blanche of Castile – Louis’ wife. 
Joan had married Raymond VI, Count of Toulouse. Their son, Raymond, was 
nineteen in 1216 but, as Toulouse had been captured the previous year by Simon de 
Montfort the elder in the Albigensian Crusade, he lacked the resources to pursue a 
claim to the English throne – not to mention that regaining Toulouse would have 
probably been his priority. 
2.3.7.3 John’s Uncles 
Moving from John’s legitimate siblings, we turn to his uncles, Geoffrey, Count of 
Nantes, and William FitzEmpress. However, these had both died without issue.  
2.3.7.4 Return to the House of Blois 
Stephen’s eldest son, Eustace, predeceased him and his second son died five years 
after him without issue. Stephen’s eldest granddaughter, Ida, Countess of Boulogne 
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had died in April 1216, but was succeeded by her daughter, Matilda II of Boulogne. 
His younger granddaughter, Matilda of Flanders had died in October 1210, leaving 
seven children; the eldest male child, Henry II of Brabant, was the same age as 
Henry III.  
It seems doubtful that Stephen’s descendants would have been welcomed – not only 
because of Stephen’s reputation but also because they were firmly part of the 
French nobility. To support a French noble for the crown would undermine the 
symbolic resistance to the French Prince Louis. It should also be noted that 
Stephen’s great-grandchildren’s third cousin, Theobald VI of Blois, (who was 
descended from Stephen’s older brother, Theobald) likely fought at the naval battle 
of Sandwich for Louis.163 
2.3.7.5 Henry II’s and John’s Illegitimate Children 
Another option would have been to turn to one of Henry II’s many illegitimate sons, 
the most notable of whom was William Longespée, earl of Salisbury. Although 
Longespée began and ended the war with the loyalists, at the time of John’s death 
he was fighting for Louis, although seemingly not with designs on the throne himself. 
John’s first marriage to Isabella of Gloucester had produced no issue, but he had 
had a number of illegitimate children by various women before marrying his second 
wife, Isabella of Angoulême. Ralph Turner has identified nine illegitimate children in 
official royal records, alongside three others mentioned elsewhere:164  
- Joan, Lady of Wales, who had married Llywelyn the Great and, therefore, 
would not have been a popular choice;  
- Richard FitzRoy (aka ‘de Warenne’ or ‘of Chilham’165), who had been one of 
John’s captains and constable of Wallingford Castle in 1216. He participated 
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in the battle of Sandwich where, according to Wendover, he beheaded 
Eustace the Monk;166  
- Oliver FitzRoy, who later departed for Damietta in 1218, but did not return;  
- Geoffrey FitzRoy (d. 1205, Poitou);  
- John FitzRoy, who was a clerk in 1201 and died sometime after 1216;  
- Henry FitzRoy (d. 1245);  
- Osbert Gifford of whom we know nothing after 1216;  
- Eudes FitzRoy, who accompanied Richard of Cornwall on crusade and died 
there in 1241;  
- Maud (d.ca.1252), abbess at Barking Abbey 
- Bartholomew, Isabel, and Philip. 
Most of John’s illegitimate children appear to have been alive in 1216 and we should 
not dismiss them lightly. After all, the first English king, Æthelstan, was an illegitimate 
child and ascended the West Saxon throne in spite of three surviving legitimate half-
brothers. However, raising illegitimate children to the throne was fraught with 
difficulties, as the Carolingian monarchs Lothar II and Charles the Fat both 
discovered.167  
2.3.7.6 Henry III’s Younger Brother 
There was also Henry’s seven-year-old younger brother, Richard. There is some 
precedent for supporting a younger son,168 but there seems little reason why 
Richard’s claim could have been stronger than Henry’s, especially as it would have 
been difficult to predict which of them would make the better king. 
2.3.8 Free Choice 
The final possibility would have been to found a new dynasty. There were two key 
problems with this: (a) finding a suitable candidate and (b) deciding what to do with 
John’s sons. The second is the most important. The state had not developed to such 
a point that it was separate from its officers. The Crown’s lands were, ultimately, the 
Plantagenet family’s lands. Choosing an alternative to Henry’s sons would mean 
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effectively disinheriting them – unless they were allowed to keep their lands, in which 
case they would become over-mighty subjects. If they were disinherited, there would 
always be the potential for a future civil war, launched by the young princes to 
reclaim their ancestral lands. If the magnates decided to dispose of the princes, then 
one might question whether they took the throne by right or by force. It is perhaps 
worth mentioning, though, that Henry and Richard had three sisters – Joan, Isabella, 
and Eleanor – who could have been married off to convey legitimacy on the new 
ruling house, similar to Henry I’s marriage to Matilda of Scotland, which joined the 
Norman and West Saxon lines.169 
2.3.9 Intermediate Conclusions 
Henry’s claim, although not ideal owing to his youth, was the only viable alternative 
to Louis: all the others were too old and childless, too young, their claims too 
tenuous or politically unsustainable or simply too far away. The fact that there was 
no obvious contender to Henry and Louis is implicitly recognised in Griffiths’ 
erroneous statement that Henry was John’s only son, although he is correct in 
stating that there was ‘no plausible or acceptable alternative’ to him.170  
Moreover, John’s followers had a strong interest in supporting his son, seeing as 
their livelihoods had theretofore relied upon the Plantagenets’ generosity. In 
particular, John’s foreign-born courtiers had a strong need for the Crown’s patronage 
and protection.171 If Yorke is correct, this was not a new turn of affairs. She 
concluded that the enthronement of the Northumbrian child-king Osred represented 
“a desperate attempt to retain power by those whose fortunes were bound up with 
the continuing success of the house of Oswiu.”172  
2.3.10 Papal Designation 
There was one other who, arguably, could designate Henry as the heir: the pope. 
England was, at the time, a papal fief and, in theory, the pope was the overlord of all 
John’s lands. Innocent III and Honorius III both threw their weight behind John and 
his children. It was Innocent III, for example, who issued the Bull releasing John from 
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Magna Carta, who had sent Guala as legate to England, and who had forbidden the 
clergy from supporting Louis. Honorius was quick to confirm Henry as king and to 
give Guala all the authority he needed to defend Henry’s throne.  
It is difficult to know whether Guala and Honorius III would have accepted another 
candidate for the throne, had the loyalists decided to choose somebody else. It is 
arguable that the Church possessed a right to veto potential claimants, as perhaps 
demonstrated by the Church’s refusal to crown Stephen’s son, Eustace. After all, if 
the coronation ceremony was “a public sign that the Church received the promise of 
the king”, what was to prevent the Church refusing to accept a promise?173  
Furthermore, popes did not characteristically refrain from involving themselves in 
succession disputes across Europe, although rarely for altruistic reasons: William I 
secured papal blessing for his conquest of England, although Pope Alexander II 
seems to have been most interested in bringing the English church to heel;174 in May 
1179, Alexander III issued the papal bull Manifestis Probatum by which he created 
(or, at least, recognised) the independent Kingdom of Portugal;175 in 1189, Innocent 
III supported the candidacy of Otto of Brunswick in Germany owing to his desire to 
break up the Hohenstaufen joint kingdom of Germany and Sicily; and in 1254 
Alexander IV offered the throne of Sicily to Henry III’s second son, Edmund, although 
this offer was rescinded in 1258 and Alexander’s successors, Urban IV and Clement 
IV, both tried (eventually successfully) to confer it on Charles of Anjou.176 
The constitutionality of papal interference will be discussed at greater length in the 
next chapter. It should be noted, however, that the extent to which papal support was 
necessary or sufficient for Henry’s accession is unclear. Papal support certainly 
complemented Henry’s claim – be it his hereditary claim, his claim as heir-elect, or 
his claim as heir-designate of John – and it was clearly welcomed by the loyalists, 
who needed all the help they could get. Whether it fits in with an ancient constitution 
or fundamental laws, however, remains to be seen.  
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2.4 First Coronation, 28 October 1216, Gloucester 
Regardless of by what right, Henry was crowned on 28 October 1216. Through the 
coronation ceremony, Henry was metamorphosed into a king. It shall now be 
examined what sort of form that metamorphosis took and whether Henry was 
capable of it within the established laws. 
There are many things that we regard today as being central to the coronation of a 
new monarch, such as the venue being Westminster Abbey and the presiding 
ecclesiastic being the archbishop of Canterbury. Neither was available in October 
1216: London was, at the time, held by Louis and the archbishop of Canterbury, 
Stephen Langton, had been in Rome since the Fourth Lateran Council of November 
1215.177 There is some precedent, however, which suggests that neither the Abbey 
nor the archbishop were necessary.  
2.4.1 Venue 
English coronations have not always taken place at Westminster Abbey. There is 
some evidence that Kingston-upon-Thames was a popular location for coronations. 
Æthelstan – before he was king of the English – was almost certainly crowned there 
in 924.178 As Roach identified, for Æthelstan this was a sensible choice, as it lay on 
the borders of Wessex and Mercia, which Æthelstan was trying to unite. It also lay 
on the border of the Danelaw, “acknowledging the new axis of the realm, running 
along the Thames”.179 It was as pragmatic as symbolic, however, for Æthelstan had 
few friends in West Saxon Winchester.180  
According to the twelfth-century chronicler Hoveden, Eadred (946) and Eadwig (955) 
were also crowned at Kingston, but these have no mention in the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle (ASC).181 The coronation of Æthelred II in 978, however, is mentioned in 
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the ASC as having taken place at Kingston.182 The exception to this association with 
Kingston is Eadgar’s coronation in 973, which took place at Bath.183 
Edmund II (1016) was ‘chosen’ at London, although it is unclear whether he was 
crowned there.184 Edward the Confessor (1042), on the other hand, decided to return 
to the former West Saxon capital of Winchester for his coronation.185 It was the 
Confessor’s patronage of Westminster Abbey, however, that was part of the reason 
behind the shift towards London. According to Walker, Harold Godwinson’s 
coronation was held on the same day and at the same location as the Confessor’s 
funeral, Westminster Abbey, for the very practical reason that it saved lots of to-ing 
and fro-ing, as well as the symbolism connecting the new with the old king.186 
London was also growing as a political centre. According to Schramm, “If London 
recognized him [the new king], he could reasonably expect to carry the country with 
him”.187 Indeed, Brooke says that the citizens of London came to make “the startling 
claim that no king could be chosen without their consent”.188  
William I was crowned at Westminster Abbey and, from that time onwards, the 
Abbey was the place of choice. For instance, Schramm stressed the fact that Henry 
Beauclerc, in 1100, made the long journey from Winchester to Westminster to be 
consecrated.189 By the time Henry III came to the throne, there had been a century-
and-a-half’s tradition linking the coronation to the Abbey – but if one were to argue 
continuity from the Anglo-Saxon period then there was little reason why the 
coronation could not take place elsewhere, especially if it was politically sound. 
Gloucester was an unprecedented choice, but so was Westminster Abbey for 
Harold. Furthermore, Gloucester was still an important place, as illustrated by the 
fact that William I held one of his triannual crown-wearings there.190  
2.4.2 Archbishop of Canterbury 
                                            
182
 Gomme, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 99; Giles, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 85. 
183
 Gomme, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 95; Giles, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 83; See also: Roach, 
Kingship and Consent in Anglo-Saxon England, 871-978, 62–63. 
184
 Gomme, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 125; Giles, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 105. 
185
 Schramm, A History of the English Coronation, 38. 
186
 Ian W Walker, Harold: The Last Anglo-Saxon King, 2nd ed. (The History Press, 2010), 260; see 
also: Frank Barlow, Edward the Confessor (University of California Press, 1984), 254–255. 
187
 Schramm, A History of the English Coronation, 38. 
188
 Brooke, The Saxon and Norman Kings, 33. 
189
 Schramm, A History of the English Coronation, 39–40. 
190
 Schramm, A History of the English Coronation, 38. 
53 
 
William I was crowned by the archbishop of York,191 who according to the English 
sources also crowned Harold II (although, the Norman sources mention Stigand, 
archbishop of Canterbury).192 Henry I was crowned by the Bishop of London (as 
Archbishop Anselm was in exile).193 None were considered any less a king because 
of it. The majority of Anglo-Saxon kings, however, appear to have been crowned by 
the archbishop of Canterbury, regardless of where they were crowned. 
At the time, the archbishop of York was Walter de Gray and the bishop of London 
was William of Sainte-Mère-Eglise. I have been unable to locate either of them in 
October 1216 and neither is listed by Wendover as being present on the day before 
Henry’s coronation.194 Interestingly, neither is mentioned in John’s testament.195 The 
reason for this is unclear: Walter de Gray, for instance, was high in the estimations of 
both John and Henry III.196 Instead, it was des Roches, bishop of Winchester or 
Guala who performed the task. The bishopric of Winchester is a prestigious one, and 
des Roches would have been the most senior English bishop present.  
2.4.3 Proceedings 
Prior to the ceremony, William Marshal knighted Henry. According to Wendover, 
Henry was accompanied “in solemn procession” to the church by the magnates. 
Once at the church, he publicly swore to protect and show reverence towards the 
Church and God, to “show strict justice to the people entrusted to his care” and to 
“abolish all bad laws and customs … and observe those that were good, and cause 
them to be observed by all”.197 If Wendover’s account is correct, it appears that 
Henry was made to swear the tria praecepta of the Anselm ordo, which is the form 
found in Bracton and was the ‘definitive’ form “for at least the greater part of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries.”198 Following the oath, Henry then did “homage to 
the holy church of Rome and to pope Innocent for the kingdoms of England and 
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Ireland” and promised to pay the annual thousand marks promised by John. It was 
only then that Henry was crowned; according to Wendover, it was Peter des Roches 
who was given the honour of crowning and anointing him. This concluded the 
ceremony. A banquet was held in the evening and the following day Henry “received 
the homage and fealty of all the bishops, earls, barons, and all others present, and 
they all promised faithful allegiance.”199 
That Henry might not have been able to understand the meaning and implications of 
the oaths that he gave and received does not appear to have been a barrier. It is 
possible to argue that this represented a ‘Crown’ that was deemed competent even if 
the person of monarch was not. However, this is artificial and the limitations 
afterwards imposed on Henry recognised that he was not fully competent. Instead, it 
is much more likely that Henry performed these acts because they were integral to 
the process of becoming king and were, therefore, done out of necessity. 
2.5 Treaty of Lambeth, September 1217 
Even though Henry was now king, his throne required defence. On 20 May, the 
Henricians took advantage of Louis’ divided forces by engaging the northern part 
within the walls of Lincoln and overwhelming them. Louis was then reliant on 
reinforcements sent by his wife, but the relief force was met by English ships and 
defeated off Sandwich on 24 August. The Henricians marched towards rebel-held 
London and Louis agreed to discuss terms “on condition that they would make 
suitable terms of peace, saving his honour, and without injury to his followers”.200 
In mid-September an agreement was reached that imposed duties on both parties. 
Louis would henceforth abide by the church, leave England immediately and never 
‘return with evil designs’, surrender those lands and castles captured during the war, 
and “would use his best endeavours to induce his father Philip to restore to the 
English king, Henry, all his rights in the transmarine provinces.”201 The Henricians 
agreed to restore the situation ante bellum, to free prisoners without ransom, and 
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pay Louis £5000.202 Though Louis renounced his claim to the throne, it is interesting 
that he was not made to declare that Henry had had the better claim.  
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
We are used to the idea of a strict line of succession controlled by Parliament. We 
know how many of the incumbent’s kin must die, become ineligible, or abdicate 
before a certain individual can succeed to the throne – provided, of course, that 
Parliament does not alter the rules concerning the line of succession, as it did in 
2013.203 However, stable and orderly succession is a luxury of modern times. Today, 
the monarch’s role is largely ceremonial and their personal qualities do little to hinder 
or improve effective governance. In the medieval period, the monarch was not only a 
functional part of government, they were the centrepiece: the dux bellorum, fountain 
of justice, and heart of administration. Modern monarchs reign, medieval monarchs 
also ruled and, as long as they did, the succession was, in Brooke’s words, “a 
profoundly serious matter: too serious to be subjected to simple rules”.204 
The modern law of succession dates from the eighteenth century.205 Brooke’s 
description of succession before that point appears to be the right one: 
There were, indeed, no precise rules; but the succession to the thrones of Anglo-Saxon 
kingdoms and the English kingdom was hedged round with a series of conventions, 
customs and assumptions; and out of the dialectic between these conventions each 
succession was settled – sometimes peacefully, sometimes with violence.
206
 
In an attempt to legitimise themselves, claimants would try to show that they had 
excellent credentials and the support of some group, but ultimately their authority 
would rest on the influence that they could wield. The case of minor monarchs is an 
interesting one because they were largely unable to press their claim themselves. It 
is also interesting because minor kings, considering the centrality of the monarch, 
could not provide effective government. What they might be able to provide, 
however, was a degree of stability. In Henry’s case, his youth was politically 
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fortuitous, as he could play the card of innocence, which he exploited in an open 
letter: 
We hear that a quarrel arose between our father and certain nobles of our kingdom, 
whether with justification or not we do not know. We wish to remove it for ever since it has 
nothing to do with us.
207
 
This idea was reflected in the writers of the period, all of whom “regarded the 
accession of Henry III as the beginning of a new era”, perhaps more so than after 
most coronations.208 Henry’s youth may also have been an opportune moment for 
the barons to stamp their mark on the practice of statecraft and to reverse the 
Plantagenet tendency toward absolutism. Alternatively, it might simply have been a 
way of saving face for those too proud to submit to Louis – even if Louis was 
prepared to offer lucrative rewards, as he did to Hubert de Burgh.209 
After considering the various elements of Henry’s accession and that of his 
predecessors, it becomes clearer that Henry’s accession was a political settlement. 
This settlement did play out in a constitutional theatre, however, with various 
competing ideas about what should be the case – ideas that varied with time, place, 
and person. Within that theatre, Henry had a good claim, but ultimately it had to be 
made good by his supporters. 
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3 Government and Governance 
3.1 Introduction 
Allowing a child to come to the throne – especially one as young as Henry – raised a 
host of problems, especially: (a) how was the kingdom to be governed whilst Henry 
was (deemed) unable and (b) when would Henry be (deemed) able? The first of 
these questions shall be discussed in this chapter; the second in the next.  
The question about who was to govern the kingdom and how they were to do it was 
a very serious one – particularly in light of the dire situation in which the Henricians 
found themselves. One must applaud the loyalists, for Henry survived the civil war 
and his minority. Furthermore, Henry’s minority, unlike the German minorities, did 
not result in the diminution of royal power, which Abulafia thought was a major factor 
in the development of strong regional princes.210 England survived as a unitary state. 
However, their approach to the minority was unorthodox and inconsistent throughout 
its course; two things that do not square well with ideas of constitutionalism. 
Furthermore, whilst Henry’s minority laid the way for future minorities (such as his 
grandson, Edward III, and his great-great-grandson, Richard II), the exact 
arrangements of Henry’s minority do not appear to be later repeated.  
3.2 The Will of King John 
As he lay dying, King John attempted to designate Henry as his heir (2.2)  even 
though it would doubtless have been clear to him that it would be some time before 
Henry could rule. It would seem logical, therefore, for John to have made some 
provision for the running of the kingdom during Henry’s minority but, according to 
Turner, 
On the death of John there were no detailed instructions to guide the magnates; they had 
instead a poor substitute, the vague and evidently hastily prepared will of the dead 
King.
211
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Despite lacking in substance, John’s testament is our best direct record of his 
wishes. It has already been touched upon in the previous chapter (2.2.1), but shall 
be considered in more depth here.  
3.2.1 Error in the Foedera Text 
The text of John’s testament found in Rymer’s Foedera is the basis of most modern 
commentary on the subject.212 However, Church recently identified an omission in 
the Foedera text.213 The two missing words, testamentum meum (‘my testament’), 
are seemingly innocuous but dramatically alter the tone.  Warren’s translation, which 
was based on the Foedera text, is as follows: 
…I commit the ordering and execution of my will to the fidelity and discretion of my faithful 
men whose names are written below, without whose counsel, were they at hand, I would 
not, even in health, ordain anything…
214
 
Compare this with the Latin in the original testament, as transcribed by Church, and 
Church’s translation in which the reinstated words are emboldened: 
…ordinationem et dispositionem 
testamenti mei fidei et 
dispositioni legitime committo 
fidelium meorum subscriptorum, 
sine quorum consilio, etiam in 
bono statu constitutus 
nullatenus in presentia eorum 
testamentum meum 
ordinarem…
215
 
 …[I] commit the arbitration and 
administration of my testament to 
the trust and to the legitimate 
administration of my faithful men 
whose names are written below, 
without whose counsel, even in 
good health, I would have by no 
means arranged my testament in 
their presence…
216
 
Warren’s translation is humbling and from a constitutional viewpoint indicates that 
John relied on his fideles to such an extent that he could “arrange nothing of 
importance without the counsel of the men who are listed at the foot of the 
document”.217 In effect, it implies conciliar government. However, the true meaning, 
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when we take into account the omitted words, is much more mundane and only 
means that John, in view of his illness, needed help to organise and execute his last 
wishes. 
3.2.2 ‘Arbiters’ of John’s Testament  
Church has suggested that the thirteen men named as arbiters218 in John’s 
testament were intended to form Henry’s minority government.219 However, there is 
no evidence that they ever acted consciously together as such.220 This might mean 
that John had never intended them to form a minority council, which is reinforced by 
the startling omissions of Hubert de Burgh and Richard Marsh, the chancellor.221 
Indeed, there is some evidence that John had something, or rather, somebody, more 
specific in mind. 
3.2.3 Evidence in the History  
In an “affecting scene” in the History, John entreated those by his deathbed to beg 
the Marshal to forgive John for all the ‘wrongs’ and ‘many tribulations and troubles’ 
that he had caused him.222 John then praised the Marshal’s loyalty and asked those 
present “to see that he takes charge of my son / and always keeps him under his 
care, / for my son will never govern these lands of mine with the help of anyone but 
the Marshal”.223  
It is unclear, however, whether the Marshal was to be merely Henry’s guardian and 
aide, or whether John envisioned the Marshal as a regent. It is distinctly possible that 
John had not envisioned the Marshal as either. Crouch has argued that, in all 
likelihood, the “king’s departing words on the Marshal formed part of a longer 
deathbed confession” and that the author of the History, on account of William’s 
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appointment, was probably “extrapolating what happened later at Gloucester”.224 
When one looks at the testament, there is little sign that William Marshal was to be 
given preference. His name does appear in a prominent position in the list of John’s 
arbiters, being the first of the secular lords, but there is nothing to indicate that this is 
due to anything other than his seniority in age, experience, and wealth – making him 
a natural candidate for the regency but nothing more.  
Therefore, whether John had envisaged a select minority council ruling England, an 
individual regent or, indeed, whether he had given much thought to it at all, is 
unclear. In any case, what John might have intended may be academic for, as 
Painter said: “there is no evidence that their late master’s wish carried any weight 
with the leaders of the loyal party”.225 
3.3 England as a Papal Fief  
On 15 October 1216, John, fearing the worst, sent a letter to the pope commending 
“his kingdom and his heirs to the protection of the pope”.226 In fact, as overlord of 
England, Honorius III “automatically became the guardian of the late king’s 
children.”227  
Honorius does not seem to have shied from using his power for “[a]s soon as he 
heard of John’s death, he conceded to Guala full power without appeal to do what he 
thought expedient for the king and the kingdom. The loyalist magnates were ordered 
to submit to him ‘humbly and devotedly’.”228 Henry himself did homage to the Holy 
See at his coronation and, four days later, entrenched papal protection still further by 
taking the cross “not with any intention of going on crusade but, as a Peterborough 
chronicle put it, ‘for the greater protection of himself and his kingdom’.”229  
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In April 1217, Honorius wrote again to Guala bestowing “wide powers”, aimed at 
throwing the Church’s financial resources behind Henry, as well as asking Guala to 
find a bride for Henry and to ensure the execution of John’s testament. Honorius also 
wrote to Philip Augustus “in a friendly spirit” asking him to recall his son from 
England “lest it should be recorded that he was striving to disinherit one of the 
coheirs of the kingdom of Christ”. We then have a letter from November 1217, which 
Turner believed must have come from the Marshal, which, amongst other things, 
expressed Henry’s “gratitude for the Pope’s assistance in raising him to the throne”. 
If nothing else, we must agree with Turner’s conclusion that “[t]hese services of the 
Papacy made a deep impression on the mind of the young king”.230 
It is possible, therefore, that John intended the pope to govern England through 
Guala, the legate. Furthermore, it is clear that both Honorius himself and the loyal 
English magnates were keen that Rome be involved. From the English magnates’ 
viewpoint, it makes a great deal of sense, for the Pope wielded not only spiritual 
sanctions but also prestige and influence; the pope could even mobilise armies, as 
demonstrated in the crusades both in the Middle East and nearer to home, e.g. the 
Albigensian Crusade in southern France that had been proclaimed by Innocent III in 
1208 and was still ongoing in 1216.231 It should also be remembered that the 
churchmen in England wielded a huge amount of power and ensuring their 
cooperation with the government was important.  
However, John’s surrender of the kingdom to the pope on 15 May 1213 and 
reception of it back as a papal fief,232 re-confirmed in his letter of 15 October 1216, 
represents a massive transfer of sovereignty.  
3.3.1 Transfers of Sovereignty 
From the foundation of the English Church by Augustine in 597 to the Henrician 
Reformation in the 1530s, the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and, later, England were part 
of western Christendom under the Roman Church.233 Throughout this time, it 
appears to have been generally recognised by both secular and ecclesiastical writers 
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that kings and popes had different jurisdictions.234 For example, the author of 
Bracton said: 
[J]ust as the lord pope has ordinary jurisdiction over all in spiritual matters, so the king 
has ordinary jurisdiction in his kingdom in temporal matters. They have neither equals nor 
superiors.
235
 
There seems to have been little disagreement about the first sentence from Bracton, 
at least in theory.236 However, there were immense difficulties in drawing a sharply 
defined line between the spiritual and secular spheres or ordines237 – particularly 
when one begins to take into account the eternal, natural, and divine laws that were 
believed to regulate human conduct above and beyond human law.238  
The second sentence is far more problematic. Popes Gelasius I (492-496), Gregory 
VII (1073-1085), Innocent III (1198-1216), and Innocent IV (1243-1254), in particular, 
strove to establish a doctrine of papal supremacy.239 Perhaps the most radical 
formulation was by Alanus,240 a clerk of Innocent III, who thought that “there was no 
limitation in principle on papal action in temporal affairs, though there might be for 
reasons of expediency.”241 Innocent III himself was keen to show that papal authority 
was the greater: 
[God] instituted two great dignities, a greater one to preside over souls as if over day, and 
a lesser one to preside over bodies as if over night. These are the pontifical authority and 
the royal power. Now just as the moon derives its light from the sun and is indeed lower 
than it in quantity and quality, in position and power, so too the royal authority derives the 
splendour of its dignity from the pontifical authority.
242
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The Holy Roman Emperor and the various kings countered these moves, resulting 
in, for example, the controversies over the investitures (although most canonists 
seem to have been of the opinion that the king did have some role to play243) and 
‘criminous clerks’. However, “no English king or parliament before the days of Henry 
VIII had any intention of disputing the pope’s authority in that wide sphere of human 
concerns which every one except a few heretics agreed to call spiritual.”244 In terms 
of rebuttal, one might point to the ‘great’ Statute of Praemunire (1393),245  which 
became a potent weapon for Henry VIII against the Roman Catholic Church. 
According to Maitland, whether the statute’s framers foresaw such a use is a “moot 
point”,246 but it seems clear that its original scope was limited to protecting the 
Crown’s interests against the Church and it was only by a kind of mission creep that 
it came to assume a radical anti-ecclesiastical, anti-papal flavour.247  
Most importantly, perhaps, was the fact that the papal court, “upholding the universal 
jurisdiction of the Roman see” offered itself as both a “general court of first instance 
and as a supreme court of appeal for every Christian,”248 which was an idea 
developed further by Innocent III.249 Early on, theories of dualism amongst the 
canonists morphed into monism, for their theories “implied a single society of all 
Christians, over the constitution of which one ruler enjoyed plenitude potestas. This 
power was held, it was beginning to be argued [in arguments derivative of the 
Gelatian tradition], by him who was vicarus Christi.”250 
Therefore, throughout the medieval period there was an immensely powerful 
supranational legal order stretching across western Christendom, which van 
Caenegem went so far as to call a ‘quasi-state’.251 Constitutionally, this is incredibly 
important for it implies that none of the Christian lands were completely sovereign – 
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least of all the Holy Roman Empire.252 Indeed, the importance of the role of the 
Church in medieval society can be seen in Magna Carta, in which protection afforded 
to the rights and privileges of the church took pole position.  
The impact of John’s surrender of England to the pope, therefore, starts to look less 
significant, except in that, in the short term, it placed the Church’s full weight behind 
John and his son.253 The thousand marks did continue to be paid regularly until the 
Second Barons’ War. Thereafter, it was paid increasingly sporadically and in 1366 
Parliament declared John’s surrender invalid and non-binding, ending the payment 
once and for all.254 Interestingly, this was not the first time that John’s surrender had 
been argued to be invalid: Philip Augustus and Louis of France had argued that 
England had not been John’s to give away.255 
It is perhaps the case, therefore, that regardless of John’s actions in 1213, the pope 
could easily have argued his authority to intercede on Henry’s behalf – particularly in 
default of a secular authority that could. It was not uncommon for the pope to send 
legates, and therefore Guala’s presence should not seem too surprising. Whatever 
the case, it is clear that ultimate power, and the legitimate foundation of the minority 
government, might not have come from within the kingdom (and, thus, from its 
constitution) but, rather, from Rome – indeed, Beem has said that papal power was 
at its ‘apex’ during Henry’s minority.256  
3.4 Appointment of William Marshal, 29 October 1216 
Henry III was crowned at Gloucester on 28 October 1216. The following day, the 
magnates gathered to discuss their next move.257  
The magnates appear to have been under the impression that the question of who 
would govern the kingdom was not yet settled, for they set about settling it. In their 
deliberations, they appear to have only considered creating one position, which 
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would be the leader of the government. As Painter remarked, their options were 
limited as to who this could be and Alan Basset, who was present at the assembly, 
declared that the choice was really only between William Marshal, earl of Pembroke, 
and Ranulf, earl of Chester.258 
William Marshal was a younger son of a minor baron and had made his way in the 
world from a landless knight to a major landholder through service to the Plantagenet 
royal family. In 1216, William held substantial lands in the Welsh Marches and 
Ireland and, though he was past his physical prime (being in his early- to mid-
seventies), he was well-respected, experienced, and well resourced. Ranulf, earl of 
Chester, was in his mid-forties and, although his “material resources within England 
were greater than William Marshal’s,”259 Ranulf appears to have deferred to the 
Marshal. Having canvassed the opinion of the magnates, a few of the senior men 
withdrew to prevail upon the Marshal to accept. 
It took some persuasion before William accepted and was eventually only persuaded 
by Guala’s offer of “the pardon and remission of his sins”.260 It is impossible to know 
whether this offer was just ‘too tempting to be refused’, as Painter described it,261 or 
whether Guala ‘required’ William to take the role, as Norgate describes it.262 Perhaps 
the fact that Guala did not command him outright to accept indicates that William had 
some choice. In any case, he seems to have been delighted with the opportunity to 
pave his way to heaven if not, as John Marshal and Ralph Musard suggested, by the 
honour to be gained and the ability to ‘enrich all his friends’.263  
The Marshal’s appointment presents a number of difficulties. It was certainly a 
practical solution, but was it a constitutional one? There are five key questions that 
need to be answered: 
(i) What was the title of his office? 
(ii) What were the number and scope of his powers? 
(iii) What was the source of his powers? 
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(iv) What was the longevity and vitality of his powers? 
(v) What was his relation to the other senior officials? 
In essence, we are looking to discover whether the Marshal’s powers were 
predetermined, which shall be considered in the following discussion. 
3.4.1 William Marshal’s Position  
In modern texts, William is universally referred to as ‘regent’.264 However, this word 
was not used by contemporaries. For the first couple of weeks, and at least on four 
occasions,265 William was styled ‘justiciar’.266 Whether this formulation was William’s 
doing or that of the chancery clerks is unknowable. There was much to recommend 
this title, however, as from the reign of Henry II the justiciar had increasingly come to 
represent the king’s alter ego267 and had acted as regent during the English kings’ 
frequent absences.268 Indeed, as recently as 1214, Peter des Roches – then justiciar 
– had acted as regent during John’s absence in Poitou.269 However, by mid-
November William had ceased being ascribed this title; no doubt largely in part to the 
arrival of Hubert de Burgh at Bristol, who “had presumably reminded his colleagues 
that this title was already used by himself.”270 
Hubert had held the justiciarship since replacing des Roches around the time of 
Magna Carta, June 1215.271 Hubert had been absent from the assembly at 
Gloucester because he had been seeing to the defence of Dover. It does not appear 
to be the case that Hubert’s loyalty was in doubt and, indeed, his staunch loyalty was 
demonstrated when, as Wendover tells us, he refused to surrender Dover to Louis 
following John’s death.272 There were precedents of a double justiciarship in the 
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reigns of Henry II and Richard I: Robert of Leicester and Richard de Luci in 1159,273 
and Hugh de Puiset of Durham and William de Mandeville in September 1189274. 
The first of these seems to have lasted for around nine years, ending on Luci’s death 
in April 1168.275 The latter lasted only for a few months, ending with Mandeville’s 
death in November 1189.276 On the whole, however, the justiciarship was held by a 
single individual.  
There is also arguably a case that William was barred from the justiciarship. As 
Norgate noted, the justiciar was appointed by the king “by letters patent, to be held 
during the King’s pleasure, was not vacated by the King’s death, but belonged of 
right to the grantee until he was superseded by means of a new appointment.”277 As 
discussed earlier, it is possible that John had envisioned William in the leading role, 
but there is no suggestion that John formally appointed William justiciar, thus 
demoting Hubert. Therefore, as John had not removed Hubert and as Henry was too 
young to do so, Hubert’s justiciarship appears to have been secure for as long as 
Henry was a minor. Furthermore, whilst Hubert was not a major landholder, he was 
an able castellan (shown both on the Continent and at Dover) and it was important 
not to alienate him. Thus, by distinguishing William’s role from the justiciarship, 
Hubert could, to a certain extent, be appeased. If William was not justiciar, however, 
then what was he?  
From mid-November 1216,278 William styled himself rector noster et regni nostri,279 
which was a title created for him and disappeared when he vacated it in April 1219. 
This title has been translated variously as ‘our guardian and the guardian of our 
kingdom; our keeper and keeper of the kingdom’,280 and ‘governor of ourself and our 
realm; governor of the king and of the kingdom’281. The word that was variously 
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translated as ‘guardian’, ‘keeper’, and ‘governor’ was rector, which may also be 
translated as: ‘controller’, ‘director’, ‘steersman’;282 ‘guide’, ‘leader’, ‘ruler’, 
‘preceptor’283.  One might have easily, however, translated it as curator, custodian, 
steward, viceroy284, gerent/vicegerent, or prefect. Although the English derivative is 
clearly visible in the Latin, there does not appear to have been any indication that 
rector held any religious significance in the context of William’s role.  
From the proliferation of possible translations, it is possible to gain a general sense 
about William’s role, but it does not help us to understand it precisely. Therefore, it 
may be illuminating to consider analogous precedents. 
3.4.1.1 Prior Regents 
As far back as the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of Northumbria we have evidence of a 
regent-like role being played by Berhtred in Osred’s minority. He was described by 
Stephanus as “secundus a rege princeps (second in rank to the king)”, but whose 
position as a ‘royal deputy’ was normally referred to in eighth-century Northumbrian 
chronicles as patricius.285 However, it seems unlikely that the thirteenth-century 
magnates would have been well-acquainted with eighth-century Northumbria. 
William I had often left the care of Normandy in the hands of his queen, Matilda, but 
there is no evidence that this was the case for England.286 Rather, it was Lanfranc, 
archbishop of Canterbury who called the shots in England during William’s 
absences. In some Norman sources, Lanfranc was described as princeps et custos 
Angliae [ruler and custodian of England], although this does not seem to have been 
a formal title used by him.287  
Henry I often left his wife, Matilda, with the mantel of government when he was 
absent.288 However, with his brother imprisoned on his orders, his eldest daughter’s 
marriage in 1114 to the Holy Roman Emperor, his wife’s death in 1118, and his son’s 
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death in 1120, Henry had no close relatives onto whom he could devolve power 
when he went abroad in 1123. Therefore, Henry left the care of the country in the 
hands of Roger, bishop of Salisbury who appears to have been called either 
procurator or provisor.289 Again, Roger does not appear to have occupied a special 
office; during this period he did not attest charters in his own name or the name of an 
office but, rather, per breve regis (‘by writ of the king’).290  
Stephen and Henry II both employed their wives as regents, and the latter also his 
second son.291  When Eleanor of Aquitaine and Henry the Young King (Henry II’s 
wife and son) rebelled, however, Henry II turned to Richard de Luci, the justiciar, 
and, from 1173, “Richard took place of the royal regents as the king’s alter ego.”292 In 
truth, Warren was correct when he said that  
There was no consistency in the methods employed: sometimes members of the royal 
family were appointed as regents, sometimes a group of trusted counsellors, sometimes 
one.
293
 
Even if the magnates of 1216 had been aware of these previous informal usages in 
these analogous situations, which is unlikely, the Marshal did not derive his authority 
from the king’s appointment or from his inherent status as a member of the royal 
house. The novelty of his title, in many ways, represented the novelty of his position. 
We are little closer, however, to understanding what position the Marshal truly 
occupied or how different in content it was to the justiciarship. There is little evidence 
that the Marshal’s powers were explicitly decided in the Autumn 1216; rather, most 
of his powers appear to have been implicit and granted on trust, seemingly for a time 
unspecified.  
3.4.1.2 Guardianship 
Whatever role William played, it was professed in his title that he played it towards 
both the kingdom and the king. According to the History, William devolved the 
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guardianship of the king to des Roches with Guala’s blessing, although des Roches 
was later to dispute this.294 
3.4.2 Source of the Marshal’s Powers 
There appears to be four main contenders for the source of William’s powers. First, 
there is Henry himself; however, there is no evidence that Henry played any part in 
the Marshal’s selection, though he may have legitimised it by his ongoing 
acceptance.  
Second, there is the late King John. If the History’s version of events is correct, then 
there is a strong case for this and Carpenter found this convincing.295 However, 
seeing as the History itself admits that Ranulf, earl of Chester might contend for the 
regency, the History also provides a strong counterargument.296  
Third, there is Guala, the papal legate, acting under the authority of the Pope. 
According to Painter, Honorius did not in fact see the Marshal as much more than 
“the most prominent layman of the realm” and left it to Guala’s discretion as to how 
much he would involve the Marshal.297 This view may be supported by a symbolic 
transfer recorded in the History from Guala to the Marshal following the Marshal’s 
appointment: 
Thereupon, as was his duty, the legate handed everything over, 
and the worthy Marshal took into his care 
both the King and the realm.
298
 
What was handed over exactly is unclear but, more interestingly, there are the words 
“as was his duty” – was this his duty because it was commanded by the pope or 
because he was bound to comply with the magnates’ appointment of the Marshal? In 
any case, Guala and Honorius III appear to have exercised continuing control over 
the nature of the office. For example, according to the History, the Marshal asked the 
lords as to whom should be entrusted with the king’s person, but Guala intervened 
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and said that the choice was the Marshal’s.299 We might infer from this that Guala 
had made special appointments part of the remit of the Marshal’s office, although 
this appears to conflict with Ralph de Neville’s appointment as keeper of the seal in 
1218 and, indeed, with de Roches’ later refusal to accept that the Marshal had had a 
role in appointing him. A more concrete example of control over the Marshal’s office 
can be found in mid-1217 when it appears as though “Ranulf or his supporters 
petitioned Guala, the legate, for the earl to be accepted as coadjutor to the Marshal 
on the grounds of the Marshal’s advanced age”.300 Honorius rejected the request, 
however, for he seemed concerned not only about the dangers of divided authority 
but also about offending the Marshal.301 Thus, Honorius appears to have reserved 
ultimate decisions regarding appointments to himself. 
Lastly, there is ‘common counsel’. Such a view is supported by the Barnwell 
chronicler who reported that the Marshal, Guala, and des Roches were jointly 
“entrusted with the king and the kingdom ‘by the common counsel’ of the 
magnates.”302 It seems clear that all three men had their roles deliberated at 
Gloucester, either directly or indirectly. However, if we accept the History’s narrative 
that Guala acted on papal authority, that the magnates nominated the Marshal but 
Guala appointed him, and that the Marshal used his new powers to appoint des 
Roches, then the Barnwell account appears to fall into a non sequitur, i.e. he 
assumes that the fact that the events took place in the presence of the magnates 
meant that they were more than mere spectators. In Turner’s view, the Barnwell view 
was closer to the truth: the magnates ‘appointed’ the Marshal and Guala ‘approved’ 
it.303  
The Barnwell account is problematic in its use of ‘common counsel’. The assembly at 
Gloucester was not representative (2.3.4) and, moreover, it is unclear whether the 
magnates’ consent was sufficient for the Marshal’s appointment, merely necessary, 
or neither. Although, it would later be argued that the magnates’ consent was both 
necessary and sufficient for government appointments; for example, Ralph de 
Neville was granted the king’s seal at the Great Council of November 1218 and later 
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argued that “since he had been appointed by a great council, only a great council 
could dismiss him.”304  
In truth, everybody probably had their own view on what happened that day, as was 
later attested by the disagreement as to who had made des Roches guardian. If it 
was possible to objectively say that one party had the casting vote in the 
arrangements, it is difficult to say now who that was. In the end, it is probably better 
to see the Marshal’s appointment not as having been made according to certain 
rules but as representing a political compromise that was not necessarily reached in 
a democratic fashion. 
3.4.3 Isabella of Angoulême, Queen Mother 
Isabella of Angoulême, Henry’s mother, deserves special attention. John had 
married the prepubescent Isabella on 24 August 1200 in an effort to strengthen his 
position on the continent and she would have been in her late twenties when he 
died.305 Following Henry’s coronation, Pernoud said, Isabella was “politely but firmly” 
asked to leave by the English barons and that she complied because “she realized 
how unpopular she was”.306 
It is certainly striking how little a role Isabella played in the minority government, 
especially considering that Anglo-Norman queen-consorts and queen-mothers had 
acted as regents in the past: e.g., Matilda of Flanders, Matilda of Scotland, Matilda of 
Boulogne, and Eleanor of Aquitaine.307 Certainly, there had been many powerful 
queen-mothers in English history; in particular, Eadgifu of Kent (c.903–c.966), 
Ælfthryth (c.945–c.1001), and Emma of Normandy (c.985–1052).308 One must also 
not forget Empress Matilda (1102–1167) and the later example of Isabella of France 
(1295–1358).309 This was as true on the Continent as in England; most notably, 
Brunhilda of Austrasia (c.543–612, Austrasia and Burgundy), Irene of Athens (c.752–
                                            
304
 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 94–95. 
305
 HG Richardson, “The Marriage and Coronation of Isabelle of Angoulême,” The English Historical 
Review 61, no. 241 (September 1946): 304, 298. 
306
 Pernoud, Blanche of Castile, 99. 
307
 West, The Justiciarship in England 1066-1232, 3, 14, 25, 31. 
308
 Stafford, Queens, Concubines and Dowagers, chap. 6. Eadgifu of Kent was mother of Edmund I 
and Eadred. Ælfthryth was mother of Æthelred II and step-mother of Edward the Martyr. Emma of 
Normandy was mother of Edward the Confessor and Harthacnut, and step-mother of Edmund II, 
Sweyn Knutsson, and Harald Harefoot 
309
 Empress Matilda was Henry II’s mother; Isabella of France was Edward III’s mother and extremely 
influential in his early reign. 
73 
 
803, Byzantine Empire), Empress Theophanu (c.955–991, Holy Roman Empire), and 
Isabella’s contemporary Blanche of Castile (1188–1252, France). Indeed, many 
queens reached “the height of their careers not as wives of royal husbands but as 
mothers and regents for young royal sons.”310 Blanche, for example, effectively ruled 
France from her husband’s death in 1226 to her own death in 1252.311  
In many ways, mothers made ‘natural guardians’ as they rarely had designs on the 
thrones for themselves.312 Isabella, then, could reasonably have been expected to 
act in Henry’s interests, whose interests were in many respects also her own. 
Whether she could have occupied a formal role in the government, however, is much 
less certain and Stafford warns us away from “searching for too great a constitutional 
precision in distinguishing such regency from the engrossing roles played by 
mothers such as Eadgifu…”313 It is arguable that Isabella would not have needed an 
office, as queen-mothers had a natural authority and, indeed, it is arguable that the 
office of regent developed precisely for those who did not have an inherent, natural 
authority. In any case, there seemed little to prevent Isabella from occupying a 
leading role in the government. 
In truth, Isabella’s problem was not constitutional impropriety but her political 
position. She was relatively young and inexperienced in government, had no land in 
England, and had no family in England (other than her young children), which would 
have given her a firm base of support.314 It would be wrong, however, to dismiss her 
in the way that Pernoud did. Although some preparations for her departure for the 
Continent were being made in July 1217, she appears from the History of the Dukes 
of Normandy to have been involved in the negotiations with Louis to end the war.315 
Furthermore, once she had returned to the remaining continental Plantagenet lands 
in 1218, she wrote to the English government numerous times demanding money 
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and aid to protect Henry’s interests there against the French king316 and, according 
to Norgate, had taken Angoulême’s “government into her own hands” 317. Indeed, 
even her marriage in 1220 to Hugh de Lusignan was supposedly undertaken, on her 
part, for Henry’s benefit.318 This does not mean that she did not want to play a larger 
role, however, and was denied it. Carpenter argued that she was “[f]iery and 
ambitious, she almost certainly aspired to a regency role like that soon to be played 
in France by Blanche of Castile, the mother of Louis IX”.319 This is not provable 
either way but we can say with certainty that she had little authority in England 
between leaving England in 1217 and her death in 1246.   
It is also important to contextualise the period in a time when regencies dominated 
by queen-mothers was becoming less common, which Stafford associated with the 
“triumph of the idea of primogeniture” and increasing reliance on, and desire of the 
nobility to dominate, royal patronage.320 Indeed, in all the post-Conquest English 
royal minorities, there was only one instance where there was a dominant queen-
mother, Isabella of France, which was no doubt in part owing to her role in Edward 
II’s deposition. 
3.4.4 Intermediate Conclusions 
John appears to have been intent on his line continuing but appears to have left it to 
the discretion of his followers as to how this was to be achieved. In lieu of a clear 
and readily accessible precedent – not that they cared to look – they set about 
appointing a leader and, in all likelihood, proceeded on the basis of crossing bridges 
when they came upon them. The fact that they had to invent a title for the Marshal 
seems to demonstrate the novelty of his position and, whilst sounding like a 
descriptive title, it left much open to interpretation. What powers William would 
exercise do not seem to have been predetermined and his actions were no doubt 
delimited more by political expediency than constitutional propriety.  
As it has been seen, the source of William’s powers was unclear. Likewise, the 
length of his office appears to have been left undetermined. It was likely assumed 
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that he would fulfil it until the end of the war, the end of the minority, his retirement, 
or his death (whichever came first). Who would have the power to decide which of 
these times it would be or, indeed, if it should be another time, was left unclear. In 
truth, William probably only held power for as long as he remained politically tenable. 
This would have, in part, been contingent on Henry’s development but, more 
fundamentally, it would have been contingent on which party – or parties – had the 
most influence at any given time. How things actually turned out is discussed below 
(see 3.5.2.1). 
3.5 William Marshal’s Government, 29 October 1216 – 7 April 1219 
3.5.1 Ending the War 
The most important objectives for Henry’s minority government were to defeat Louis 
and to restore royal power, particularly the treasury.321 One of the earliest and most 
symbolic steps that Henry’s government took was to reissue Magna Carta in 
November 1216 – albeit a slightly watered down version.322 Nevertheless, had it not 
been for this, it is quite possible that Magna Carta would have not assumed the 
position that it has in English legal history for, until that point, it was a failed 
compromise agreement between John and his barons.323 For our purposes, the most 
salient point is not the constitutional significance of the Charter in itself but, rather, 
the fact that it was issued by a minority government. 
The Charter was issued under the seals of William and Guala.324 For the Church, 
Guala’s authorisation was a ‘momentous volte-face,’325 following Innocent III’s 
condemnation of it the year before. Norgate argued that the magnates had acted 
reasonably in that they had excluded the clauses from Magna Carta “such as a 
provisional government, under existing circumstances, could not safely deal with.”326 
Amongst the excluded clauses, for instance, was the ‘most startling and 
revolutionary change’: the security clause.327 However, even if it is true that some of 
the most controversial clauses “which had impinged most closely on the rights and 
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revenues of the crown” were removed,328 the very issuance of it alone represented a 
massive incursion on royal power taken at a time when the king was unable to 
oppose it. It also flew in the face of the undertaking by William and the other 
magnates not to make any grants in perpetuity so as to protect the king’s rights.329  
Magna Carta was not an enunciation of the ‘true principles’ of the English 
Constitution and, therefore, one cannot defend the magnates’ decision by saying that 
they were merely affirming what was already the case.330 As important as the 
Charter was to become, it is difficult to reconcile their actions with their responsibility 
to protect the rights and lands of the king and, even though Magna Carta (1216) did 
not bind Henry legally (as he was a minor),331 it bound him politically. But for the 
Henricians, it was the political side that was most important: it was their opening 
gambit in attempting to differentiate Henry’s reign from John’s. Indeed, for those 
professing the failure of Magna Carta as the reason why they were warring against 
the king, its reissue “left no valid excuse for the continuance of a refusal to recognize 
the native sovereign”.332 
Magna Carta (1216) made little difference. Louis’ supporters “took oaths to accept no 
heir of King John as king” and the English magnates in Louis’ party – whom the 
Charter was intended bring back over – appear to have been the ones to dissuade 
Louis from making peace in January 1217.333 This says a lot about the Charter and 
the basis of the war. The war was not a constitutional struggle between a liberty-
loving baronage and an oppressive crown; it was driven by personal grievances and 
interests,334 aggravated by private struggles “waged by individuals over castles, 
lands and rights.”335  
There was little change in the overall situation during the winter of 1216-17. Around 
the 27 February Louis sailed to France and returned around 22 April.336 In May, 
Louis divided his army, with Louis himself besieging Dover and the other part of his 
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force heading north. The Marshal rallied the Henricians at Lincoln where Louis’ 
second army was to be found and offered battle. Louis’ forces refused to fight a 
pitched battle and stayed behind the town walls, but after gaining entry to the town, 
the Henricians achieved an emphatic victory; the news reached Louis on 25 May.337 
Over the following summer months, a number of the rebels started to come back into 
the fold.338 On 24 August, a fleet commanded by Hubert de Burgh met the French 
relief force off the coast near Sandwich and achieved another resounding victory. 
Four days later, negotiations opened and continued throughout the first weeks of 
September. On 23 September 1217, Louis sailed back to France – never to return to 
England. 
3.5.2 Nineteen Months under the Marshal 
Although the war was over, the work of repairing the wounds was only just begun. 
Royal power in the localities had suffered tremendously during the war, and with 
“internal divisions and the paucity of its resources,” recovering royal power was 
going to be an uphill struggle.339 These problems were compounded by the fact that 
many of the officials felt that they could not be removed from office until Henry came 
of age340 and that, by being barred from making permanent alienations, the minority 
government had little to use to reward loyal followers. Furthermore, even though the 
struggle with the dauphin of France was over and Alexander of Scotland relaxed his 
pressure on the northern border, Llywelyn in Wales continued hostilities.341  
In November 1217, Magna Carta was again reissued. This time, however, it was 
accompanied by another charter: the Charter of the Forest. This charter is less well 
known than its larger brother but it is as constitutionally significant. It reinforced the 
idea that the Crown could be limited in its actions and was especially potent because 
the forests had traditionally been a large source of revenue. As Carpenter rightly 
says, “[t]hanks to the Charter of the Forest, the restrictions imposed on kingship in 
1217 were far greater than two years before.”342 
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At the start of September 1218, Honorius accepted Guala’s resignation as legate, 
who was replaced by Pandulf.343 Norgate theorised that the knowledge of Guala’s 
imminent departure and the toll of the previous two years on the Marshal were what 
prompted the momentous action at the Great Council of November 1218 to make 
Henry his own seal:344 
Henceforth all royal letters were authenticated by Henry III’s seal, which showed him, in 
the customary fashion, enthroned on one side and on horse-back in full armour on the 
other, in both cases a fully grown man.
345
 
Despite being depicted as an adult, there was no question that Henry would now be 
controlling the government. Though Henry’s seal was appended to royal letters, 
“they were still attested by the regent or the bishop of Winchester…”346 The seal was 
given into the keeping of Ralph de Neville by the council, who would maintain control 
over it for two decades.347 The first letter patent to which Henry’s seal was appended 
forbad any grants in perpetuity being made whilst the king was still a minor, which is 
one of the most significant features of the minority and will be discussed in due 
course.348  
3.5.2.1 William Marshal’s Retirement 
The creation of the new seal may well have been the prelude to the retirement of the 
office of rector. After Guala’s departure, the regent continued to attest letters but they 
were increasingly attested and authorised by des Roches and de Burgh.349 Around 
the beginning of February 1219 the Marshal fell ill350 and by March it became 
apparent that he was dying. By the end of March the Marshal was to be found at 
Caversham and at the start of April he called a council to his bedside.351  
According to the History, the Marshal said to Henry that it was necessary “if it please 
you, that arrangements be made / to have the barons elect someone / to protect 
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yourself and the realm”.352 We cannot rely too heavily on the exact wording of the 
History, but it is interesting that the Marshal apparently offered that his replacement 
be appointed if it pleases Henry. What is more interesting, however, is the apparent 
intent that there would be a direct successor to the Marshal. It is also interesting that 
the Marshal is said to have envisioned an election. However, a few lines later – and 
after des Roches had protested that he was Henry’s guardian – the Marshal bad the 
legate to return tomorrow and said that  
In the meantime I shall confer with my son 
and my men, and decide 
who shall take charge of things. 
May God ensure that our counsel is wise!
353
 
The following day the Marshal delivered his decision. He had reasoned that there 
was no land so divided in opinion as England and, therefore, he had decided to give 
Henry “to the care of God, the pope, / and the papal legate. Let the legate be his 
guardian / in their name” and went on to defend his decision “if the land is not 
protected / by the pope at this juncture, / … [then] I do not know who could protect 
it”.354 It should be noted that the Marshal’s opponent in October 1216, Ranulf of 
Chester, was away on crusade. Thus, after a relatively minor disagreement with des 
Roches, the Marshal’s role disappeared in a unilateral decision. The Marshal 
appeared to be of the opinion that an election would be too divisive and perhaps 
feared the influence of des Roches. In any case, there is a distinct demonstration of 
a lack of commitment to democratic values and conciliar government.  
Following his decision, the Marshal commanded his son to hand over Henry to the 
legate in front of the magnates, which he duly did and despite des Roches’ efforts to 
prevent it.355 In Painter’s view, this gained from the barons “at least their tacit 
consent”.356 However, consent may not have had anything to do with it. Rather, it 
was a public demonstration of the Marshal’s decision. For Painter, the Marshal acted 
within his rights: “William had no possible legal right to appoint his successor, but he 
                                            
352
 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, vol. 2, l. 17987–17988. 
353
 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, vol. 2, l. 18025–18028. 
354
 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, vol. 2, l. 18050–18060. 
355
 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, vol. 2, l. 18091–18114. 
356
 Painter, William Marshal, 279. 
80 
 
could surrender his charge into the hands of the overlord of England”.357 Considering 
that the Marshal’s role had no precedent, it was arguable that it could have been 
within his remit. The idea of ‘surrender’, however, is merely a matter of construction 
and it could easily be said that the Marshal gave Henry to the legate thereby 
excluding all others and, therefore, effectively appointing him. Turner was certainly of 
the opinion that the operating factor was the Marshal’s choice: “So Pandulph 
succeeded the earl Marshal as regent, not by virtue of his appointment as legate, but 
in pursuance of the wishes of the earl, which the magnates of England ratified.”358 
Ultimately, it was a political decision made not according to any form but, rather, by a 
man concerned that an election might result in power being held by somebody of 
whom he did not approve.  
Henry was still only eleven and, in terms of his ability to rule, little had changed since 
1216. It is significant, therefore, that the Marshal’s position was allowed to lapse in a 
situation analogous – at least in terms of the king’s ability – to that in which it was 
created. It was left unclear when the position would exist in the future, if it were to 
exist at all. Despite the Marshal’s disapproval, there is no reason why the legate 
could not have called an ‘election’, much as he did in 1216. It is perhaps arguable 
that the position of rector had been created in a state of emergency and now it would 
lapse as the state of emergency had passed; in the words of Norgate:  
There was now no invader to expel, no rebellion to subdue, no need for a warrior-regent: 
and there was also no man among the baronage clearly marked out for the regent’s office 
as the Marshal had been by his personal qualities and by the universal estimation of his 
fellow barons.
359
 
However, there is not much indication that the rector’s creation was anything to do 
with the war, which was demonstrated by its continued existence after the war was 
over. Instead, it was primarily created to deal with the minority, which was far from 
over. 
That said, the need for a special office was certainly less apparent than before. For 
instance, the king now had his own seal and, although there were still troubles in 
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Wales and royal authority was still not fully restored,360 the situation was less dire 
than when a foreign prince occupied half the country. Thus, for a time at least, the 
government could be a little less autocratic and some political deadlock could be 
tolerated. Perhaps the Marshal lacked foresight here, however, because by failing to 
support a strong successor, he laid the way for infighting, which – after a respectable 
period of cooperation – led eventually to the concentration of powers once again in 
an individual. 
William Marshal died on 14 May 1219. The office of rector would later be discussed 
in 1422 when Henry VI came to the throne but never recreated.361 According to 
Hillen and Wiswall, “no other single person would serve either in Henry III’s minority 
or in later ones, as regent for a minor king in England.”362 Whether this is true is 
discussed below (3.9). 
3.6 Government between April 1219 and Autumn 1221 
Norgate entitled the chapter dealing with this period ‘The Legation of Pandulf’.363 In 
it, she described Pandulf as the ‘Legate-regent’364 whose powers were theoretically 
“more absolute, for the powers which had appertained respectively to the Marshal 
and to Gualo were united in his person; he was at once the elected regent of the 
realm and the representative of its overlord.”365  Though Pandulf attested few letters 
and appeared to play a minimal role in the day-to-day activities of the government, 
Norgate was clear about his supremacy. He shared the day-to-day functions of the 
office that had been the Marshal’s with two men: Hubert, as justiciar and in 
accordance with “long-established constitutional tradition”, became the effective 
second-in-command;366 and Peter, the bishop of Winchester, who assumed a natural 
position of authority as the king’s tutor,367 although he “had no official title and no 
specific functions in the civil administration.”368 
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Carpenter, on the other hand, entitles the chapters in his book, The Minority of Henry 
III, as “The Triumvirate, 1219-20: The Verge of Anarchy” and “The Triumvirate, 1220-
21: Success.”369 For Carpenter, the government of this period was a ‘triumvirate’ of 
de Burgh (justiciar), des Roches (bishop of Winchester), and Pandulf (legate). This 
arrangement did not form immediately upon the Marshal’s resignation but was: 
fashioned … out in the open by great councils at Reading, Oxford and Gloucester. Here 
again, therefore, great councils exercised a decisive role in appointing the king’s chief 
ministers. 
Though Pandulf was recognised by Henry himself later in his reign has having been 
the ‘first counsellor and chief of all the kingdom of England … by common consent 
and provision of all the kingdom’, Carpenter is also clear that Pandulf had little role in 
the day-to-day governance, although that is not to say that he was inactive.370 On 17 
April a council was convened at Oxford, where the justiciar “was given charge of the 
attestation of royal letters, thus replacing the bishop of Winchester.”371 
Hubert and Peter initiated a brief tussle attempting to restrict Pandulf’s access to the 
treasury and, for a period between 6-18 May, Hubert did not attest any letters.372 
This was only resolved at a council in June at Gloucester, with the seal being 
restored to Hubert and, according to Carpenter “from now onwards the chief 
responsibility for day-to-day government was his.”373 Letters pertaining to the royal 
household, however, were to remain in Peter’s jurisdiction,374 but, in Carpenter’s 
eyes at least, Peter had been demoted.375 Despite the fact that Hubert was now 
definitively above Peter, he was still below Pandulf “whose claim to be in ultimate 
control of the king and kingdom was accepted;”376 that said, Pandulf was not always 
obeyed.377 
Norgate’s and Carpenter’s descriptions of the government are generally similar. 
Carpenter goes to greater lengths, however, to stress the collaborative elements 
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and, for him, the ‘triumvirate’ – just like the Marshal’s government – could govern 
only with the magnates’ consent.378 In Carpenter’s work, power is much more clearly 
‘ascending’, i.e. flowing from the magnates-in-council upwards to the office holders. 
So, for example, Hubert did not assume his place in the government by virtue of 
being justiciar but because “[t]he magnates trusted Hubert to provide a form of 
amenable, modern government; they did not trust Peter to do so.”379 For Norgate, on 
the other hand, power appears more to descend from the ‘legate-regent’ to the 
magnates.  
In political terms, Carpenter’s seems the most realistic – but which is the 
constitutional answer? This, of course, depends largely on from where Pandulf 
derived his office. Whilst Guala had clearly only derived his from the pope (whose 
authority in England had been augmented by John’s surrender in 1213), Pandulf had 
been appointed by the Marshal and the subsequent confirmation of the magnates, 
and also the pope. Which was the operating factor? Did the magnates’ involvement 
change the aspect of his authority – now jointly derived from the pope and the 
magnates? Whatever conclusion one reaches, it is constitutionally difficult. On the 
one hand, it would mean that sovereignty lay with the pope and, on the other, it 
would be tantamount to saying that whatever the relevant people decide is 
constitutional, is constitutional; the latter being reminiscent of Griffith’s assertion that: 
Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would be 
constitutional also.
380
 
Certainly, the changing sands of government with the political winds do seem to start 
to indicate that there were not fundamental principles that needed to be adhered to 
and that, rather, the government was determined by the quality of the people 
available, their political tenability, and the encompassing circumstances. Indeed, 
things were to change once again with two important events in 1221: Pandulf’s 
resignation and the king’s fourteenth birthday. 
3.6.1 Pandulf’s Resignation, 26 July 1221 
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In October 1220, Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury – who had only arrived 
back in England in 1218 – set out again for the Continent. His destination was the 
papal court where he aimed to “secure the recall of Pandulf, whose position as 
legate inevitably reflected on his own authority as archbishop,” as well as to gain the 
Pope’s permission for the return of his brother, Simon, to England.381 In July 1221, 
Stephen returned from the papal court: 
His return spelt the end of Pandulf’s legation. No doubt pointing to the increasing strength 
of the king’s government, and the impossibility of his own position during a legation, 
Langton persuaded the pope both to withdraw his legate and put no one in his place. At 
Westminster, therefore, on 26 July, in the presence of the bishops of Salisbury, 
Winchester and London, Pandulf resigned his office.
382
 
With Pandulf’s resignation, Stephen became the uncontested primate in England. 
However, he did not assume the prestigious and privileged position that Pandulf had 
held – nor does it appear that he aspired to do so.383 Instead, it was to be the man 
who should have arguably become regent in the first place – Hubert;384 as will be 
seen shortly, Peter was to find himself demoted and Ranulf of Chester (though 
returned from crusade) does not appear to have contested the regency. Pandulf 
remained in England for a few months more, departing in October.385  
Pandulf’s vacation of the legateship is an appropriate time to quickly appraise the 
influence of the two legates. In both Powicke’s and Carpenter’s views, the legates 
had served the kingdom well. Powicke summarised their influence in the following 
way: 
The legates encouraged those who desired to see order and unity, and did their best to 
maintain peace. They took the lead in times of crisis, negotiated with neighbouring 
princes … In all that they did, they acted as responsible agents of the pope, with whom 
they were in frequent communication.
386
 
Carpenter stressed the ‘immense’ role that Pandulf had played following the 
Marshal’s resignation:  
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He had stiffened and energized the government, come to its rescue with frequent loans 
and kept before its eyes the ultimate objective: the resumption of the king’s castles, 
demesnes and possessions.
387
 
Their efforts appear to have been appreciated by the magnates, as Powicke 
noted.388 Their withdrawal, however, represented a shift in authority with papal 
authority once again becoming more remote. Even though the legates largely left the 
administration of the kingdom to the magnates and officials, their ongoing presence 
legitimised the government’s actions. After their removal, the sustained input of 
papal authority disappeared, leaving a gap that could be filled with other sources of 
authority. From that point forward, the idea that the arrangements made were made 
under the jurisdiction of the pope became increasingly less sustainable and a subtle 
shift of sovereignty back from the Roman See occurred – though by no means a 
complete shift. 
3.6.2 Henry’s Fourteenth Birthday, 1 October 1221 
The impact of the king’s entry into his fourteenth year will receive greater attention in 
the next chapter and shall only be touched upon lightly here.  
The transition from thirteen to fourteen – from boyhood to adolescence – appears to 
have resulted in the degradation of the status of his governor, Peter des Roches; 
seemingly realised through a joint effort of Hubert and Pandulf, who had received 
permission from the pope the previous year to replace Peter.389 Peter’s removal as 
the king’s governor may have well occurred, in practice at least, sometime earlier; 
this is reinforced by his absence on pilgrimage between April 1220 and July 1221, 
and his lack of activity with regard to the king and his household.390 In September 
1221, Peter took the cross, which “suggests that he knew that his guardianship was 
coming to an end,”391 although by December the crusade was postponed 
indefinitely.392 
3.7 Hubert de Burgh’s Ascendancy, Autumn 1221 – January 1227  
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3.7.1 Events of 1221-1227 
For a moment in October 1221, it looked as though the fourteen-year-old Henry 
might take on a much greater role in government but the Pope, on the advice of the 
magnates, decided not to make any change.393 In June 1222, the resumption of the 
royal demesne was finally achieved under the guidance of Hubert and he could also 
list the reassertion of his control over the exchequer under his ‘considerable’ 
achievements since Pandulf stepped down.394 However, the resumption of the 
castles and sheriffdoms was trickier, in large part due to the arguments by the 
officers that they had been appointed by John and could not be removed until 
Henry’s majority.395 
The year 1223 was a busy one, for it saw the “threatened invasion of Ireland by 
Hugh de Lacy, the death of the king of France and the conquest of south Wales by 
the earl of Pembroke.”396 It also saw some changes to Henry’s status. In April 1223, 
Honorius wrote to Hubert, Peter, and William Brewer that they should surrender the 
lands and castles that they held of Henry, and also to Ralph de Neville, commanding 
him to only use the seal under the king’s direction. As Carpenter noted, this was not 
a declaration that Henry was no longer a minor but that he was mature enough to be 
“deemed able to control the government of the kingdom.”397 It thus indicated that 
Henry might come to his powers in a piecemeal fashion. The impetus for these 
letters of the pope is the matter of some debate.398 These letters were to have little 
effect, however, for the Earl of Pembroke’s campaign against Llywelyn in Wales and 
the death of Philip Augustus in July led to them being set aside in practice.399 
In November, there was a period of unrest as Hubert sought refuge from the earls of 
Chester and Gloucester, and the Count of Aumale – claiming that there was “a plot 
to seize and imprison him.”400 However, with the intervention of Stephen Langton, 
the dispute did not descend into civil war. On 6 December 1223 it was agreed that 
the negotiations would be suspended and resumed on 20 January. On 10 
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December, Stephen “joined with Hubert to give the king control over his seal … After 
10 December 1223 all letters under the great seal were attested, at least in normal 
circumstances, by the king rather than by his justiciar.”401 
In terms of the king’s status, however, this was still little more than a halfway house. 
Henry still could not make any permanent alienations. That said, the seal did now 
follow Henry;402 Henry was now the centre of the government – although, Hubert 
remained close by. 
The principal events of 1224 were Louis’ virtually unopposed conquest of Poitou and 
the downfall of Falkes de Bréauté, which brought with it an estrangement of the likes 
of Ranulf of Chester and des Roches from the government. In 1225, a tax of a 
fifteenth on movable property raised enough for the recovery of Gascony and the 
final version of Magna Carta was issued – from 1225 onwards, Magna Carta would 
no longer be amended but merely confirmed, e.g. by Henry III in 1237 and 1253, and 
Edward I in 1297403. 
3.7.2 Justiciarship and Regency 
Ranulf, earl of Chester, had left England to go on crusade in June 1218 and returned 
to England in the summer of 1220, over a year after the Marshal’s death.404 
However, between 1220 and his death in 1232, despite his ‘well-known hostility 
toward Hubert’,405 he does not appear to have directly contended for the senior role 
in government. With Peter having been subdued, no papal legate, and Archbishop 
Stephen Langton happy to fill a more demure role, Hubert emerged as the principal 
figure in Henry’s government – and was to remain so throughout the minority and 
until his eventual fall in 1232.406 
Regency is a word often applied in three different contexts, where the monarch is: 
(1) abroad/incommunicado or (2) incompetent because they are (a) non compos 
mentis or (b) too young. Essentially, the monarch is incapable of practically 
undertaking the day-to-day functions of their role. These three scenarios are often 
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taken as equivalent and it is assumed that the structure of government would be the 
same. If this had been the case, however, the Hubert should surely have become 
regent in October 1216 as his predecessors in the role of justiciar had been ‘regents’ 
whilst the king had been abroad in earlier times. However, until 1221 (almost four 
years after the death of John), there was always an authority in England considered 
to be above Hubert.  
It is possible, therefore, that the English magnates did not consider eventualities (1) 
and (2) as equivalent (perhaps not even 2(a) and 2(b), although they would have had 
little cause to consider this distinction). There is something to this as, even if the king 
were far away, there could still be recourse to him – if not immediately then certainly 
sooner than the eleven years between Henry’s accession and his majority. For 
example, when Richard I left on crusade, William Longchamp was left in charge. 
However, Longchamp proved to be unpopular and, consequently, was removed on 
Richard’s orders in favour of Walter de Coutances, archbishop of Rouen.407 The king 
could always issue a ‘writ of the king from oversea’ and any actions taken in his 
absence were pro tempore, i.e. until the return of the king.408 Indeed, Warren 
stressed that just because the king was abroad, it did not mean that they were ‘out of 
touch’ as “[e]fficient cross-channel courier services were established”.409 
It is likewise possible that the magnates did not see the justiciars of the past as 
having exercised the powers of a regent by right of their office but by appointment of 
the king; it was just that this appointment tended to fall on the senior administrator. 
Certainly, earlier regents, such as Roger, bishop of Salisbury and Robert de 
Beaumont, earl of Leicester had had no defined office but, rather, used their 
personal authority in much the same way that queen-consorts and queen-mothers 
did.410 Hubert did not possess the wherewithal to use his personal authority alone 
and, therefore, had to lean on his office. Consequently, both the Marshal’s and de 
Burgh’s positions seem to indicate a movement away from personal authority 
towards official authority, i.e. that they should be obeyed not because they were the 
Marshal or de Burgh per se but, rather, because they were rector and justiciar. That 
said, the fact that neither office long outlived the Marshal or de Burgh does indicate 
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that, at this juncture, there was a rather weaker conception of ‘office’ than there is 
today. 
3.7.3 King’s Council 
Baldwin attributed Henry III’s minority to being one of the key factors in the formation 
of the ‘king’s council’:411  
The council of the period of Henry III’s minority was more than a temporary board of 
regency. Apart from the king’s incompetence, the council filled a need in relations with 
each of the courts and organs of government as a board of supervision and appeal. […]. 
That it did not fall into abeyance at the close of the minority, enough illustrations later than 
1227 have been given to show.
412
 
For Baldwin, the minority provided an opportunity that was snapped up and, for 
Carpenter, the practical need for the senior members of government to secure the 
‘common consent from great councils’ was the thing that “gives the minority much of 
its constitutional importance”.413  
There is still the perennial problem, however, of defining the ‘King’s Council’ and the 
danger of attributing to it an overly institutionalised form. There are many similarities, 
in fact, to the treatment of the Anglo-Saxon witan, which, the renowned Anglo-Saxon 
scholar Sir Frank Stenton referred to as the ‘King’s councils’.414 There does also 
appear to have been some disagreement during Henry’s minority as to what body 
could legitimately make decisions; in August 1220 Robert de Vieuxpont pointed out 
to Hubert that an order that had been made by himself and the ‘council’ had in fact 
“emanated from a certain part of the king’s council, without common counsel and 
assent of the magnates of England who are held to be and are of the chief council of 
the king.”415 Whether this really elucidated a constitutional principle is, however, less 
certain; Vieuxpont – and also the earl of Salisbury in this case – may have simply felt 
excluded from a matter in which they clearly felt they should have a hand. 
                                            
411
 James F Baldwin, “The Beginnings of the King’s Council,” Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society 19 (1905): 27. 
412
 Baldwin, “The Beginnings of the King’s Council,” 56. 
413
 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 55. 
414
 Roach, Kingship and Consent in Anglo-Saxon England, 871-978, 3. 
415
 Robert de Vieuxpont to Pandulf. Quoted in: Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 209. 
90 
 
Certainly, the major political players expected to be involved in the major political 
decisions, but whether this was really a development of the minority is debateable. 
For instance, we find in Gervase of Canterbury’s Gesta Regum (which at this point 
may have been written by his continuator) that in 1204 the “preparations for the 
defence of England against the French invasion were made ‘with the assent of the 
king and of all the magnates’” and in 1205 “‘all the magnates being assembled at 
Oxford, King [John] was compelled to swear that he would preserve unharmed the 
laws of the realm of England with their counsel’”.416 For Gransden, Gervase’s ideas 
were ahead of his time, which may well be the case. It should also be noted that 
Gervase was highly critical of John and, therefore, it is not surprising that he might 
want to stress any event that might make John more accountable.417 
It is arguable that, during Henry’s minority, the magnates’ increased involvement 
gave rise to an expectation that they would continue to be involved, but whether this 
gave them a right to be involved is another matter. Even Carpenter admits that “[t]he 
council was not a formal body” in the sense of having a fixed constitution.418 Clause 
14 of Magna Carta had set out a process for convening an assembly, but its only 
purpose was to give effect to Clause 12, i.e. to grant extraordinary taxation.419 Both 
clauses were omitted from the reissues, however, and, although they went on to 
enjoy some life outside of the reissues, they could not claim to establish a body with 
wide-ranging consultative and deliberative functions.420 As Gwilym Dodd has argued, 
whilst medieval minority governments did display a remarkable amount of 
cooperation, they were not “a real substitute for the royal prerogative.”421 Even in 
later minorities, it was the monarch who ruled, even if that was done on their 
behalf.422 
3.8 End of the Minority, 1227 
                                            
416
 Gransden, Historical Writing in England, 258. 
417
 Gransden, Historical Writing in England, 258. 
418
 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 54. 
419
 William Sharp McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John with an 
Historical Introduction (James Maclehose and Sons, 1914), 253; Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 
54–55; Holt, Magna Carta, 455. 
420
 McKechnie, Magna Carta, 255. 
421
 Gwilym Dodd, “Richard II and the Fiction of Majority Rule,” in The Royal Minorities of Medieval and 
Early Modern England, ed. C Beem (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 113. 
422
 Dodd, “Richard II and the Fiction of Majority Rule,” 117. 
91 
 
Louis VIII of France – the Louis who had invaded in 1216 – died in November 1226, 
leaving a minor heir, Louis IX. For England, this presented a supreme opportunity to 
recover the lands that had been lost under John and could have been a significant 
factor in Henry’s declaration in January 1227 that, henceforth, he would control the 
government.423 As Carpenter noted, there was no other major event at the time that 
would have triggered the change; Henry would not be twenty-one until October 1228 
and there had been no letter from the Pope.424 
Hubert de Burgh remained part of Henry’s government until Henry removed him in 
1232. It is perhaps interesting that Matthew Paris would state on this event that 
Hubert was removed “although it is said he held his office by royal charter in 
perpetuity”.425 
3.9 How many Regents? 
One thing remains to be considered and that is Hillen and Wiswall’s claim that no 
person, other than the Marshal, would serve as sole regent for a minor king in 
England.426 It is, in fact, arguable that there were two other regents upon whose 
shoulders the government rested during Henry’s minority:427 Pandulf and Hubert. 
Norgate, as it has been seen, described Pandulf as the ‘legate-regent’ and Painter’s 
description of William Marshal as “except for some few limitations largely self 
imposed, king of England”428 echoes the Waverly annalist’s description of Hubert as 
lacking “nothing of royal power save the dignity of a royal diadem.”429 Neither William 
Marshal, Pandulf, or Hubert were ever called regent; during the minority, Hubert’s 
and Pandulf’s offices were augmented to include the duties of a regent but, as 
William had no office, one needed to be created for him. Therefore, it is difficult to 
deny Hubert and Pandulf theoretical status as regents, although Hubert has a much 
stronger claim than Pandulf.  
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4 Minority 
4.1 Introduction 
The final question that needs to be answered is at what point Henry III would 
exercise the full powers of kingship. It was obviously impractical for him to do so 
upon his accession, owing to his tender age and the extremity of the situation. 
Therefore, his powers had to remain in abeyance, but which ones and for how long? 
It shall be argued that the answers to these questions were determined by Henry’s 
ability and the political situation; both of which lack constitutional clarity. 
Furthermore, making it contingent on ability begs the questions of: (a) what if Henry 
never showed an ability to rule? – he was, after all, accused on a number of 
occasions of being ‘simple’430; (b) if kingship is contingent on ability, then might an 
adult king have their powers reduced in view of their ability, or lack thereof?; (c) who 
was to decide whether or not Henry was able?; and (d) once Henry was declared 
able, was there a residual right to declare him unable again?431 
4.2 Henry’s Early Childhood 
We know little of Henry’s earlier years. He was born on 1 October 1207 at 
Winchester and around 1211/1212 he appears to have been entrusted to the care of 
Peter des Roches, bishop of Winchester, in whose care he would remain until 
1221.432 Henry had four younger siblings, all of whom were also entrusted to des 
Roches and his satellites, although none appear to have been raised together.433 
Considering that it was common for medieval children to be raised away from home, 
this is not too surprising.434 
4.2.1 Education 
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Like most other royal and noble children, there were probably many people involved 
in his education.435 We know that Richard, Henry’s younger brother, had a tutor in 
Robert of Acaster.436 It is possible that Master Henry of Avranches, a continental 
poet, was Henry and Richard’s tutor for a time, as Russell and Heironimus have 
suggested. Avranches certainly was closely associated with Peter des Roches, who 
was “one of his greatest patrons”, and left England around the same time as des 
Roches in 1227.437 The only direct evidence of a connection between Avranches and 
the young royal princes, however, is a lengthy metrical grammar that he dedicated to 
them.438 For Carpenter, this grammar was a piece of showmanship by Avranches, 
designed “more to impress the court than to educate his pupil”439 and, for Vincent, “it 
was not the sort of work to have been of any practical use as a textbook”.440 
Even if Avranches was not involved in Henry’s education, somebody probably taught 
Henry to read. Steane thought literacy a likely part of a king’s education from the 
thirteenth century onwards but Orme, who is a greater authority, went even further 
and said that “[t]here seems no doubt that all the English kings from 1100 (except 
perhaps for Stephen) were able to read”.441 Henry I and Henry II both learned to 
read.442 Henry’s father, King John, carried with him “a small library” and in 1205 he 
asked Reginald of Cornhill to send to him “two tuns of wine and ‘a history of England 
in French’”.443 Henry’s son, Edward I, was almost certainly literate, as was Henry’s 
wife, Eleanor of Provence.444 Although, it appears that John struggled at Latin.445 
Philip de Aubigné, a Leicestershire knight, almost certainly worked with Henry, 
particularly during Henry’s long visits to Wallingford Castle. But it is unlikely that 
Aubigné delivered academic or moral instruction.446 Rather, he was Henry’s tutor-in-
arms, teaching Henry the ‘three pillars of military education’: horsemanship, 
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huntsmanship, and swordsmanship.447 This sort of training would probably have 
begun when Henry was seven or eight years old.448 He may have also taught Henry 
etiquette, as well as other things such as dancing and singing.449 
The History mentions that when Henry met William Marshal on his way to Gloucester 
to be crowned, he had with him Ralph de Saint-Sanson “who had been his governor 
and guardian, / and still was, / for he carried him in his arms”.450 Unfortunately, we 
know little about Ralph or his role, although it seems to have ended around this time. 
He appears only once in the History, although he crops up a number of times in the 
Patent Rolls; e.g., in 1223 he was given safe conduct as king’s envoy and in 1230 he 
received letters of protection whilst travelling abroad with Henry.451  
4.3 Interregnum, 19-28 October 1216 
We do not know when Henry was informed of John’s death, but he certainly did not 
make the journey from Devizes to his father’s funeral and entombment behind the 
shrines of St Wulfstan and St Oswald at Worcester.452 Whether it was thought that 
Worcester was too far, the journey too perilous, or the political situation still too 
undecided is unclear.  
After the loyalists had convened at Gloucester and agreed to back Henry, Thomas 
de Sandford was sent to escort Henry to them. Henry then made his way with a 
“great company of armed men” to Gloucester.453 William Marshal met Henry halfway, 
around Malmesbury, although his motive for doing so is unclear.454 He may have felt 
that Henry’s security would be greater if he was accompanying him; he may have 
wanted to prepare Henry for what was to come; he may have even wanted to gauge 
whether Henry would be suitable. It may, however, have been merely courtesy; 
similar to the ritual of adventus, a part of which was the occursus or ‘meeting’. This 
was where the host travelled to meet the guest not only as “accompaniment along 
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the last stretch of the journey” but also as an act of etiquette “respecting the guests’ 
higher standing by making it appear as if the hosts had come to the guests, rather 
than vice-versa.”455 
Henry’s and the Marshal’s meeting is reported in the History. Upon meeting the 
Marshal, Henry is reported to have said “I wish to tell you truly, / that I give myself to 
God and yourself, / so that in God’s name you may take charge of me. / And may our 
true God, the protector of all that is good, / grant that you so manage our affairs, / 
that you may take good care of them.”456 Despite the symbolic deference of the 
Marshal’s journeying out to meet Henry, it is perhaps Henry’s apparent humbling 
deference to the Marshal that is the most powerful.  
Henry’s coronation date was set for 28 October and hasty preparations were made. 
Whether Henry understood all that was going on, or the ramifications of the oaths 
that he took, is difficult to tell.  
4.4 William Marshal’s Government, 29 October 1216 – 7 April 1219 
The government was entrusted to William Marshal’s leadership (3.4). He decided 
that it would be both dangerous and a hindrance for Henry to follow him about the 
country and so, according to the History, entrusted him to the care of Peter des 
Roches.457 If there were to be a period of practical apprenticeship or if the king were 
to be present at all major decisions, it was clear that it would not start immediately. 
Instead, Henry would be kept in the South West where there was “little or no 
opposition … and no sustained attack to fear from the Welsh princes”.458 Henry’s 
mother, Isabella, was given “lodgings in the castle at Exeter” and his brother, 
Richard, was kept at Corfe.459 
4.4.1 The Duration of the Minority 
In every society a person’s status depends to some extent on his age. In western countries 
people have to reach a specified age before they can marry, before they can vote, before 
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they can legally contract debts; the qualifying age may be different for different activities and 
is different in different countries.
460
 
Henry’s youth does not appear to have barred him from becoming king, but it 
certainly restricted what he could do. Henry would be restricted for so long as his 
status remained unchanged. When and under what conditions his graduation would 
occur, however, seems to have been uncertain. Would it, for instance, rest solely on 
the attainment of certain age or would it be decided by some other criteria, such as 
physical or mental development? Moreover, if it occurred at a particular age, would 
that be the same age as the age of majority? 
The magnates were painfully aware that if they were to reinstate Plantagenet 
hegemony, it was vital not to permanently alienate the Crown’s assets. Such an 
inability to delay gratification and the consequent dispersion of the royal demesne 
must, for example, have been a significant factor on the weakening of the eighth-
century Northumbrian monarchy.461 Furthermore, the magnates would have wanted 
to avoid allegations (true or otherwise) of mismanagement of the Crown’s resources, 
especially the career courtiers whose positions relied on faithful service to the 
Crown. This had been the allegation levelled by Bede against Behrtred and 
Berhtfrith, who were influential in Osred’s government, and these circumstances may 
have played a part in Osred’s assassination.462 
Therefore, the magnates imposed upon themselves the restrictions that applied to 
other wardships at the time. As Glanvill put it: “Guardians must restore inheritances 
to heirs in good condition and free of debts, in proportion to the duration of the 
wardship and the size of the inheritance.”463 Not only must it be in ‘good condition’, 
however, but the magnates were also barred from alienating “any part of the 
inheritance permanently” or, as Bracton put it, “they may alienate nothing of the 
inheritance so that it is permanently lost”.464 Such a sentiment can be found in the 
modern law of trusts, which, for example, requires that trustees not take undue risks 
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when investing the trust’s funds so that the fund may be preserved.465 These 
restrictions were later confirmed when Henry was given his own seal in 1218 (3.5.2). 
This disability, however, made things difficult for the magnates, especially 
considering the dire financial and political situation; after all, grants of land were 
valuable items of patronage and could be used to win allies and secure funds. 
Indeed, following Henry’s coronation the Marshal sent out letters to the magnates 
“promising them possessions and many presents besides, on condition of their 
faithfully adhering to the said king”.466 But, unable to use permanent grants, the 
loyalists settled on temporary grants.467 The first that was enrolled was issued on 30 
October 1216, which granted two castles to William de Ferrers, earl of Derby, until 
Henry’s fourteenth birthday.468 This was the first of many such grants.469 It became 
clear that Henry’s coming of age would be of great import: Peter de Maulay claimed 
in 1225 that he had made an oath to John not to surrender his castles until Henry 
was of ‘legitimate age’ and it is possible that Ranulf of Chester made a similar 
promise.470 Would this occur at fourteen, as it initially seemed set to? 
4.4.1.1 Fourteen? 
Fourteen had a lot to recommend itself as a point of transition. In Roman law, it 
marked the transition from pueritia [childhood] to adolescentia [adolescence],471 from 
the status of impubes to pubes.472 Although this was originally merely a conventional 
age and could be delayed for a number of years “where for some reason or other it 
was thought desirable to allow a comfortable margin”,473 it later became a fixed 
threshold marking the end of tutela, i.e. it was the age when the tutor (guardian) lost 
their powers over their pupillus.474 According to Rawson, those whose paterfamilias 
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had died would not have had “full financial autonomy until the age of twenty-five”475 
and, certainly, special protection does seem to be accorded to those under this 
age.476 
In terms of precedent, Eadwig (r.955-959) had been crowned around the age of 
fourteen and, according to Stafford, was certainly no older than fifteen.477 How much 
power Eadwig exercised himself, however, is unclear. Beem believed that Eadwig’s 
reign was dominated by a regency council, but Stafford in Unification and Conquest 
does not mention this and, in fact, her discussion of his brief reign indicates that 
people at the time (although this may be propaganda) held Eadwig accountable for 
the failings of government as though it had been in his control.478 Otto III, Holy 
Roman Emperor (r.996-1002) was fourteen when his regent and grandmother, 
Empress Adelheid, died in 994 and he took the reins. That the English magnates 
were aware of Eadwig’s and Otto III’s precedents is unlikely. However, they would 
almost certainly have been aware of Philip Augustus of France (r.1179-1223), who 
had been crowned junior king at fourteen and had “exercised the functions of royalty 
from that time forth”,479 and of Frederick I of Sicily (later Frederick II, Holy Roman 
Emperor) who had been declared of age in 1208. Indeed, Vincent has hypothesised 
that the ‘Sicilian precedent’ may have been a deciding factor in Henry’s minority.480 
Following Philip Augustus’ example, kings of France attained their majority at 
fourteen.481  
As is the case today, adolescence in the medieval world carried with it negative 
connotations: 
He had an unstable disposition, was undisciplined, careless, sensual, had no taste for 
effort, and delighted in pleasure. In narrative texts, he is often presented as a person 
inclined toward excess, with a tendency for overreacting and blasphemous speech.
482
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Eadwig was portrayed in the Life of Dunstan in the following way: “Young, foolish, 
dominated by bad counsel, easily led astray by the lusts of the flesh, he was an 
exiler of saints, morally deficient and politically incompetent.”483 William Marshal 
himself had developed a reputation during his teenage years “for drinking, eating, 
and sleeping, but for little else.”484 It is not unthinkable that the magnates may have 
preferred a later age than fourteen. Indeed, had they turned to canon law, it is 
possible that they could have delayed Henry’s majority until twenty-five.485 An 
extreme attempt to delay a prince’s majority was made in France half a century later: 
Following the death of Louis IX’s and Queen Margaret’s eldest son, their second 
son, Philip, became heir to the throne. However, Margaret did not think much of 
Philip and so, in the spring of 1263, she  
made Prince Philip swear on the Bible that until the age of thirty he would remain in her 
‘bail’, which is to say in her custody, under her surveillance; and would heed no one’s 
advice against her wishes. 
But Philip’s misgivings had grown as he realized that his mother meant to keep him in a 
state of artificial minority until he was thirty.
486
 
Louis was horrified when he heard and Pope Urban IV eventually released Philip 
from his vow.487  
4.4.1.2 Twenty-One? 
Although partly favoured in Roman law and in France, fourteen as an age of 
transition does not seem to have had much of a home in English law. Under English 
law, the age of majority depended upon the kind of property held by one’s father. 
Both Glanvill and Bracton are in agreement as to the several ages of majority, 
although Bracton goes into greater detail – particularly regarding female heirs.488 
Heirs to military fees come of age at twenty-one, heirs to sokemen at fifteen, and an 
heir to a burgess when he can “count money carefully, measure cloth and generally 
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do his father’s business”.489 This creates a number of problems, not least because 
fourteen does not appear.  
Was Henry – as the son of a king and king himself – analogous to any of these 
categories? Carpenter says that the ‘general consensus’ at the time was that Henry 
would assume the full powers of king at the age of twenty-one, presumably also 
when he attained his majority. This would have meant that he was seen as 
analogous to the son of a knight. Were heirs to military fees on a par with kings and 
princes? How the magnates chose to treat Henry – as compared to their own 
children – was symbolically very important: was the king merely primus inter pares 
(first among equals) and subject to the same laws as everyone else, or was the king 
qualitatively different? If the former, does it mean that Pollock and Maitland’s thesis 
was right that monarchs did not differ in kind but in degree from their subjects 
(1.4.3.1)?490 
In one very important way Henry did receive different treatment from the sons of 
knights and the magnates: he was knighted on the same day as his coronation at the 
age of nine. Boulton has shown that it was not unusual for members of the royal 
house or “viri regales” to be knighted at a younger age than their lower-born peers. 
Between 1066 and 1154, by Boulton’s calculations, the average age for a member of 
the royal house to be knighted was around 17.3 years, whereas the average age for 
those of lower birth was 21.5-22.5 years.491 In the period 1154-1272, the average 
age for the viri regales was a little higher: according to Boulton’s calculations, the 
average age was 18.5-20.0, the former figure excluding Peter de Savoie who was 
dubbed, exceptionally, at 38. Boulton did however make a startling omission: Henry 
III. Boulton does include Henry’s younger brother, Richard of Cornwall, and there is, 
in fact, a gap in Boulton’s table where Henry III should sit. If we include Henry III, 
therefore, then the average ages, without and with de Savoie respectively, fall to 
                                            
489
 Glanvill, Tractatus, 1965, 82; Glanvill, Tractatus, 1812, 170. 
490
 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law: Before the Time of Edward I, I:512ff. 
491
 D’A.J.D. Boulton, “Classic Knighthood as Nobiliary Dignity: The Knighting of Counts and Kings’ 
Sons in England, 1066-1272,” in Medieval Knighthood V: Papers from the Sixth Strawberry Hill 
Conference 1994, ed. Stephen Church and Ruth Harvey (The Boydell Press, 1995), 74–75. 
101 
 
17.9-18.9. This is in comparison to an average age amongst the baronage of around 
20.5-21.6.492  
The ages at which the known cases of the viri regales achieved their military majority 
is shown in the chart below. As can be seen, there is a significant disparity in ages. If 
we were to set aside Henry’s dubbing, then we might conclude that fourteen was a 
necessary, though not sufficient age. However, Henry’s example undermines any 
such thesis.  
 
Boulton argued that age and skill were incidental to knighthood for the upper 
echelons of society; rather, age of dubbing would be contingent upon potential to 
inherit. Cadets, on the whole, could be knighted at any time that was deemed 
suitable. Elder children, who stood to inherit their parents’ dignities and estates, 
however, would be knighted simultaneously, or shortly after, being invested with 
‘dignity or domain’.493 Thus, one’s age of military majority (i.e. age of dubbing) could 
be different from one’s age of majority – particularly as time progressed and 
knighthood ceased being a professional class but rather a mark of social status.  
As Henry clearly came into property on his father’s death, it could well be this fact 
that triggered his dubbing. This might explain, for instance, why Henry the Young 
King, Henry III’s uncle, had not been knighted in 1170, for he inherited nothing. If this 
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is the case, then knighthood was not a prerequisite for kingship but it was a 
prerequisite to inherit a kingdom. Such a theory would also explain why the twelve-
year-old Louis IX of France was knighted en route to his coronation at Rheims in 
December 1226.494 Painter, however, has suggested that there may have been a 
(misjudged) political motive behind Henry II delaying Henry the Younger’s military 
majority: he would be “unlikely to be troublesome politically” if he was not a fully-
fledged knight.495  
Investiture, as Boulton recognised, was not the only trigger. Knighthood was also a 
precondition to bear and use arms, and it could be bestowed for this purpose: Henry 
the Younger had been knighted with the blessings of his father-in-law, Louis VII of 
France, around the age of eighteen in 1173 so that he could wage war against his 
father;496 John Lackland had been knighted in 1185, aged nineteen, in anticipation of 
an expedition to Ireland; 497 Arthur of Brittany had been knighted in 1202 when Philip 
Augustus “erected him as John’s successor in all his fiefs save Normandy” and it 
was reasonably certain that Arthur may have to fight John;498 and Richard of 
Cornwall was knighted aged sixteen in 1225 in preparation for his expedition to 
Gascony.499 This was not necessarily just the case for the high nobility, as William 
Marshal may also have been ‘prematurely’ knighted in 1166 due to “the nature of the 
military emergency” in which William de Tancarville, William’s master, found 
himself.500 Although, early knighting was clearly much more prevalent for the high 
born.501  
In many cultures, the right to bear arms had accompanied a general rite of passage 
into adulthood, which brought with it certain socio-political rights such as liberation 
from paternal power and acceptance into the public life of the community.502 If this 
had been the case in England, therefore, then Henry – at nine years old – would 
have to have been considered an adult. However, it appears that the age of majority 
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and the age of military majority were separable. This is attested in Clause 3 of 
Magna Carta (1216), which states the age of majority as twenty-one and provides 
that it could not be attained earlier by being knighted.503  
Consequently, it seems that knighthood may not have been a prerequisite for 
kingship but as Henry inherited his father’s lands and titles, and as Henry became 
the figurehead for a military campaign, his knighting appears to have been only 
natural. However, even though Henry was knighted well in advance of his peers, 
therefore, this did not necessarily derogate from the general age of majority of 
twenty-one. In this respect, it remained tenable that Henry was analogous to his 
contemporaries and, indeed, half a century later Alexander III of Scotland attained 
his majority at the age of twenty in 1261. If this was the case, then Henry’s 
fourteenth birthday can be recast merely as a point of review, not as a marker of 
radical transition. By that time, although Henry may still not have been able to give 
permanent grants, he might at least be able to express an opinion on them. 
4.4.1.3 Counter-Precedents 
Otto III, Philip Augustus, and Frederick I of Sicily would have been the most readily 
available and applicable precedents. In each case, political motives can be found for 
their comings-of-age.  
When Otto III took charge in September 994, it was not on the event of his birthday 
but on the event of the death of his grandmother, Empress Adelheid.  
It seems that Philip Augustus’ father, Louis VII, had been reluctant to crown his son 
during his lifetime. However, in 1179 Louis became seriously ill and he sought to 
install his son as king, which happened in November, “not in order to demonstrate 
his rights, but because it was necessary for him to govern.”504 There are three things 
that need to be borne in mind: (1) that Louis was still alive for the greater part of 
Philip’s first year, i.e. until Philip was fifteen; (2) the menacing presence of Henry II of 
England and his sons; and (3) the rift between Philip, his mother, and his maternal 
uncles over Philip’s marriage to Isabella of Hainault in April 1180. Philip’s 
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ascendancy was a reaction to a political situation in which Philip needed to seize the 
initiative if he was to stop his kingship and his kingdom from being undermined.  
Frederick I of Sicily, like Henry III, had been a papal ward. This had been an 
arrangement made by Constance, Frederick’s mother, shortly before her death and 
one which Abulafia has said “made considerable sense, given the emergency”.505 
The lack of a strong preserving authority had meant that “factionalism in the kingdom 
[had] encouraged those in power to use royal assets as a means to gain military and 
political support.”506 Pope Innocent III lacked authority in the kingdom until he made 
some headway in 1208 and, no doubt, he wanted to capitalize on it by declaring the 
impatient young Frederick of age at the end of the year when the king turned 
fourteen, and proceeded to arrange his marriage. With Frederick of full age, there 
was the hope that the royal finances and control over Sicily could be restored. It may 
be that Frederick was genuinely declared of age because he was fourteen, but 
considering Innocent’s troubles with the nobles, he probably wanted to emancipate 
Frederick from their grip and then exercise his own authority over Frederick as his 
suzerain lord sooner rather than later. Perhaps it is significant that Frederick’s own 
son, Henry VII, remained a minor until he was eighteen, and then only started his 
personal rule because of the abrupt departure of Louis, duke of Bavaria, from his 
court towards the end of 1228.507 
Fourteen was not the only age at which medieval kings were declared of age. The 
Austrasian kings Childebert II (575-595) and Theudebert II (595-612) both attained 
their majorities at fifteen, according to Stafford’s reckoning.508 The Byzantine 
emperor Constantine VI (776-797) appears to have attained his majority in 790, aged 
nineteen, when he ejected his mother, Irene of Athens, from his court.509  
For the great majority of early medieval kings and princes, we have little evidence of 
when they achieved their majorities. The waters are further muddied by the early 
deaths of many minor kings, such as Sigeburt II of Austrasia (d.613, ca. eleven), 
Osred I of Northumbria (d.716, ca. sixteen), Edward the Martyr (d.978, ca. sixteen), 
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Ladislaus III of Hungary (d.1205, aged five), Edward V (d. 1483, aged twelve), and 
Edward VI (d.1553, aged fifteen). It is difficult to know when any of these kings would 
have become fully-fledged monarchs owing to the fact that they did not survive long 
enough for it to become clear.  
A further complication is that, in many cases, there does not appear to have been a 
singular moment of transition or, if there was, it was not a dramatic constitutional 
moment. The most important example of this is Henry III’s contemporary, Louis IX of 
France. As Jean Richard noted, the “contemporary historians failed to record the 
moment when he attained his majority.”510 Richard was certain that there must have 
been an age of majority (which would have been around twenty),511 but that this was 
overshadowed in constitutional terms by the continuing dominance of Louis’ mother, 
Blanche of Castile.512 For Hillen and Wiswall, it was only with his marriage to 
Margaret of Provence (1234) when the ‘first phase’ of his minority ended but only 
with Blanche of Castile’s death (1252) that “Louis’s minority government really [came 
to an] end”.513  
4.4.1.4 A Discretionary Age of Majority? 
Both Glanvill and Bracton indicate that the attainment of an arbitrary age was not the 
only way that a medieval person might attain their majority, which was perhaps a 
reflection of the difficulty in tracking people’s ages. As noted above, sons of 
burgesses would come of age when they could handle business affairs. Bracton is 
clear: “Thus it is not defined in terms of time but by sense and maturity.”514 
Adulthood was competency-based and could vary between individuals. A similar 
thing applied to daughters of sokemen and burgesses, who would attain their 
majority when they were “capable of carrying out the tasks required of a woman of 
[their] station.”515 For at least daughters of sokemen, however, their majority could 
not practically be obtained “before her fourteenth or fifteenth year since such things 
require discretion and understanding” – putting them, essentially, on a par with male 
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heirs in socage.516 Bracton goes on to explain that the rules stating that sons of 
sokemen come of age at fifteen because socage “demands strength, as well as 
discretion and understanding”, and that the age of majority for heirs to military tenure 
was twenty-one because it requires “greater strength, and greater understanding and 
discretion, that the heir in military service be of sufficient vigour to bear the arms 
appropriate to his military duty.”517 
The first implication of basing majority upon competency is that it could mean that 
the age of majority for a king should be higher than twenty-one. After all, surely the 
strength and understanding required of a king were greater than any other in his 
land. If drawing from the Roman law tradition, there would have been some 
precedent for delaying Henry’s majority until he reached twenty-five.518 However, this 
would have meant prolonging an already long minority, resulting in a greater period 
of uncertainty. A minority government, after all, appears to have been limited to 
temporary and provisional actions, and its authority was less than that of a fully-
fledged king. Henry’s minority is a testament to the struggles of a minority 
government: it struggled with the resumption of king’s demesnes, sheriffdoms, and 
castles;519 and it struggled to maintain order, as illustrated by the ‘Christmas crisis’ of 
1221, Hubert de Burgh’s brief flight to Gloucester in November 1223, and the fall of 
Falkes de Bréauté in 1224.520  
Alternatively, it is arguable that the king should come of age sooner than his fellows, 
as he is deemed a constitutionally special case. This is particularly the case if 
kingship is seen as being theocratic and the king himself as minister Dei or vicarius 
Dei in terris as Bracton called the king on a number of occasions.521 The supposed 
close affinity with God could imbue the king with a superhuman aura, although this 
does not appear to have been an image that Henry inspired amongst his 
contemporaries: he does not appear to have been precocious and later developed a 
reputation as rex simplex – a simple king. Consequently, there would have been a 
lack of motivation and justification for declaring resolutely that Henry would come of 
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age early. However, the magnates probably also wanted to avoid closing doors 
unnecessarily – it could turn out to be appropriate to declare Henry of age early. 
Therefore, a certain degree of vagueness about Henry’s age of majority – made 
possible by a lack of strong precedent – meant that Henry might be given power 
when both he and the kingdom were adjudged ready. Who was to be the judge of 
that, however, was uncertain and would, like Henry’s majority, be decided by political 
circumstances rather than constitutional rules. 
Whatever the case, the link between ability and maturity on the one hand and legal 
thresholds cannot be ignored. Even though all age-delimited thresholds are largely 
arbitrary, that does not mean that they are completely so. They recognise that 
people develop as they age and attempt to draw a general line between those who 
are (deemed to be) able and those who are not. The reasons for doing so are 
obvious: it creates certainty and, therefore, stability; is administratively simpler; and 
attempts to achieve horizontal fairness. However, it remains a very rough, blunt tool 
– often used not following empirical investigation but guesswork and prejudice. 
Furthermore, no age threshold can be set in stone, as general abilities might vary 
from time to time, especially when one introduces an education system.  
When one takes into consideration that it is axiomatic that different people are 
different, it is easy to see how the magnates may have been inclined to look behind 
the threshold to the reasons that it was first implemented and to use that as a basis 
for Henry’s change in status, not the threshold itself. There would be many benefits 
to such an approach, not least that Henry would assume only so much responsibility 
as he could handle. It would reduce the potential for making bad decisions, which in 
turn would preserve Henry’s dignity and the dignity of the Crown. 
The implications, however, of overtly connecting ability with right-to-rule are seismic. 
It implies that competency is a prerequisite for kingship and it follows that only 
competent monarchs are allowed to rule. The consequence being, of course, that a 
monarch who has become incompetent could have their powers removed from them. 
Indeed, this is attested by Henry VI (1421-71) and George III (1728-1820), both of 
whom were relieved of their kingships – for a time at least – as a result of their 
mental health problems. More radically, it could provide the basis for the depositions 
of Edward II (1284-1327) and Richard II (1367-1400); after all, if the monarch is 
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chronically incompetent, it seems unwise to maintain them – although, it is a fine line 
between an inability to make decisions and an inability to make wise decisions. Is 
this evidence, therefore, of a provision implicit in the constitution equivalent to §4 of 
the 25th Amendment to the US Constitution, which provides the explicit mechanism 
for the replacement of the president where he “is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office”? The case is arguable but not convincing. Furthermore, 
whilst it does seem the logical conclusion for a constitution ready to accept a minor 
king but not allow him kingly powers, there is no evidence that the minorities 
provided the direct grounds for the regencies under Henry VI and George III, and the 
depositions of Edward II and Richard II. 
The final matter to discuss is that it seems to have been generally assumed that the 
change in status would be wholesale, i.e. that Henry would go from having no 
competences to all. It is of course possible, however, that the magnates envisaged a 
much more graduated process where, even though Henry was basically competent, 
some competencies would require greater experience. This is the basis, for example, 
of the American system of ages of candidacy, which range from twenty-five for 
senators to thirty-five for presidents and vice-presidents.522  
It is clear that access to institutional competencies could be affected by personal 
abilities. The magnates were not going to let Henry rule from the first day of his 
reign. There were some early indications that Henry would accede wholesale to his 
powers at the age of fourteen; Powicke even suggests that his thirteenth birthday 
was briefly considered, but these times came and went.523 From then, the signs 
pointed to his late-teens/early-twenties and, most likely, was the age of twenty-one. 
4.5 Second Coronation, 17 May 1220 
Henry had the weight of the greater baronage and the pope behind him, but he 
himself had little personal authority. In August 1219, matters got out of hand at 
Tickhill in Yorkshire, where the constable refused to yield. On 29 August, Pandulf 
sent a letter to de Burgh and des Roches saying that “[t]he constable and men of 
Tickhill were daily committing worse iniquities ‘and by way of derision they call the 
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king not a king but a boy’”.524 There had also been difficulties at Mitford in 
Northumberland, where Carpenter believes that Henry may have attended in person. 
Philip of Oldcoates agreed, before the minority government, to surrender Mitford, but 
by October had reneged on his promise.525 It is unclear what impact Henry’s 
personal presence would have had and whether it had been sufficient to secure 
Oldcoates’ submission, but it is clear that – in any case – Henry’s authority (both 
personally and as expressed through his government) was not enough to keep 
Oldcoates subdued.  
For Carpenter, it was these struggles at Tickhill and Mitford that prompted the 
government “to send Robert, quondam abbot of Thorney, to the papal court” in order 
to gain permission from Honorius for a second coronation.526 It would be fair to add 
that, had Tickhill and Mitford been completely isolated incidents, the impetus for a 
second coronation would not have been so great; defiance at Tickhill and Mitford had 
been the most flagrant, but they were symptomatic of a wider problem. As well as 
amending any irregularities in Henry’s first coronation, his second would reassert 
royal authority.527 It would also, as Carpenter remarked, ingratiate the government 
with the Church and, in particular, would “please [Westminster] abbey and the 
archbishop [of Canterbury]”.528 After all, it does appear that the abbot of Westminster 
had taken offence at the coronation being held at Gloucester, which Guala had to 
assure him had only been done out of necessity.529 
Henry was not the only king of England to have been crowned twice. Eadgar was 
possibly crowned twice – perhaps first in 961, although there is not much evidence to 
support this, and then later in 973 at Bath. In 1194, after his release from captivity, 
Richard I renewed his coronation oaths at Winchester – an account of which can be 
found in Gervase of Canterbury.530  
In early April 1220, papal letters arrived in England authorising a second coronation 
because Henry’s first coronation, in Honorius’ words, “on account of the disturbed 
condition of his realm, had been performed less solemnly than was right and fitting, 
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and in another place than that which the usage of the kingdom required.”531 In 
permitting a second coronation, Honorius almost implies that the people of Tickhill 
had a point: Henry had indeed not been king since October 1216 because his first 
coronation had not been validly performed. In truth, there is an element of 
indeterminacy about Henry’s coronation at Gloucester, which was probably sufficient 
but remained open to challenge. It was time to tie up any loose ends that might have 
unravelled Henry’s kingship.  
It was decided that Henry’s coronation would be held to coincide with Pentecost, 
which in 1220 fell on Sunday 17 May. Boulton noted that, during what he calls the 
“pre-classic” phase of knighthood (ca. 1066-1154), the feast of Pentecost was often 
used as the setting for dubbings and that it “would come to be the principal feast 
associated with the cult of chivalry in most courts, both real and fictional”.532 Why this 
association developed is anyone’s guess, though Boulton has suggested that it 
might have been partly for functional reasons, for “it occurred at a time of year when 
tournaments and other outdoor festivities could be held in some comfort”.533  
Edgar was crowned at Bath in 973 on Pentecost, but whether the thirteenth-century 
magnates would have been aware of this is unlikely.534 However, neither 17 May or 
Pentecost had any special significance for Henry himself. Norgate remarked that it is 
somewhat surprising that they should not have waited the seventeen months until 
Henry’s fourteenth birthday, which could have accompanied a change in status. 
However, as Harold Wilson quipped, ‘a week is a long time in politics’ – seventeen 
months was just too far away for convenience and, perhaps, the true motivation for 
the coronation is demonstrated not during the ceremony but the day after. The 
annals of Dunstable describe the scene: 
the barons who were present swore that they would resign their castles and wardenships 
at the will of the King, and would render at the Exchequer a faithful account of their ferms; 
and also that if any rebel should resist the King, and should not make satisfaction within 
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forty days after being excommunicated by the Legate, they would make war upon him at 
the King’s bidding, that a rebel might be disinherited without the option of a fine.
535
 
The coronation was an act of showmanship and demonstration, which the 
government used as a platform from which to reinstate royal power. Carpenter has 
calculated that “[a]t least £760 were spent on the ceremony and celebrations, thus 
exhausting a good proportion of the revenues from the exchequer’s Easter term”.536 
The coronation was accompanied by a flurry of letters from Honorius, which outlined 
a broader scheme of reform: “the king’s castles, manors, vills and other demesnes 
were to be restored to him; full satisfaction was to be given for the issues received 
from them since the war; and henceforth no one, however faithful, was to hold more 
than two royal castles.”537 The effort appears to have been worthwhile, for it 
represented a ‘turning point’ in the Crown’s fortune.538 
Despite the fact that Henry’s kingship and resources appear to have been secured, 
little changed for Henry himself. It is possible that the coronation had even been held 
when it had precisely to avoid any thought that Henry would now occupy a more 
active role in the government. All in all, Henry’s second coronation was a brilliant 
piece of political propaganda, but the glimmer of solid constitutionality appears to 
disappear, at least in terms of the ‘who’ and the ‘where’ of the coronation.  
4.5.1.1 Magna Carta and the Coronation Charters 
Magna Carta (1215), attested by John, only lasted for a few months.539 Having been 
vigorously opposed by Innocent III, the Church performed a magnificent volte-face 
when the Papal Legate, Guala, supported the reissue of Magna Carta – albeit 
somewhat emasculated – on 12 November 1216; less than a month after Henry’s 
first coronation.540  
Monarchs often issued a charter around the time of their coronation; in part, as a 
manifesto but also as a bribe to win support and cement their claim. Henry I had 
issued a charter for his coronation to secure the ‘goodwill of his electors’ and, 
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likewise, so did Stephen – twice.541 It was Empress Matilda’s failure to do so which 
meant that she did not become the first regnant queen of all England. By Henry II’s 
time, the coronation charter was becoming something of a tradition and he too 
issued a charter.542 Henry the Young King, Richard, and John broke this apparent 
tradition and did not issue charters.543 Magna Carta (1216), issued on behalf of 
Henry III, however, could be seen as a return to the earlier tradition. It is interesting, 
therefore, that although Magna Carta had been reissued by Henry (in 1217) and was 
to be reissued again (in 1225), his second coronation was not an occasion for it. In 
later times, the confirmation of Magna Carta tended to fall within the middle of a 
reign,544 and it was perhaps a coincidence that that Magna Carta (1216) fell around 
his first coronation.  
Alternatively, it might reveal something as to the circumstances of the second 
coronation, which was designed to enhance royal power through a show of strength. 
It was not, in any way, a negotiation: it was a demand to be respected and, 
therefore, did not require a concession.  
4.6 Henry’s Fourteenth Birthday 
Henry turned fourteen on 01 October 1221, putting to the test the early indications 
that that was when Henry would take over the reins of government. It seems that 
Henry’s role in the kingdom had been growing: even though he still spent long 
periods of time apart from the government, he had held his own court at places such 
as Wallingford and Havering, where “a stream of letters and visitors” sought him out 
to deal with people’s “demands and requests”, treating him as “an independent force, 
separate from Hubert, Pandulf and Peter”.545 Moreover, he had “communicated his 
will to the government, or sought its advice, in letters of his own authenticated by the 
seal of his steward, William de Cantilupe.”546 But was his growing political 
competence enough? 
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Since the Marshal’s death in April 1219, relations between de Burgh and des Roches 
had soured to the point that Carpenter believed that they were ‘bitter rivals’ by early 
1221.547 It was perhaps this rivalry that had prompted des Roches to go on 
pilgrimage to Spain between mid-April and mid- to late-June 1221 or, perhaps, as 
Vincent has suggested, because he had thoughts of going on crusade and designs 
on the archbishopric of Damietta.548 His absence, however, itself piqued suspicions: 
on 30 May 1221, des Roches and his associates, Peter de Maulay and Engelard de 
Cigogné, were accused of treason.549 These accusations were quickly dropped, but 
from the time of his return, des Roches seems to have lost control over Henry’s 
household and “continued to look to the crusade as an honourable means of 
escape”.550 He took the crusader’s vows on 19 September, probably unaware that 
the Christian forces in Egypt had already effectively lost.551  
For Carpenter, des Roches’ return to England had not just marked his loss of control 
over Henry’s household, but over Henry himself, for he “ceased to be the king’s 
guardian”.552 It may in fact be the case the des Roches had lost control of Henry as 
early as January 1221.553 Carpenter casts into doubt whether this relief of both 
tutorship and guardianship simultaneously was inevitable: 
His control of the king could easily have continued after October 1221 but the king’s 
fourteenth birthday certainly provided his enemies with powerful arguments with which to 
attack his position.
554
 
Norgate described this event in the following terms: “Henry’s school-days were over, 
but not his minority.”555 In the eyes of Honorius, however, Henry’s education was far 
from over.556 The English magnates, too, seemed to have been in agreement on this 
point as, following a meeting at Westminster in October 1221, Henry wrote to 
Honorius “asking him ‘not to change the state of our land’ until envoys had informed 
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him of its ‘state and of our doings’.”557 Carpenter rightly recognised that this clearly 
put the power to elevate the king’s status with the pope (regardless of the king’s 
age), but that the initiative lay within England; where exactly it lay, however, still 
remained unclear. If Carpenter is correct and that Henry’s letter followed from 
discussions by the baronage in October at Westminster, then it seems that the 
initiative lay with the English magnates-in-council. However, one could quite read in 
that Henry himself could inform the pope of progression in the ‘state and his doings’ 
or even certain members of the government, such as de Burgh. Henry’s majority still 
remained highly political and was potentially open to exploitation. 
What the age of fourteen signified is unclear, but it certainly was not sufficient to give 
Henry control of the English government. It is arguable that his attainment of 
fourteen was necessary, and that he could not have taken control of the government 
any earlier, but this is a difficult hypothesis to test as it may have simply been the 
case that fourteen, in the wider context, had no more significance than thirteen or 
fifteen. Although it was perhaps a little clearer that the ultimate decision would rest 
with the pope, the exact circumstances under which Henry would take power and on 
whose initiative remained chronically unclear. For the time being, Henry’s position 
remained unchanged; de Burgh’s, on the other hand, became greatly enhanced. 
4.7 Events of 1223 
4.7.1 Council of Westminster, January 1223 
Following spending Christmas 1222 at Oxford, Henry moved to London where he 
held conference with the barons.558 One of the issues raised, was whether the king 
would confirm “the rights and free customs, to obtain which the war had been 
entered on against his father”.559 Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury, 
argued that Henry could not refuse to do so since, at the end of the war, “he and all 
the nobles of the kingdom with him swore to observe all the aforesaid liberties, and 
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to cause them to be observed by all”.560 Henry was, at this time, fifteen years old and 
it is perhaps interesting that such a request should be made of him, considering that 
he still could not validly grant Magna Carta. Was it perhaps a call for a manifesto, a 
promise that Henry would observe Magna Carta and the other customary rights and 
liberties when he was eventually to come to power? Or, rather, were the magnates 
seizing on Henry’s growing competence by tying the government to his promises, 
using the king as leverage on the likes of Hubert? Or perhaps was it, as Norgate 
suggested, that they were angling for a revision of Magna Carta?561 
In the event, according to the History, it was not Henry who replied but William 
Brewer: “The liberties which you demand, since they were extorted by force, ought 
not by right to be observed”. Passions began to rise and Langton retorted: “William, if 
you loved the king you would not disturb the peace of the kingdom”.  It was at this 
point that Henry intervened: “We have sworn to observe all these liberties, and what 
we have sworn we are bound to abide by”.562 In the History’s portrayal of events, 
which seem plausible, Langton appears to be on the verge of blackmailing Henry by 
threatening that civil war might again break-out if he did not make a confirmation. 
Whether Henry’s subsequent confirmation was because he was a man of his word 
(as he tried to make out), because he shrewdly sensed the mood of the room, or 
because he simply wanted to avoid conflict is difficult to tell. Alternatively, it may 
have been naivety, as Norgate has argued.563  
Henry immediately ordered an inquisition into the liberties that had existed in the 
time of his grandfather, which was to report to him at London by the fifteenth day 
after Easter.564 These appear to be the actions of a king acting independently. 
However, this confirmation could not have been legally binding, but perhaps that was 
not its intention: to be politically binding was sufficient. The very fact alone, however, 
that it was to be binding – in any form – was significant for it limited the king’s 
sovereignty. It was not quite tantamount to a constitutional settlement because it 
hinged on the fact that Henry had promised the liberties and not that the liberties 
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existed regardless of what the king thought, but it was clear that there was a strong 
vein of opinion that Henry would have to operate within certain bounds. 
It seems that, when Langton and others had requested the king to confirm the 
nation’s liberties, they had not intended that things be restored to the times of Henry 
II. He consequently ordered that no action be taken on the findings of the inquiry and 
announced that “it was not our intention to raise or have observed evil customs in 
our kingdom”.565 Had Henry’s and Hubert’s position been stronger, this inquest could 
have provided the basis for the strengthening of royal power by reviving the practices 
of his grandfather, but there had almost certainly been concerns that such an inquest 
could have been an attempt to obviate the Charters and any local progress. 
4.7.2 Papal Letters, April 1223 
In mid-April, the Pope sent letters, which would have arrived in mid-May, to the 
political players in England, at the head of which were Hubert, Peter, and William 
Brewer. Carpenter tells us of these letters: 
The pope rejoiced to learn that what the king lacked in years, he made up for in prudence 
and discretion. Consequently, the three ministers were ordered to ‘deliver to him the free 
and undisturbed disposition of his kingdom, and to resign to him, without any difficulty, the 
lands and castles which you hold as custodies, and to procure the resignation by others 
who hold in lands and castles in similar fashion’. Another letter was sent to Ralph de 
Neville in his capacity as keeper of the seal. Having explained about the order to the 
three ministers, Neville was enjoined ‘now to use [the seal] at the pleasure [of the king], 
and in respect of it to be submissive and obey only him, causing no letters henceforth to 
be sealed with the king’s seal save at his will’. There was also a letter to the earls and 
barons of England. They too were informed of the letter to the three ministers and then 
told to be intendant henceforth on the king and to assist him against opposition, or else 
‘you can fear, not without cause, a sentence of excommunication’. 
Honorius did not declare Henry of age. What he did do, however, was to proclaim that the 
maturity of the king’s understanding made up for his immaturity in years. He was thus 
deemed able to control the government of the kingdom. The castles were to be 
surrendered and the seal to be used at his will. The way was thus cleared for the whole 
structure of local and central government to be remodelled.
566
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This was a momentous development, especially bearing in mind that the king was 
still only fifteen. It also showed clearly that there had been discretion in declaring the 
king of age and that that discretion was held by the pope. However, the letters were 
clearly a reaction, demonstrated by the pope’s statement that he “rejoiced to learn” – 
somebody had evidently written to him. 
It seems that, since November 1222, Henry had accompanied Hubert wherever he 
went. We could be inclined to read this as Hubert not trusting Henry to be by himself 
anymore, but this does not seem the likely explanation. For example, Hubert 
appeared to encourage Henry to “dispense gifts of wine, game and timber” from 
August 1222.567 It seems more likely that Hubert had thought it time to immerse 
Henry in the actions of government. Could Hubert, therefore, have judged that Henry 
was in fact ready to take on the control of the government and had therefore applied 
to the pope for Henry’s liberation from his minority? This seems highly unlikely, 
especially since Hubert himself denied in 1239 that it had been him.568 
Carpenter has compared Henry’s coming-of-age to a bomb, which, if detonated 
skilfully, could be used to the detriment of one’s enemies.569 Powicke concluded that 
the April letters had originated with representations not from Hubert or ‘his rivals’, but 
rather “from Langton and his colleagues”.570 Carpenter has skilfully argued, however, 
that Hubert was truthful when he pointed his finger in 1239 at Peter des Roches.571 
Des Roches, he claimed, sought “more to harm [Hubert] than to benefit him”; des 
Roches had sought to explode the bomb.572 
However, the bomb was a dud as the political situation that unfolded over the next 
few months was not conducive to Henry’s assumption of power. There were two 
main events that prevented the letters’ implementation: there was trouble in the 
Welsh Marches, where the earl of Pembroke was advancing on Llywelyn and then, 
in late July, the news reached England of the death of Philip Augustus. This could be 
a momentous occasion, when the losses of John’s reign could be undone, and 
letters were sent to Normandy inviting them back into the fold – holding Louis to his 
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promise in September 1217 to hand back Normandy.573 Whatever optimism there 
might have been of the return of Normandy, however, had evaporated by late August 
and Louis VIII had even threatened to invade England if Henry did not desist in his 
designs.574 
In August, the government decided to ask Honorius to withdraw his April letters. In 
November, Honorius replied that he was “most reluctant” to withdraw his letters and 
“merely forbad action on them without the king’s consent”.575 It is significant that 
Honorius put the executive decision in Henry’s hands, but Henry still did not possess 
anything approaching complete control and was still limited to temporary grants. 
4.7.3 Henry Given Control of the Seal, 8/10 December 1223 
For a time, it appeared as though the country might once again descend into civil 
war. This was, however, avoided and a truce reached on 6 December with Langton 
playing the role of mediator. Over the next four days, a great change took place.  
On 8 December, the bishop of London was given the keeping of Colchester castle. 
This document was not signed, as had been the case heretofore, “Witness Hubert de 
Burgh, my Justiciar” but per ipsum dominum regem [‘on the motion of the Lord King 
himself’].576 On 10 December, a further change took place. From this date forward, 
the formula teste me ipso [witnessed by myself] appears in the royal letters, “instead 
of the authentication by one or more of his most responsible counsellors”.577 Henry 
had been given control of his seal and, from that point onwards, the seal followed 
him, with Ralph de Neville, the keeper of the seal, “in law if not in fact, immediately 
subject to the royal will”.578  
Norgate has called this a “partial coming of age (if such a phrase may be 
allowed)”.579 The ban on the use of the seal to make permanent grants still remained 
effective and, in reality, the government continued to be dominated by de Burgh. 
Exactly how much influence Henry wielded is difficult to tell, but, for Carpenter, 
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Henry now “took ultimate responsibility for the issuing of royal letters and for the 
decisions which they implemented”.580 Henry was now in control of government 
policy, although Hubert probably possessed the guiding hand. 
The basis for this change was the papal letters of April, although those letters had 
envisaged an immediate transferral. Even if it was commonly agreed that the Pope 
had the power to declare changes in Henry’s status, the English magnates seemed 
to have reserved the right to decide upon the timing and mode of their 
implementation. Considering that the pope was a month’s journey away (two months 
including the return journey) and the fact that he was perpetually out-of-touch with 
current affairs in England, it seems to some extent reasonable that the English 
magnates ‘on the ground’ should possess the final word. However, the pope, at 
least, had not viewed his letters as giving permission; he had commanded. Indeed, 
the fact that the ban on permanent grants remained in force made Henry’s powers 
much less potent than seemingly the pope had declared.  
It is slightly suspicious that the (partial) enactment of the letters coincided with des 
Roches’ withdrawal from the government, attesting his last letter for nine years on 8 
December. A number of des Roches’ followers also seem to have left the court.581 It 
certainly appears to have happened at a good time for de Burgh and Henry’s 
maturity does not seem to have been the only consideration in all of this.  
4.8 Events of 1224-1226 
In 1224, there was trouble both home and abroad for the minority government. Louis 
VIII encroached on Henry’s lands on the Continent, overrunning Poitou in the 
summer, and William de Bréauté’s seizure of Henry of Braybrook, a royal justice, 
resulted in an eight-week siege of Bedford castle. The siege ended with the hanging 
of the entire garrison on Henry’s orders, but in agreement with Hubert de Burgh and 
Archbishop Stephen Langton. The siege brought to an end Falkes de Bréauté’s 
influence in England and he died two years later in exile.582 Thus, Henry’s 
government won a great victory at home, but suffered a terrible defeat in Poitou. 
Carpenter marked the irony of this, saying that “Poitou was lost at the very moment 
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when the English government, in terms of financial resources, was better equipped 
to defend it than at any time since the war”.583 Henry’s revenues, however, were still 
no match for Louis VIII’s, such that it “was with easy confidence that Louis ridiculed 
Henry III, at the end of 1224, as ‘a boy and a pauper’”.584 Louis’ taunt has to be taken 
at more than just face value, but it is clear that Henry, though his status in England 
was growing, still lacked respect on the international stage. 
Gascony remained under English control and in 1225 an expedition was sent, 
headed by Richard of Cornwall to secure it. They achieved this and, in fact, Gascony 
remained under the English crown until 1453.585 This expedition, however, was 
expensive and Henry requested a tax of a fifteenth on all moveable goods; the 
magnates agreed to the tax, in return for the confirmation of Magna Carta.  
Magna Carta (1225) was, in many ways, the final version. The main change that was 
made was that Henry now granted the charter “of his own ‘spontaneous and free will’ 
rather than, as in 1217, on the advice of his bishops, earls and barons.”586 Unlike 
January 1223, this confirmation was in writing but the ban on grants in perpetuity 
was still in force. It would not be, in fact, until Henry’s request for a thirtieth in 
January 1237 that he would confirm it for the first time with full validity as an adult.587 
Until then, it would have been possible for Henry to argue that he was not bound to 
observe the Charter and, indeed, there had been rumours that Henry had applied to 
the pope for its revocation (a rumour that Henry staunchly denied). His 1237 
confirmation was merely an oral confirmation, but this appears to have been 
sufficient. Henry re-confirmed the Charter twice more during his lifetime: 1253 and 
1265. Edward I stalled in confirming the Charter, but with his confirmation in 1297 
(twenty-five years into his reign), arising from a political crisis and in return for a tax, 
Magna Carta’s place in English history appears to have been sealed. 
4.9 End of the Ban on Permanent Alienations, January 1227 
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In early November 1226, Louis VIII of France died suddenly, leaving the twelve-year-
old Louis IX as his heir. This was a turn of events to be capitalised upon and, no 
doubt, played a leading role in Henry’s letters of 21 January 1227:588 
Be it known to you that by the common counsel of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the 
bishops, abbots, earls, barons, and other our magnates and faithful men, we recently at 
Oxford provided that henceforth we will cause charters and confirmations to be made 
under our seal. And we therefore bid you without delay publicly proclaim and make known 
to all persons in your bailiwick who have, or claim to have, lands or tenements or liberties 
by grant or concession and confirmation of our ancestors the Kings of England, or by our 
precept, that they come to us without fail before the beginning of this approaching Lent of 
the eleventh year of our reign, to shew us by what warrant they have, or claim to have, 
those lands or tenements or liberties, as they desire to keep or to recover them. You are 
also to make known to all persons in your bailiwick, and cause to be publicly proclaimed, 
that whosoever shall desire to obtain at any time our charter or confirmation of lands, 
tenements, markets, liberties, or anything whatsoever, let them come to us before the 
same term, to ask for our charter or confirmation thereof.
589
 
This was, at heart, a revenue-raising exercise, as confirmations and issuances of 
charters etc. could be charged for, and would thus fill the royal ‘war-chest’.590 
However, it also removed the final restriction on Henry’s kingship: he could now 
make permanent grants. For Powicke, Henry had now “declared himself to be of full 
age”.591 Henry was at this time was nineteen-and-a-quarter years old, still one-and-
three-quarter years shy of twenty-one. Had he come of age?  
Norgate was a little more reserved than Powicke, saying that, from this point forward, 
Henry “must indeed be accounted as of full age”; note that she hedged it with 
‘accounted as’.592 Carpenter was more reserved still, saying that Henry’s letters of 
January 1227 had not been “accompanied by a declaration that the king had 
reached his majority”.593 If Wendover is to be believed, Henry had possibly made an 
oral declaration in February 1227 at a council held in Oxford, whereby he “declared 
himself of legitimate age to be released from wardship, and to take the chief 
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management of the kingly duties”.594 However, we have only Wendover’s word for 
this and Norgate was damningly sceptical of his account of events: “this writer’s 
account of that action, and of its accompanying circumstances, is too full of 
demonstrable confusions and inaccuracies to be worthy of confidence in any 
particular”.595  
There does not appear to have been any recent papal involvement and Norgate 
even doubted that Honorius would have heard of Henry’s graduation as he died on 
18 March.596 For Carpenter, this was a key point: “No letter was obtained from the 
pope to that effect, whatever Henry later believed.”597 It is possible that – and this is 
the line that Norgate adopted – the move was made within the scope of the April 
1223 letters and Honorius’ letters later that year, which were “wide enough to cover 
the proceedings of January, 1227, without any need of further ratification from 
Rome”.598 This is rather problematic, however, in view of the fact that it took almost 
four years for them to be fully acted upon – a time scale that surely would have 
required re-confirmation from the pope, especially considering that the pope had not 
authorized such a long delay. Indeed, the exact impetus for the letters is unclear. 
Wendover attached the malicious intent of de Burgh to their genesis, who benefitted 
from Henry’s emancipation, being made earl of Kent and received Haughley, 
Rayleigh, Montgomery, Cardigan, and Carmarthan.599 As Norgate said, this “may 
very likely” be the case, but “we need not accept for truth the insinuation which 
Hubert’s enemies seem to have induced Henry to believe at a later time”.600 For 
perhaps one of the most important moments of Henry’s reign, we know surprisingly 
little. 
As we have seen, there were a number of possibilities as to how Henry could come 
of age. However, there does not seem to have been much consideration that Henry 
could declare himself of age, despite Honorius’ letter in November 1223 (4.7.2). If 
Henry had really been able to declare himself of age since 1223 (when he was 
sixteen), why had he not done so? The answer was probably that it would not have 
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been so easy to take a competent sixteen-year-old seriously as a competent 
nineteen-year-old. By then it would have been difficult to argue that Henry was 
incapable; he might not be able to make the wisest choices, but he certainly was 
able to make reasoned choices.  
It is worth mentioning that Henry was not the only king to declare himself of age in 
English history. Richard II, on 3 May 1389, aged twenty-three, declared himself of 
age before his council. Richard was fed up with a minority that he felt had been 
artificially prolonged with, in the words of Stubbs, “restraints which would be 
intolerable to the meanest of his subjects”.601 It is doubtful whether Henry’s 
declaration played any role in Richard’s. Rather, as Dodd suggested, it was probably 
“influenced by events across the channel, where six months previously the young 
Charles VI had staged a similar coup against his own overbearing uncles, asserting 
his right as a king of almost twenty years old to take control of affairs himself.”602 
When we look later still, we find that, in December 1547, the duke of Somerset’s 
term of office was changed from “from Edward [VI]’s achievement of majority at 
eighteen to the king’s pleasure, which acknowledged the possibility that Edward 
might achieve his majority prior to his eighteenth birthday.”603 Edward, of course, did 
not live long enough for such an event to play out, although it is worth noting that he 
did not come of age at fourteen.  
January 1227 is the point at which Henry is considered to have started his personal 
reign. However, Hubert remained close until his fall in 1232 and the brief resurgence 
of Peter des Roches. In 1234, Peter himself fell and, according to Beem, this was the 
“first time since his accession and now aged twenty-seven, Henry III, was free to 
wield undisputed sovereignty”, although, he added, “he continued to be dominated 
for many years by his chosen advisors”.604 Towards the latter part of his reign, his 
government became distinctly unpopular and Carpenter went so far as to say that 
“[t]he most fundamental developments during his rule, the emergence of parliament, 
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the widening of the political community and the growing sense of xenophobic 
national identity were shaped by opposition to royal politics.”605 This opposition to 
Henry’s politics led to the Second Barons’ War in the 1260s. 
4.10 Concluding Remarks 
From a constitutional viewpoint, the arrangements regarding Henry’s coming-of-age 
are distinctly unsatisfactory. Despite early indications that fourteen was the point of 
transition, there was little effort to publicise Henry’s age of majority in advance. 
Consequently, Henry’s majority appears to have been discretionary. Whether this 
discretion was contingent on Henry’s ability or the political environment – and who 
was to exercise it – was left unclear.  
For a long time, it appeared that the discretion was the pope’s, even though he was 
perpetually out of touch with events in England. However, when the pope finally did 
act in 1223, the government under de Burgh decided to interpret it as they saw fit. 
Considering the political turmoil of that year, they may have done so in the interests 
of effective government. In the end, it appears to have been Henry who took the 
initiative, leaving open the question about under exactly what authority he did so. We 
should be suspicious, however, of the timing, which seems to have been tied with 
foreign policy: Louis VIII of France’s death and the accession of his young son, Louis 
IX, was an opportunity not to be missed. Henry’s assumption of regal power was 
fundamentally a political event, determined not by well-defined rules but by those 
who were there and their responses to the environment. 
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 The Stubbornness of Ancient Constitutionalism 
The continuity or discontinuity of the English constitution has long been hotly 
debated. Arguments in favour of continuity are usually associated with anti-reform 
movements and conservatism, i.e. established practice should be adhered to or 
preserved. When continuity is combined with precedence, however, it also becomes 
a powerful argument in favour of reform, although it is cast as restoration or 
reinstatement of a status quo ante, rather than innovation. Preservation and 
restoration are the central tenets of ancient constitutionalism, whose basic argument 
is that the modern constitution is, and ought to be, the same as the constitution of 
yore.  
Ancient constitutionalism flourished in the late medieval and early modern period 
where it was used in the cases for absolutist monarchy, limited monarchy, and 
republicanism.606 The epitome of early modern ancient constitutionalism is to be 
found in the writings of Sir Edward Coke.607 In his preface to the third part of his 
Reports, for example, he traced an elaborate journey of the ‘Common Lawe’ – the 
bedrock of the English constitution – from the Trojans and ancient Britons to his day, 
believing that the “lawes of England are of much greater antiquity than they are 
reported to be, & than any the Constitutions or Lawes imperiall of Roman 
Emperors”.608  
Most of Coke’s claims have been discredited owing to historical inaccuracy, but 
ancient constitutionalism prospered. It found its most sophisticated expression in the 
writings of the Whig historians, notably Stubbs and Macaulay.609 For them, the 
English constitution’s source was not in Britain, but in the ancient forests of 
                                            
606
 See Greenberg’s discussion of the development of the ‘radical’ ancient constitution from the 
Norman Conquest to its use in defence of republicanism and the deposition of Charles I: Greenberg, 
The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution, passim. 
607
  
608
 Sir Edward Coke, The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, ed. Steve Sheppard, 
vol. 1 (Liberty Fund, 2003), 66, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1884. 
609
 For the classic study of the Whig interpretation of history, see: Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation 
of History; and see also: Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past. 
126 
 
Germany.610 Since its heyday in the nineteenth-century, Whig historicism has waned, 
particularly following the historiographical trend towards modernism and 
postmodernism. However, the underlying constitutional patriotism and English 
exceptionalism of ancient constitutionalism persist and, for many, are core parts of 
national identity.611  
Discontinuity has, too, long been argued. For example, John Hayward, Coke’s 
contemporary, argued that the Anglo-Saxon system of government had no bearing 
on the constitution of his time as it had been irreparably disrupted by the 
Conquest.612 In modern academic circles, discontinuity is the mode. For example, 
King and Bogdanor have argued that the constitution is changing as we speak; as a 
result of membership of the European Union, House of Lords’ reform, devolution, 
and the Human Rights Act 1998 etc.613 Bogdanor even went so far as to say that 
“the constitution so brilliantly analysed by Bagehot and Dicey no longer exists”.614 
This begs the question as to whether the constitution that Bagehot and Dicey 
described in the nineteenth century was the same as the thirteenth-century 
constitution. One writer who almost certainly would have said that it was not was the 
medieval historian Sir James Holt who stated boldly that “Twelfth-century England 
had no constitution”;615  presumably, if there was none at the end of the twelfth 
century, there would still have been none at the start of the thirteenth.  
5.2 The Constitution during Henry III’s Minority 
In the first chapter, it was shown that there was no single, overriding principle 
governing the succession: there were many ways that a person could claim to be the 
legitimate and rightful heir. However, only certain kinds of claims would have been 
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thought acceptable. For instance, unlike in Swift’s Lilliput, the English succession 
was not decided on the basis of the end at which one cracked one’s egg.616  
In the second chapter, it was shown that the leadership of the kingdom was initially 
invested in William Marshal, whose position was unprecedented. Following his 
death, power shifted by degrees into the hands of Hubert de Burgh. However 
unprecedented, it is clear that they did not seek to overhaul the English political 
system. Rather, they attempted to accommodate Henry’s minority within it by 
creating temporary coping mechanisms. 
There was an element of conciliar government, but there was nothing constitutional 
about it. Not only were there many clamouring to be involved (especially Peter des 
Roches and his satellites) but there would also have been a desire to avoid another 
civil war. Consequently, it might be better to describe the government as conciliatory 
rather than conciliar. Furthermore, had Henry, in his personal reign, been able to 
retake the former Plantagenet continental territories or install his second son as King 
of Sicily, there may have been no suggestion that the minority played a part in later 
developments towards conciliar government. As it was, Henry is remembered as a 
weak king. 
In the final chapter, it was argued that the lack of clarity about when Henry would 
come of age was distinctly unsatisfactory. This is at odds with the foundational aim of 
constitutions to create certainty about the distribution of power.  
Thirteenth-century people had certain ideas and assumptions about the ways that 
things ought to be done; this was their constitution. Unlike today’s well-defined 
constitutional arrangements, the thirteenth-century constitution was a loose 
collection of customs that were passed along haphazardly. This often created 
competing understandings, as demonstrated by the laws of succession, but the fact 
that there were understandings is important.  
I would suggest that a good way to think of the medieval constitutions is as ‘ballpark 
constitutions’: spacious with lots of ideas kicking about inside. The ‘ballpark’ is a 
constitutional theatre, populated with ideas that we today regard as pertaining to 
constitutional matters. The key difference to modern constitutions is how conflicts 
                                            
616
 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels (Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2001)[first published 1726], pt. 1. 
128 
 
were resolved. In the present day, uncertainties are resolved through a defined 
process, e.g. adjudication in a constitutional court, deliberation in the legislature, or 
even seeking the mandate of the electorate. In the medieval period, however, 
uncertainties were settled more often through extra-legal means, with any 
equilibrium lasting only so long as the political balance did not tip. There is a sense 
in which this is fundamentally true of all constitutions, but medieval political systems 
were much more sensitive to changes in the political environment. Furthermore, 
there was a lack of abstract constitutional thought,617 which meant that the 
constitutional vocabulary was lacking even if they had wanted to take a more 
legalistic approach. It is for these reasons that it is often easier to discuss medieval 
political developments in terms of politics rather than law. 
To sum up, there was a constitution, but it was not a modern constitution. Instead, it 
was a loose collection of ideas, the arrangement of which being a function of the 
political environment. It is for this reason that Henry’s minority is best described as a 
political, rather than constitutional, settlement and, as the political environment 
changed during Henry’s minority, the political settlement changed. There was much 
left unclear in this settlement, not least for how long it was to last and, ultimately, it 
appears to have been a further change in the political environment that signalled its 
end (4.9).  
Henry’s minority presents a discontinuity from what preceded it and it is clear that 
there was scope for the constitution to change. Consequently, it is perhaps better to 
refer to the thirteenth-century constitution as “an” English constitution – rather than 
“the” constitution – just as there had been many other English constitutions since 
England’s unification in the tenth century. Henry’s minority, therefore, appears to be 
a nail in the coffin of ancient constitutionalism: the constitution has always changed – 
and always will. 
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